Progress of the War.

THE ARMIES IN THE CRIMEA.

(*From the Correspondent of the Times.*)

CAMP BEFORE SEBASTOPOL, Tuesday, Nov. 20—As if to mock us for our self inflicted miseries of last year, the weather continues to present the most delightful antithesis to the storms and rains of this time twelvemonth. How many lives, how many reputations might have been saved, if the November of 1854 in the Crimea had been at all like the same month in this present year! Up to the moment at which I write, there has not been a day since last April in which military operations could not have been undertaken. Either last year was remarkable in the annels of the Crimea for its severity, or we are enjoying a season of exceptional mildness. The country is open in every direction to carriage, man, or beast—the trenches are dry; in faet, the weather presents contrasts of endless variety to that which prevailed last year, and affords ground for infinite speculation and comment. There is no reason, however, to suppose, that the English army would have had much reason to congratulate itself on the fact, that the clemency of the season had averted the evils which want of roads, excessive fatigue, and a false position would have entailed upon them, inasmuch as it is certain the bad weather paralyzed the enemy, cut off their reserves, impeded their transport of food and of reinforcements, and prevented their making another attempt—not at Inkermann, of which they had to their cost learned the strength, but from the Traktir bridge, or at some other point of the Tchernaya then in their possession, from which they could have debouched into the plain of Balaklava, and made a grand attack on the rear of our lines. Although those lines were greatly strengthened, and the profile altered and improved when the rumours of the Russians gathering force towards Baidar with the intention of assaulting us prevailed, they were far from being perfect or unassailable last November. We now learn that the country between Tchongar, Perekop, and Simpheropol was in such a state that it was with difficulty the garrison of Sebastopol could be fed, and that strong reinforcements were kept for weeks waiting at Odessa, Nicolaieff, and Cherson, till they could march into the Crimea, and were finally detained till the spring of this year. But for these impediments the Russians would have had a prodigious army about Sebastopol this time twelvemonth or early in December, and if they were indisposed to try another Inkermann, they could certainly have pressed us much harder in the trenches and tried our men by strong and repeated sorties, to which as it now appears their hard worked and exhausted garrison was not adequate. At times it was difficult to march even a battalion from the army of the Belbek or Mackenzie's Farm into the city or to effect the usual reliefs. If to these considerations be added the notorious sentiments and opinions of persons high in authority who advocated the abandonment of the siege, and the retreat of the army from the Crimea after the battle of Inkermann, it will be seen that our prospects would not have been much better, had weather like that we now enjoy prevailed last winter. As to future operations, it is not becoming in me to speak, but the Russian general must be a man of extraordinary confidence if he thinks he can extricate his arms, when the spring comes, from the grasp of an enemy which already clutches the whole of his coast, is established at two points in his rear, and has four distinct bases of operations, with sufficient forces to use them all, and to concentrate a prodigious force on any point he pleases. He may err, and if he does, and the blot is hit, the the result will be fatal. The Russian infantry, in spite of its stubborn endurance and passive courage, is not equal to either French, Sardinian, English, or Turkish troops. Every day shows us that it has no chance against the latter when they are led and officered by Englishmen or brave and skilful European soldiers. Their cavalry in equal numbers will be ridden down like grass, whenever they stand against English or French squadrons, and notwithstanding the excellence of their artillery compared with other arms of their service, it cannot compete with ours for an instant as regards rapidity of motion or precision of fire. Prince Gortschakoff will be a grand strategist opposed to very weak generals, if he succeeds in saving his army and marching them scatheless from the Crimea, The health of our troops is excellent, the drafts which arrive are rather younger than is desirable, but they will get experience and instruction during the winter. They are admirably clothed and fed as no army was ever fed before—fresh meat, bread, and vegetables are frequently issued to all. Henceforth, the men are to get fresh meat only three times a week, and bread only three times a week, instead of every day. On the other days they will receive pork or salt beef, and excellent biscuit. In respect of winter clothing, hutting, and feeding, our men are immeasurably better off than our allies, and, indeed, it is not unusual to see the latter eating in the English camp of the excess of our soldiers' cooking kettles. Little friendships have sprung up in this way "Franceese" comes over with his spoon, a smile, an onion, and a bit of salt, or savoury condiment, to some sapper or grenadier, day after day, about dinner time, indulges in pantomimic conversation, interlarded with many "bonos," and regales on good soup and broth, to the great delight of his entertainer. Thus both are satisfied—a true entente cordiale is established through the medium of the stomach, and no one is a loser. The reinforcements to our ally contain like our own many very young men, and I was particularly struck with the yonthful appearance of the men of a regiment which arrived at Kamiesch on Monday. There is scarcely any use in keeping up an appearance of a diary, for one day is uncommonly like another. Preparations for the winter are evident on every side. December will be inaugurated with a steeple-chase of English dimensions, in stakes, jumps, and fences. Theatricals are looking up, and nearly every division will have a theatre open during the Christmas week, and some daring spirits are even talking of a pantomime, and of essaying a repetition of the bold experiment of an amateur performance in Guy Faux, or a match for a King, with which it is hoped the author will not interfere by any question of copyright. Indeed, there would be some difficulty in raising it in the Crimea, unless the provost marshal considered the matter came under his jurisdiction, which is very sharp, short, and decisive. Some useful examples have been made among the unruly in Balaklava. Kadikoi, and camp, and refractory navvies and canteenmen have been triced up and had a dozen or two, ere they knew who was doing it. The agent or representative of a celebrated military tailor in London was unfortunate enough to engage in a personal controversy with one of the provost marshal's serjeants some nights ago, in Balaklava, and, having been dining out, he was discreet and valorous enough to "let fly with his left" on the official's frontispiece, by way of bringing the affair to a satisfactory termination. He was at once seized and carried off to the main guard, where delinquents pass the night in fear and trembling till they are tied up for the attentions of the drummers in the morning. In vain did he entreat the presiding judge to send for various distinguished clients to speak to character or bail him out; in vain did he implore that Lord This or General That, whose intimate friend he was, might be summoned. No efforts could avert or delay his doom; he was tied up, when his turn came, like the rest, and received "two dozen" on the back. The Highlanders are about getting up a theatre also, but it would be a strain of the most ardent friendship to go up to Kamara to see an amateur performance, unless the players entertain the audience for the night, and the general camp axiom certainly is, "where I dine I sleep, and where I sleep, I breakfast." Some people are talking of "payment at the doors" to go to purchase comforts for the sick, but they really and truly are in want of nothing at present. The hospital kitchens are certainly worth seeing, and M. Soyer has, by the introduction of his stoves and of an improved system of *menage*, contributed to render them efficient. His stove would be still more valuable if it roasted or baked, as well as boiled, but at present, the last is the only operation to which it is suited, and the old camp-kettle did that as well, always, however, with a much greater consumption and waste of fuel. In economising the latter scarce and most expensive article by the introduction of stove M. Soyer has rendered a consideradle service. No article presses more heavily on the resources of the commissariat department, is more bulky and difficult of transit, more scarce, and most expensive than wood for fuel.

RECEPTION OF GEN. CANROBERT BY THE KING OF DENMARK—General Canrobert was received in a private audience by the King of Denmark. The General was taken to the palace in one of the Court carriages, in which was M. de Moltke aide-de-camp of his Majesty. More than 200 persons assembled in the court of the hotel, and cheered him as he entered the Royal carriges. The audience lasted for half an hour. At 5 o'clock the *corps diplomatique*(with the exception of the Russian Charge d'Affaires), the members of the Cabinet, the high dignitaries of the Crown, the commanders of the army and navy, and the most eminent functionaries were invited to a banquet given in honour of the General. General Canrobert sat next to the King. In the middle of the repast the King, who wore the insignia of the Legion of Honour, proposed the health of his Majesty the Emperor and at the same time the music struck up the national air, "Partant pour la Syrie." In the evening the General attended a ball given by the Landgrave Willium, in honour of the birth of his son. M. Dotezar presented the Ambassabor Extraordinary of the Emperor to the Royal family, all the members of which received him most graciously. The next day General Canrobert visited the military establishments of the capital, accompanied by the Minister of War.

The gunboats building in the South of England have engines of 60 horse power. The first launched has been named the Beaver.

WHAT ARE THE OBJECTS OF THE WAR?

The organ of Mr. Disraeli—though we are glad to see that it is not the organ of Lord Derby or the protectionist party—affirms, that the objects of the war are accomplished. We need not follow its reasonings on this point, but will simply ask, "What *are* the objects of the war?" It will be quite time enough to declare that they are accomplished, when we know in what they consist. We need not inquire in what way Lord Aberdeen originally understood the war, or what was the limitation which Sir James Graham, or Mr Gladstone, or Mr. Sidney Herbert, or Lord John Russell would have imposed upon it; but in what sense it was and is understood by the British Parliament and people, by Napoleon III, and his gallant nation, by the Turks, by the Piedmontese, and by the universal sympathy of civilized Europe.

The outbreak of the war was long foreseen by the ablest statesmen and diplomatists of England, Germany, and France. It was not only Napoleon 1.—as great a statesman and philosopher as he was a soldier—who predicted it as inevitable, unless Europe prevented it by the establishment of great constitutional States on every side of the Russian frontier; but such men as Prince Metternich in Germany, and Lord Palmerston in England, who for the last five-and-twenty years have been fully aware that, sooner or later, it would be found necessary to limit by force of arms the encroachments of Russia upon the territories of her neighbours. The ambition of Russia was no secret. The means, diplomatic, commercial, and military, domestic as well as foreign, by which the late Czar Nicholas sought to accomplish his ends, though not so obvious as they ought to have been to the people of England—a people proverbially ignorant or careless of foreign policy—were patent to all the advanced spirits of the age. The voice of warning was scarcely ever mute; but engrossed as the nation was with its domestic politics, and its immense trade and commerce, the voice was for the most part unheeded, and those who raised it were accused of being alarmists. But our principal statesmen knew perfectly well the danger before them. When in 1853, the Czar, through the medium of Prince Menschikoff, threw off the mask, and aimed a blow against the independence of Turkey, it was universally felt both by statesmen and people that, if Russia persisted in her demands upon the Sultan's Government, it would be impossible to prevent a war. Even Lord Aberdeen knew this. He felt that such a war, if it ever broke out, would be a war of principle, a war that would not last merely for a few months, or years, or involve only two or three Powers, but that might last for a generation, and extend to the whole of Europe. For this reason he did his utmost to prevent the outburst. He endeavoured to adjourn the evil day; to procure a peace, or at the least a truce, by diplomacy, by negotiation, and by appeals to the justice, if not to the fears of the Czar. He would at that time have been quite contented, as he himself avowed, if he could have arranged a pacification that would have lasted for twenty years. Lord Aberdeen was selfish enough not to care for pesterity. What he desired was to save the men of the present day from the unutterable miseries of a European war, and to have our children or our grandchildren, if the course of events so decreed it, to fight a still harder fight for their own independence and that of the world. For this it is now useless to reproach Lord Aberdeen or the statesmen who acted with him. Their great forbearance—though it pampered the pride of the Czar Nicholas, and taught him to believe in his own invincibility—at least proved the reluctance of the rulers of this great nation to provoke war, their deep sense of its evils, and their innocence of all attempt or inclination to hasten or to exasperate it.

But the men to be blamed at this juncture were the cowardly King of Prussia and the irresolute Emperor of Austria. These men, if they had boldly supported the remonstrances advanced by Aberdeen and the Emperor Napoleon, and plainly notified to Nicholas that, if he drew the sword, they would fight against him, would have procured peace without bloodshed, by making it evident to the ambitious Czar that he stood alone, and would have had the whole of Europe—Governments as well as people—arrayed in arms against him. They failed to adopt this wise and conservative policy. As an inevitable and palpable consequence, the objects of the war immediately extended themselves. The independence of Turkey, the first ostensible object, would have been its last. If the Great German governments had been alive to their duty and their interest, that object would have been secured by their co-operation, and the world would in all probability have enjoyed the peaceful, twenty years which Lord Aberdeen had reckoned upon. In the meantime, events might have been so moulded by wise statesmanship, that Europe would have opposed the growth of Cossackism, in the North and North-East, the growth of Constitutional Government in her Central States, and have met encroaching barbarism by the strength derivable from the wealth, the spirit, and energy of a civilization developed in the enjoyment of rational liberty.

But this was not to be. The Czar was haughty and blind, and the Sovereigns of Germany, great and small, were traitors to the dignity of their own crowns and the interests of their people; and, by their pusillanimity or their ignorance, allowed a war, that might have been a little one and easily strangled in its birth, to grow to the proportions of that mighty giant which we now behold it. On their heads will some day fall the penalty. Many of our statesmen, who know full well the magnitude of the war which they had so ardently striven to prevent, lacked the genius or the courage to direct it; and one by one they dropped off from the Government, till, backed by the indomitable "pluck" and sterling good sense of the British people, there came into power, under the presidency of Lord Palmerston, a Ministry equal to its task, and fully comprehending it. It is certain, that the great statesman was not blind to the fact, that the object of the war ceased to be limited to the mere independence of Turkey the moment it became evident that Prussia and Austria would not take part with Great Britain and France in combating the pretensions of Russia. He and his countrymen know that it has now a wider scope. It is not enough, that the independence of Turkey should be secured. The attack on Turkey was but a portion of a great scheme—to make Russia the dominant Power of Europe—to procure egress into the Atlantic for her war navies—either by command of the issues of the Baltic, or by the deep fiords of the north-western portions of Norway, from which even now her territories are separated by scarcely fifty miles; and to have similar command over the Mediterranean, by possession of the Bosphorus; and thereby to give the law to the civilized world in our hemisphere.

The instinct of Europe felt long ago that such were the objects of Russia; that she pursued them by the subjugation, bit by bit, of Turkey, and by the robbery, piecemeal, of every state or nation which had the misfortune to have her for a near neighbour. True statesmanship and the popular interest were agreed on the point. There was and could be no mistake about it on the part of any one claiming the possession of ordinary clear-sightedness. The success of Russia in those objects, or in any other of them would be the downfall of England and of France also. Both of these wealthy and powerful nations would sink into the second or third rank. London would become as desolate as Venice, and Great Britain would be of as little account in the world as Spain or Holland. The glory of France would be a tale of the past—as dead and as unfructuous as the vanished glory of Greece or Rome. The conviction, that this is the true position assumed by Russia influences, will continue to influence Europe until far higher objects are secured than the independence of the Turks. The Allied Powers will fight for their own independence and freedom as well as for those of the Ottomans; and they will not sheathe the sword which they have drawn, whilst they have a man to send to the fight, or a shilling to pay him. If they fail—which they will not and cannot—there is an end to better things than the Turkish Empire. If they succeed—which they must and shall, with the bles-