

Not only the Jury, he presumed, but every one who heard Mr. Haszard's evidence, and the evidence produced to impeach it, were convinced of the truth of the latter, and the want of truth in the former; and therefore, he said, it remained only for him to evince, that Mr. Cambridge knew Haszard's testimony not to be true. This, he insisted, would appear from the evidence taken down by the Clerk, on the hearing of the complaint, and which Mr. Cambridge himself had read to the Jury, in order to make out his incongruous tale of a PROBABLE CAUSE: That from this evidence it was apparent, beyond all contradiction, that instead of the Attorney General's deserting the Complainants cause, as they injuriously pretended, they themselves came to him, demanded of him all their papers, took delivery of them, and said they had no further occasion for his professional services. If the Jury therefore, should believe this written evidence to be true, then, he said, it unavoidably followed that Mr. Cambridge, at the time Haszard delivered his testimony, knew he was taking the name of God into his profane lips, to give to falsehood the semblance and shew of truth. He observed also, that Haszard's evidence made him actually to have received a thousand acres of Clark's land, and to have acceded to the proposal of receiving the further consideration of a hundred pounds, as his price for deserting the cause of Messrs. Cambridge and Bowley, although it appears from the before mentioned written evidence, that the cause was wrested out of his hands by the Plaintiffs themselves, and therefore could not have been deserted by him.

Lest it should be pretended, that this conduct of Mr. Cambridge, in first bringing forward and afterwards pressing this strange evidence of Haszard's, is proof only of an unjustifiable attempt, either to mitigate the damages in the present suit, or to prevent any being given, and therefore could not be considered as a proof of his malice in bringing forward his original accusation, the Attorney General proceeded to remark,

That Mr. Cambridge, who had himself dispossessed him both of the papers and the cause, gave to the world a clear and decided proof of his original rancour and malice towards him, by charging him afterwards with deserting the very same cause he had dispossessed him of: That producing Haszard as a witness to prove what he previously knew to be untrue, was not only an additional proof of his original malice,

but a continuation of it, and shewed him to be still strenuously intent on the ruin of a blameless and unoffending character, at the expence of justice, and every other good quality of the human heart.

After these and many other severe remarks on this part of the evidence, he drew the attention of the Jury to another instance of Mr. Cambridge's conduct, which he said was a no less palpable proof of his insatiable rancour and malice towards him. This consisted in his bringing forward a witness, of the name of Walter Berry, in support of another charge against the Attorney General, although he knew the witness to have sworn false, and had, himself, discredited the same testimony on a former occasion. This last set of remarks, which were exceedingly pointed, and applied with much severity, but which are too numerous and lengthy to have a place, appeared to make a very deep impression on the minds of the Jury.

The Attorney General, after he had placed all the other parts of the pool in the same kind of contrasted view, from whence he said the EXPRESS MALICE of Mr. Cambridge appeared, or from whence malice must necessarily be inferred, proceeded to meet that part of his defence which went to the damages, he having insisted, that as no special damages had been proved, the Jury ought not to give any.

On this part of the subject he took occasion to observe, that there are three sorts of damages, any of which would support such an action as the present one.

First, where the damage is done to the same or character of a man, as if the matter he is accused of imports scandal.

Secondly, where it is done to the person of a man, as by putting him in danger of losing either his life, limb, or liberty.

Thirdly, where it affects a man's property, as by exposing him to the expenditure of his money, in necessary charges, in order to acquit himself of the imputed crime.

The damages, he said, which he was then appealing to the justice of his country to obtain, were of the first kind, and that there was not a single charge, out of the whole catalogue of the eight, but what imported scandal, and was pregnant with that baneful vice, to a most dangerous and unrivalled degree: That no man who is but moderately acquainted even with the most common doctrines of the law, relative to actions for words spoken, or written, can well avoid knowing, that words, which are not in themselves actionable, may, nevertheless, become so, when they appear to have a tendency to disgrace a

person in his profession or trade, and more especially one of the learned professions, and who holds an office of great trust under his Majesty. He concluded with remarking, that in the event of any one of those charges being proved against him, to the satisfaction of the Court, the Court must necessarily have reported his guilt to his Excellency the Lieutenant Governor, whose first step must as necessarily have been, to suspend him from his office of Attorney General, and afterwards to transmit an account of the suspension, together with the cause of it, to his Majesty's Ministers: And what the result of such a transmittal would have been, he thought was not necessary to be told. In the meantime, he said, he must have been disgraced in his two other situations of Barrister and Attorney. He therefore could not forbear thinking, that if justice was done him, the damages ought to be exemplary, and proportioned, in some degree, to the losses to which he must have been subjected on so disastrous an event.

The Chief Justice then proceeded to deliver his charge to the Jury; and in doing which, he first stated the law, and afterwards very accurately, though briefly, brought back to their recollection the more material and operative parts of the evidence. Whether the prosecution of the Attorney General was with or without malice, he said, constituted the question at large before them; but that this depended altogether upon the evidence, of which they were the sole and exclusive judges. He concluded with recommending it to them to return such a verdict, as they, in their consciences, thought to be just between the parties.

The Jury retired, and in little more than an hour, returned a verdict for the Plaintiff for 100l. and costs of suit.

The Account of the Trial of the Action between the Attorney General and Mr. Bowley, is unavoidably omitted in this Paper, the page containing the same having been unfortunately broke in carrying to Press—but will appear in our next.

WHEREAS some evil minded Person or Persons, (in Order to injure the Subscriber) have reported, That he had endeavoured to depreciate the Debenture Money of this Island, by buying up the same at Half its Value—the Subscriber conceives it necessary, thus publicly, to assert that the said Report has no Kind of Foundation, and is utterly false and groundless—and could only have been raised from Motives of Malice.

SAMUEL C. BRADDOCK.

March 29, 1793.