first exchanged. They might well be designated the *paper currency of expediency*. Their nativity occurred in the gravest and as was believed the most religious of the Colonies, Massachusetts. That colony was at the same time, strange as it may appear, the most warlike" Again.

"The bills of credit, however, notwithstanding the colonial pledges, soon depricated and gave birth to that pernicious variety of currencies, that is to say, difference's between specie and paper values, which has not yet disappeared in America."

There are many other similarly instructive testimonies to the evil effects of these Notes, but I will not trouble your Honors further but conclude by moving that this bill be read again this day six months.—(*To be continued.*)

HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY,

Mr. Macaulay's Elective Legislative Council Bill.

(Debate continued from Haszard's Gazette, No. 21.)

HON. MR. COLES. Had he not known that the hon. member (Mr. Macaulay) had introduced the Bill, he would have imagined, from the bearing of his remarks, that he was opposed to the measure. According to the hon. member's own shewing, and his own explanation of the principles and working of the British Constitution, the House of Lords was an intermediate body between the popular branch of the Legislature, or democracy, on the one hand, and the kingly power, or despotism on the other, and its province was to keep the balance, between these extremes, even. The House of Commons, or our Assembly, as the Representatives of the people, might yield to popular clamour; but the House of Lords, or our Legislative Council' as existing independently of the popular voice, could interpose to prevent the evils which might arise from the submission of the House of Commons, or our Assembly, to clamour from without; as a few days since had been evidenced in the conduct of some hon. members of the House, who changed their opinions on account of the demonstrations made by the Sons of Temperance, their regalia, and brass band. But if the alteration proposed by Mr. Macaulay should be made, the intermediate, or balancing power, between the people and the Crown, would be wholly destroyed: for both the Assembly and the Council would be alike open to popular clamor and importunity, and the one quite as likely to be borne away by it as the other. so that an undue preponderance being given to the Representatives of the People, the democratic element would become the ruling or governing principle. The hon. member (Mr. Macaulay) says he has brought forward the measure because circumstances have made it necessary; but he has made no attempt whatever to shew in what way circumstances have proved it to be necessary. It was true that the Council had, at times, opposed acts of Legislation which the Assembly had deemed wholesome and expedient; but, in doing so, they had only exercised a power with which they had been wisely invested by the Constitution; for it could not be denied that that branch of the Legislature which was directly influenced by popular clamour and importunity, was, as being directly amenable to popular judgment, more likely to be precipitate in its legislative determinations, than that body which was constituted independently of their will. Since the introduction of Responsible Government, it was, however, very worthy of notice that greater harmony had existed between the Council and the Assembly, in their legislative capacities, than had ever, perhaps, previously been observable in their proceedings. But should the Council obstinately resist any measure demanded by the people and sent up to them, for their sanction, by the Assembly, there would still be found a remedy in the Constitution. It might, perhaps, be necessary, in the first place, by repeated elections, to prove the will and determination of the people to be steadily and resolutely set upon the accomplishment of what was refused by the Conncil; and should that body still resist, an extreme, but still constitutional course might be taken to overcome their resistance. The Assembly, holding the purse strings, might stop the supplies; the Government of the Crown, as Earl Grey threatened to do, with respect to the House of Lords when they rejected the Reform Bill, might infuse into their composition so much of the popular will as would reduce them to reason; or they might be dissolved, for they were not beyond the power of the Crown or an Act of the Imperial Parlaiment, But, under the present responsible system, his apprehensions concerning any such emergency were but very small. He doubted not that the will of the people being clearly manifested, and steadily urged by their representatives, would here, with respect to the Council, as in England with respect to the House of Lords, in the end produce the desired effet, and the Upper House would perceive the wisdom and necessity of yielding to the wishes of the people, as constitutionally expressed through their representatives in the Lower House. Were the Council, however, to be elected by the people, as well as the Assembly, each of them, deriving their authority from the same source, the power of correction, in the event of any obstinate disagreement, would be no where to be found; and the Upper House, being the chosen representatives of the People, as well as the Lower House, might, with evident propriety, sit and vote away the public money which the Assembly alone could now do. The Hon. member (Mr. McAulay) had endeavoured to shew that the introduction of the elective system here, with respect to the Council, would be no innovation of the British Constitution, because some of the Peers in the House of Lords were elected to their seats there. His parallel, however would not hold. The majority of the House of Lords were heriditary members, and those who were elected were Scotch or Irish Peers, chosen by the Aristocracy of their own country to represent them in the Upper House of the Legislature; but they were not chosen by the People, or the Democracy, as the hon. member proposed the Legislative Council should be here. The hon. member had said that, in bringing forward his Bill, he had not been influenced by any restless desire for change; but, unless he were actuated by some such desire, he (hon Mr. Coles) could not tell by what cause he was moved. Why, after the Responsible System (wich was in fact the reality of the British Constitution) had been introduced, and after it had been found so conducive to the harmonious working of the different Branches of the Legislature, such a Bill was introduced, unless it were allowed to have had its origin, either in a restless desire for change, or in mere enmity to order and good government, it would indeed be hard for any person to tell. Since the introduction of that system, no obstacles had impeded the course of legislation; measures for the benefit of the Tenantry, which had been formerly rejected by the Council, had been acquiesced in by that body; and the great majority of the people were well satisfied, both with the course of legislation and the management of the government. In the last session, the Free Education Bill, imposing an additional tax upon Proprietors, had been acquiesced in by the Council; and, in the present session, they had agreed to the Land Purchase Bill—and, to the One-ninth Bill, which they rejected in a former session, they were now prepared to yield. Other measures also of a truly liberal and popular character would likewise, he had no doubt, find acceptance with them; and there was now abundant reason to believe that, having at length had conceded to us the reality of the British Constitution, it would here work, through the Legislature, no less advantageously for the Colony, than it did at Home for the people of the Parent State. But, grant that the Council should refuse compliance with any of the measures of the Assembly, as thinking them either extravagant or unsound; they would only be exercising their constiiutional power, and interposing that check to popular or hasty legislation, which it is their especial province to apply; and it would be the duty of the Assembly quietly to submit to that check until, in another session, fortified in their demands by an expression of public sentiment in their favor, they could again urge them upon the Council for their concurrence. Indeed many cases of legislation might occur, in which it would be the bounden duty of the Council to oppose the determination of the Assembly. For instance, suppose that House had complied with the prayer of the Petition of the Sons of Temperance, and had passed a Bill for prohibiting the traffic in ardent spirits, in this Colony; would it not have been right in the Council to reject it, on the grounds that it would be unconstitutional to pass so arbitrary a law, unless public opinion, with respect to it, had, first, been sufficiently tested, and there had been, throughout the length and breadth of the Island, the most unequivocal and direct demonstrations, on the part of the people, in its favor? When any great or fundamental change was to be effected in society, or in its political constitution, an appeal to the people was held to be absolutely indispensable. With respect to the introduction of Responsible Government, the wish of the people had been fully ascertained and made manifest beyond a doubt; but, as respected the fundamental change in the constitution of the Legislative Council, contemplated by the Bill of the hon. member (Mr Macaulay,) not one constituency in the Colony had declared in favor of it; nor was it supported by a single Petition to the Assembly. That such a change was necessary, the hon. member had indeed declared; but, in the course of a set and rather lengthy speech, he had not produced even one solitary argument to prove the existence of any such necessity. Responsible Government, on the most broad and ample basis had been conceded to us; and it was evidently working to the satisfaction of all parties. The party at present in opposition, should they become the majority, would not, he believed, endeavour to set aside that system; but, in all its bearings, there was, he thought, every reason to believe they would fully carry it out, as their predecessors in power had done. With respect to the constitution of the Legislative Council, under the Responsible System, the principles of that system were made to operate to the fullest extent compatible with the preservation of the British Constitution. When any vacancies occurred in that body, the Head of the Executive filled them up by the advice of his Council, who were responsible to the people for that advice and the consequences of it. Could the hon. member (Mr. Macaulay) have shewn that the appointments, recently made to the Legislative Council, were not acceptable to the people; on that fact he might have based one reason in favour of the change. But the very reverse was the case; and the hon. member had not been able to bring forward a single argument in favor of his scheme—a scheme which was not in accordance with either the Constitution of Great Britain or that of the United States of America. In Great Britain, as all knew, the Lords were not an elective body, as the hon. member (Mr. Macaulay) sought to make our Legislative Council; and neither was the Senate of the United States of America. Should he (Mr. Macaulay) succeed, in creating for us a new Constitution, according to his wish, it would certainly be one of a most anomalous and mongrel description. The hon. gentleman then concluded by moving the following Resolution.

Whereas the Bill not being compatible with the principles of Responsible Government, so recently conceded to this Island, in accordance with the British Constitution,—Therefore *Resolved*, that any attempt to unsettle the present Systemof Government would be impolitic: and that the consideration of the Bill be postponed to this day three months.

MR. HAVILAND. He was sorry to have to rise to correct an assertion of the Hon. the Leader of the Government. That hon. gentleman had just said that the application of the elective principle to the constitution of the Legislative Council, would be contrary to all precedent and constitutional usage, both in Great Britain and the United States of America. Now that was a mistake; for when Massachusets, Connecticut, and Rhode Island were Colonies of Great Britain, their Councils were elected by the people—the Charters of those Colonies securing to their inhabitants the privilege of electing the members of their Legislatures, in both branches—in the upper as well as in the lower; and the Senate of the United States was, and had always been elected since the establishment of their Constitution.

HON. MR. COLES. He had said that the Senate of the United States was not elected—meaning that it was not chosen by the people. It was, he was well aware, composed of Senators from each State. chosen by the Legislature thereof: but that was not popular election, such as the Bill proposed to establish here with respect to the Council

MR. MACAULAY. The speech of the hon. the Leader of the Government reminded him of the dilemma of Shakspear's starved apothecary, and the apology of that character for doing that which his conscience condemned. In his (Hon. Mr. Coles's) opposition to the Bill, it was his necessity and not his will which directed his course of action. The hon. gentleman (Mr. Coles) called upon the House to put faith in Responsible Government; and it was to be admitted that it was quite natural for him to do so: he claimed to be acknowledged the father of that system; and it it was natural for a man to support his own child. As to the objections which the hon. gentleman had made to the Bill, it appeared to him (Mr. Macaulay) that they had originated in a misconception of its provisions. He was disposed to think that the hon. gentleman had lately been studying the rejected Bill of Nova Scotia, the object of which was the same as that of the measure which he (Mr. Macaulay) had had the honor to introduce, although some of its provisions were dissimilar; and that, having confusedly associated in his mind the provisions of both, he had spoken against a principle in the one, when he fancied that he was speaking against a leading feature of the other. The Nova Scotia Bill would have given to the Legislative Council a voice, with respect to money Bills, equally potential with that of the Assembly; but such an innovation of the peculiar privilege of the Lower House was carefully guarded against in his Bill. One of his chief, if not his greatest objection to the present mode of constituting the Legislative Council, was that, almost of necessity, it was principally composed of gentlemen, resident in Charlottetown, or its immediate vicinity. Nine of the present Council were so circumstanced with respect to residence; and some of them, he believed, were entire strangers to many parts of the Island. It was impossible that such men could have a community of interests with the people in general; and, therefore, they were not duly qualified to sit as their legislators. The Bill proposed to remedy that fundamental defect in the composition of the Council. By providing that each of the three Towns and each of the Electoral Districts should elect one Legislative Councillor, and that all should be paid for their legislative services, at the same rate, and in the same manner as the members of the Assembly were paid; men would be found, in the different sections of the country having their own interests closely identified with those amongst whom they resided, who would be willing to accept of seats in the Council, and who, as their expenses would be provided for, would not think it too great a tax imposed upon them for the general good, and the protection of the particular interests of their own localities, to devote their time and abilities, for two or three months in the year, to the discharge of the important and honorable duties of legislators: and thus men in the Council would no longer be found exercising legislative functions and deciding concerning local interests of which they had little or no knowledge. The hon. the Leader of the Government had objected that public sentiment concerning the measure had not been sufficiently ascertained: but he (Mr. Macaulay) would beg leave to remind that hon. gentleman, that he had given a full year's notice of his intention to bring it forward; and that, therefore, ample time had been afforded for consulting the people at large. Again, the hon. the Leader of the Government had spoken of a dissolution of the Council, in the event of its, at any time, continuing obstinately to resist the will of the people, as expressed through the Assembly, their direct representatives. Such a proceeding would, however, not only be a violation of the Constitution, but in his (Mr. Macaulay's) opinion, it would be destructive of it. But, for so arbitrary an act, should his Bill become law, no occasion could arise; for the Council as well as the Assembly, being directly chosen by the people, both would be directly influenced by public sentiment; and the two legislative bodies could, therefore, scarcely, by any possibility, be so opposed to each other, with respect to general policy, that legislation would, thereby, be brought to a dead lock. At present, as all vacancies in the Council were filled up at the dictation of the majority in the Asembly, that majority exercised an unconstitutional control over the Upper House, and, thereby, destroyed the balance of the Constitution. So long as the Council, should continue subject to such control, they conld not take independent action upon public questions, and the majority which ruled in the Assembly would, in fact, rule in the other Chamber also. To restore and preserve the just constitutional balance between the two Houses of the Legislature was the object of his Bill; and he felt persuaded that, to every reasoning and independent mind, it must be evident that, neither in this, nor in any other colonial legislature, could that balance exist independently of the application of the elective principle to the Legislative Council. The necessity of it must be quite obvious to the commonest understanding. The Council, chosen by the people, would always be open to the direct influence of popular sentiment; but, at the same time, as being chosen by a class of electors whose electoral qualifications were higher than those of electors who could vote only for members of the Assembly, they would be—as the Constitution required they should be—a distinct body, independent of the Asembly, and at all times free to take independent action upon public questions.

HON. MR. POPE. The hon. member for Georgetown (Mr. Macaulay) had introduced his Bill with a speech—a sort of homily, long and dull enough to have set them all to sleep. It was indeed a most uninteresting and barren affair, imparting no information and destitute of every thing like argument. Such an innovation as the Bill proposed should have been sustained by some reasons on the part of the introducer; but he had not adduced even one reason why it should be entertained by the House. The discussion which had arisen out of its introduction was, however, irregular; for the details of the measure could not properly come under consideration before its principle had been admitted: the sooner, therefore, the House should get out of the irregularity into which they had allowed themselves to fall, the better. He was at a loss to tell in what lay the objections of the hon. member (Mr. Macaulay) to the Legislative Council as it was at present constituted. Did he disapprove of it, as being too democratic; or did he object to it, because it was too aristocratic? If he condemned it on the former account he had certainly mistaken the means by which a remedy could be effected; for making it elective would undoubtedly have a tendency rather to increase than diminish what he regarded as a defect in its composition. But if he (Hon.Mr. Pope) understood the hon. member aright, he objected to the Council because he thought it was only as an echo to the Assembly. That gentlemen who had lately been appointed to vacant seats in the Councils, were, by the Government, thought to entertain political views and sentiments in harmony with their own, he was quite free to admit. The hon. member (Mr. Macaulay) would surely not have expected the Government to place men in the Council whom they knew to be hostile to their policy. No: in filling up the vacancies in the Council, the Government had only acted with a due regard to the furtherance of the political principles by which they were themselves governed; and as, in such cases, every government would act, who sincerely desired the success of such public measures as their policy led them to propound. The course which the Government had pursued here with respect to such appointments, was precisely similar to that pursued by every British Administration in similar cases; who, on no occasion, sought to confer the privilege of seats in the House of Lords on any but their political friends, unless as a reward for distinguished public services. Nay, indeed so careful were they to guard against the exercise of any adverse influence in quarters where it might have a tendency to obstruct the progress of their policy, that, on the Government's passing from the hands of one of the two great parties in the State, into those of the other, it was a fact well known that Her Majesty had been required to dismiss her maids of honor merely because they were relations and connexions of some of the leading members of the party that had just retired from power. What was done here was no more than what was done by successive British Administrations, who sought every fair and legitimate means to strengthen their position and secure the triumph of their principles. Two or three vacancies in the Legislative Council were, for instance, to be filled up, and the Governor paid deference tot he recommendation of his constitutional advisers. His Excellency laid before them the names of certain individuals whom he might think eligible to the appointments; or the reverse was the case, and the recommendations proceeded at once from his Government. If the Government objected to the appointments which His Excellencey felt disposed to make, others were substituted for them having the approbation of his Council; if His Excellency insisted upon appointing men with whom his Government were not satisfied, they resigned.—The hon. gentleman then proceeded to say, that, if the Council were not sufficiently independent as at present constituted, he could not see how their being made elective could render them more so. If the two Houses of the Legislature should be chosen by the people, they would constitute two bodies to do the same work; and the one would have to carry out the measures of the other; or, otherwise, they would be found obstructing that course of legislation which they had been chosen to advance. For his own part, he certainly would not like that the Legislative Council should be a mere reflex or echo of the Assembly. If so they could serve no useful end in legislation. It was very well known that individual members of the Assembly were often coerced by their constituencies into an acquiescence with or support of measures of which they themselves disapproved. With the Council it was different. They lay under no obligation to abandon their own sentiments, out of deferenc to those of others; and, in nine cases out of ten, in which the Council were so opposed to popular dictation, their resistance to it was for the general good. But if on the contrary, they should be found to be influenced, in their opposition to the views of the Assembly, by nothing but the spirit of factious opposition; it would either be found, by themselves, that, for their own preservation, as a legislative body, it would be necessary for them to give way to the power of public opinion; or, should they continue blindly and obstinately to oppose it, that the sovereign would dismiss them, or an Act of the Imperial Parliment remove them, by a suspension of our Constitution, as had been done in other colonies. The Hon. member (Mr.Macaulay) was altogether mistaken in supposing that, in the provisions of his Bill, there was any thing at all analagous to the partial election of members of the House of Lords. The election of Peers, had its origin in the Union of the three countries; and the object of it was to prevent the Peers of England from being swamped by those of Scotland and Ireland; whilst, at the same, it should provide for such a representation of the Aristocracy of the annexed kingdoms, as should have due reference to the national influence assigned to each kingdom in the Lower House of the Legislature. The Scotch and Irish Peers served in rotation, because it was not convenient that they should all have seats in the House of Lords at once; but their service in the Legislature was not upon the elective principle. The condition of this Colony was very different from that of Great Britain; and a perfect resemblance between their Legislatures could not, therefore, exist. The Government of this conutry was now however carried on by the people, through their representatives in the Assembly, a majority of whom regulated the composition of the Executive Council; and the Executive Council, so constituted, very properly filled up all vacancies in the Legislative Council; and, thus, the Assembly and the Legislative Council were as closely assimilated to the House of Commons and House of Lords of Great Britain, in their separate characters and independent functions, as the circumstances of the country would permit. The operation of such a Bill as that of the hon. member for Georgetown (Mr. Macaulay), so far from completing the assimilation, would, by rendering the Legislative Council elective, completely destroy one feature in the resemblance—there would then be no similarity whatever between the constitution of the Council and that of the House of Peers. And as little, indeed, would it be a counterpart of the Senate of the United States of America. That body was not the direct creation of popular election. It was, on the contrary, chosen much in the same manner as gentlemen were here chosen at the present time, to fill the vacancies in the Legislative Council. The people of the States directly choose the Representatives; but the Legislature, whose votes are variously compounded, and whose mode of election is different in different States, directly choose the Senators. The object of the peculiar mode in which they are chosen, is to establish a body in the Legislature, by select appointment, who may act as a corrective to the propensity of popular assemblies to yield to the sudden impulse of violent passions, or to be seduced, by factious leaders within, or driven, by the force of popular influences from without, into intemperate and pernicious resolutions; and experience has fully proved the efficiency of such a body,—composed, as it is, of men eminent for their talents and distinguished for their wisdom and integrity,—to afford the necessary check upon popular legislation. Legislative bodies so composed would, almost invariably, be found opposed to all unjustifiable and ultra measures; and, on such occasions, they would be enabled to act with more decorum and dignity, than could be looked for in a popular assembly, directly acted upon by popular ferment or extravagance. There had been, he would confess, a time when he himself was favourable to the project of making the Council elective; and also of affording that body a remuneration for their legislative services, equal to that received by the Assembly. But, at the time when he thought it desirable that the Council should be elected, it was a notorious fact that the individual members of that body were closely banded together, not for the furtherance of the public well-being, but for the advancement of their own private interests, how much soever they might be opposed to those of the community at large. The necessity for such a change however, now happily no longer existed; but he was still of opinion that the members of the Council should receive the same compensation for their time and services as was bestowed upon the members of the Assembly; for, otherwise, there could be no proper representation of the local interests of those districts of the Island which were remote from Charlottetown; and the Council would still continue to be composed of gentlemen, residing in and around the seat of Government, who could have no personal or positive knowledge of the local wants and requirements of other and distant sections of the country. Under the Responsible System, the Council and the Assembly had, hitherto, worked together with as much harmony as the Constitution contemplated; and it would, in his opinion be very unwise to deny that system of a fair trial, by effecting such a fundamental innovation of the mode of composing the Council as that which was now proposed. The adoption of the plan proposed by the hon. member for Georgetown (Mr. Macaulay) appeared to him (the Hon. Mr. Pope) much more likely to produce confusion than to secure unity of action, between the two Houses of the Legislature; but, as he was always open to conviction, he would advise that hon. member to try his experiment first upon a smaller scale, in the municipality of Georgetown; and then, if he should find that the authorities in that town could be best sustained and supported by choosing from the party politically opposed to them, another body, and investing them with equal power in the management of their public concerns, he would be able to bring forward his measure, supported by the evidence of experience in favour of its wholesome and beneficial tendencies. He (Hon. Mr. Pope) could not, however, help thinking that the Bill originated in a desire to ape the obstructive proceedings of the opposition party in Nova Scotia. But, if so, he would beg leave to remind the hon. member (Mr. Macaulay) that, although the opposition in that Province was composed of men of great abilities and untiring energies, they had not been able to convince the people of the propriety of the change which they proposed. But he (Hon. Mr. Pope) conceived himself to be fully justified, on other grounds than those on which he had argued against the innovation, in viewing the movement with suspicion. In the Provinces, as well as in this Colony, the scheme was advocated by none but men who, to the very last, had opposed the extension of popular privileges, and resisted the admission of the people to a full and fair share in the management of their own affairs. How could it, then, be believed that such men would bring forward or advocate any measure which they were persuaded would still further extend that power—the power of the people—which they had, to the very last, opposed with uncompromising hate and determination? It was impossible to believe that there was any sincerity in their declarations of a desire to extend the popular privileges, or any honesty in their intentions with respect to that form of Government which had excluded them, as opposed to popular rule, from all participation in executive power. No: their design was certainly not to confer additional privileges upon the people, or still more securely to establish their rights; for the real objections of such men to the present order of things in the Legislature and the Government, were based upon their belief that the popular will had already too much influence over the deliberations of the one and the administrative acts of the other. The hon. gentleman concluded by saying he would oppose the motion for the House going into Committee on the Bill.

MR. MONTGOMERY. That the Legislative Council were now elective could not be denied; for they were chosen by the majority of the Assembly. But that such an election was a constitutional one, or one which—although it might smooth the course of legislation for a time—would either continue to secure unity of action between the two legislative chambers, or, in its working, tend to the promotion of the general interests, or secure the approbation of the people, he did not believe. At present it might be the means of ensuring harmony, with respect to acts of general policy, between the two bodies; because they who had been selected, by the Government, as representing the majority in the Assembly, to fill up vacancies in the Council had been so selected, chiefly, if not soley on account of their being of the same political creed with that majority. So long, indeed, as the party at present in the majority in the Assembly should continue in the ascendant there, nothing, perhaps, might occur to occasion any serious interruption to the good understanding subsisting between the two Houses; but suppose the result of a general election were to be adverse to the views and interests of the party now in power, what security could then be found for harmony of action between the two bodies? Would not the policy of the Council be in all likelihood, directly opposed to that of the Assembly? Something should be done now to prevent such a collision—a collision which could not fail to operate most injuriously, for a time, to the general interests of the Colony. It would, in his opinion, be wise to anticipate such a change in public opinion as would give a new political complexion to the majority in the Assembly; and to provide a remedy against any serious misunderstanding which might otherwise arise out of that change, between the two Houses of the Legislature. Such a Bill as that which had just been introduced by the hon. member for Georgetown (Mr. Macaulay) appeared to him to be the only means by which a final collision between the two Houses could be effectually guarded against. By means of it, such a gradual change might be effected in the composition of the Council, as—even if it did not wholly keep pace with that wrought by the influence of public opinion in the composition of the Assembly—would secure the regular transaction of public business, and afford a sufficient guarantee that the general interests would always be duly protected and promoted. Such a Bill, with the sanction of the Home Government, had been introduced into, and carried through the House of Assembly of New Brunswick; but it had been rejected by the Council. The necessity of some such measure here was, he thought, quite evident; but, if any other means could be found to ward off such a collesion as would, in the end, arise out of the present mode of constituting the Council, should it be adhered to, he would not object to it. The only other mode, however, which could be had recourse to, independently of an abrogation or suspension of the Constitution, whenever, and as often as such an emergency should arise would be, as had been done both in Canada and in Nova Scotia, to add to the Council such a number of new members, chosen with regard to their political sentiments, as would turn the scale in the Council in favor of the views of the Assembly. But that, he thought, would be an awkward and endless, as well as an unconstitutional mode of reconciling the adverse principles in the two Houses. On another account also, and that a most important one too, a change in the mode of constituting the Legislative Council was called for. As at present constituted, the country at large was not represented by it; and neither would it be, until such time as its members should be remunerated for their services equally with those of the House of Assembly; but it was quite as certain that the people would never consent to allow such remunerations to the members of the Council, unless they were elected by them. At present, there were only two members in the Legislative Council who resided at a distance from Charlottetown; and those, he had been informed, would not consent to hold their seats, for any length of time, unless, with respect to pay, they should be put upon the same footing as members of the Assembly.

MR. MOONEY. He could tell the hon. member for Prince Town (Mr. Montgomery) that the people would not consent to pay the members of the Legislative Council, if the provisions of that Bill should be carried out. The hon. member who had introduced the Bill had said his object was to effect reform. The change which it proposed, however, seemed to him (Mr. Mooney) calculated to effect any thing but a reform in the constitution of the Legislature; but it was just such a measure as might have been expected from the hon. member who had brought it forward, His object was not to enlarge, but to counteract. the real elective privileges of the people. Bad however as the measure was, it seemed to accord very well with the views of the hon. member for Prince Town (Mr. Montgomery); and, indeed, had it been much worse, he verily believed it