

THE HERALD.

NEW SERIES. VOL. I.

CHARLOTTETOWN, PRINCE EDWARD ISLAND, WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 7, 1870.

NO. 6.

THE HERALD
IS PRINTED AND PUBLISHED EVERY WEDNESDAY MORNING, BY
REILLY & CO.,
EDITORS AND PROPRIETORS,
At their Office, Prince Street, Ch'town.
TERMS FOR THE "HERALD":
For 1 year, paid in advance, £0 9 0
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Advertisements inserted at the usual rates.
JOB PRINTING
Of every description, performed with neatness and despatch and on moderate terms, at the HERALD OFFICE.

ALMANACK FOR DECEMBER.
MOON'S PHASES.

FULL MOON, 7th day, 10h. 27m., even., S.
LAST QUARTER, 15th day, 4h. 59m., even., S.
NEW MOON, 22d day, 8h. 7m., morn., S. E.
FIRST QUARTER, 29th day, 0h. 26m., even., E.

DAY	WEEK	SUN	MOON	HIGH	DAY'S
MONTH		RISE	SETS	WATER	WIND
1	Thursday	7 28 4	10 10	5 26	8 42
2	Friday	29 10	9 40	6 21	41
3	Saturday	31 10	9 12	7 37	39
4	Sunday	32 10	2 44	8 2	38
5	Monday	33 10	3 43	8 48	37
6	Tuesday	35 9	4 43	9 32	34
7	Wednesday	36 9	5 43	10 4	23
8	Thursday	37 9	6 43	10 56	32
9	Friday	38 9	5 11	11 36	31
10	Saturday	39 9	5 50	even	30
11	Sunday	40 9	6 40	1 0	29
12	Monday	41 9	7 31	1 44	28
13	Tuesday	42 9	8 26	2 31	27
14	Wednesday	43 9	9 43	3 17	26
15	Thursday	44 9	10 52	4 5	25
16	Friday	45 10	morn	4 29	25
17	Saturday	45 10	0 1	5 55	25
18	Sunday	46 10	1 14	6 57	25
19	Monday	46 10	2 30	7 57	24
20	Tuesday	47 11	3 45	8 59	24
21	Wednesday	47 11	4 52	9 56	24
22	Thursday	48 12	6 00	10 48	24
23	Friday	48 12	sets	11 47	24
24	Saturday	48 12	5 50	morn	24
25	Sunday	48 13	7 30	0 49	25
26	Monday	48 14	8 8	1 32	26
27	Tuesday	48 15	9 16	2 12	27
28	Wednesday	48 16	10 26	3 9	28
29	Thursday	48 17	11 30	3 56	29
30	Friday	48 18	morn	4 43	30
31	Saturday	48 18	1 31	5 33	30

PRICES CURRENT.
Ch'town, Dec. 2, 1870.

Provisions.	
Beef, (small) per lb.	34 a 7d
Do, by the quarter	34 a 5d
Pork (cassia)	5d a 3d
Do (small)	5d a 3d
Mutton, per lb.	34 a 6d
Veal, per lb.	34 a 6d
Butter (fresh)	7d a 8d
Do, by the tub	1s 2d a 1s 4d
Cheese, per lb.	34 a 5d
Do, (new milk)	10d a 1s
Tallow, per lb.	7d a 9d
Lard, per lb.	9d a 10d
Flour, per 100 lb.	19s a 20s
Oatmeal, per 100 lb.	15s 6d a 17s 6d
Buckwheat flour per lb.	14d a 2d
Eggs, per doz.	1s 3d a 1s 6d
Grain.	
Barley, per bush.	3s 6d a 4s 4d
Oats per bush.	2s 3d a 2s 4d
Vegetables.	
Green Peas, per quart	6d a 9d
Potatoes, per bush.	1s 6d a 1s 8d
Turnips per bush.	10d a 1s
Poultry.	
Geese	2s 6d a 3s
Turkeys, each	4s a 7s 6d
Fowls, each	1s 3d a 2s
Chickens, per pair	1s 8d a 3s 0d
Ducks	1s 3d a 1s 6d
Fish.	
Codfish, per qtl.	20s a 30s
Herrings, per barrel	25s a 40s
Mackerel, per doz.	
Sundries.	
Hay, per ton	65s a 75s
Straw, per cwt.	16s a 18s
Clover Seed, per lb.	4d a 2s
Timothy Seed, per bush.	
Homespun, per yard	4s a 6s
Califkies, per lb.	6d a 9d
Hides, per lb.	4d a 4 1/2d
Wool	1s a 1s 6d
Sheepskins	3s 6d a 5s 0d
Apples, per bush.	3s 0d a 4s 0d
Partridges	1s 0d a 1s 6d

GEORGE LEWIS, Market Clerk.

Banking Notices.

BANK OF PRINCE EDWARD ISLAND!
(Corner of Daniel Breen and King Streets)
HON. DANIEL BREEN, President.
WILLIAM CUNDELL, Esquire, Cashier.
Discount Days—Mondays and Thursdays.
Hours of Business—From 10 a. m. to 1 p. m., and from 2 p. m. to 4 p. m.
The P. E. Island Savings Bank is in connection with the Treasurer's Office. Days of deposit: Tuesdays and Fridays, from 10 a. m. to 3 p. m.

Union Bank of P. E. Island.

(North Side Queen Square)
CHARLES PALMER, Esquire, President.
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COMMISSION MERCHANT
AND
AUCTIONEER,
CHARLOTTETOWN, - - - P. E. ISLAND.
RONALD MACDONALD,
COMMISSION MERCHANT,
AUCTIONEER,
—AND—
COLLECTING AGENT.
Souris, P. E. I., January 2, 1870. 1y

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OFFICE:—Two doors below Bank of P. E. I.
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December, 1869.

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OFFICE IN
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(Next Apothecary's Hall)
QUEEN STREET.
RESIDENCE:
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Charlottetown, August 3, 1870. 1y

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Attorneys and Solicitors,
—AND—
NOTARIES PUBLIC.
OFFICE:
O'Halloran's Building, Great George Street
Charlottetown, P. E. Island.
R. R. FITZGERELD. - - - R. SHAW
Nov. 2, 1870. 2m

SPRING PARK

Steam Brewery,
Charlottetown, - - P. E. Island.

A. K. & F. B. Pale Ales.

IN CASK OR IN BOTTLE.
HARRINGTON & CO.
Dec. 1, 1869. 1y

SMALL DEBT COURT.

Office of the Clerk of the above Court is now held in the "Exchange," or Reading Room Building, Water Street, Charlottetown, P. E. Island.
F. S. LONG WORTH, Clerk.
Nov. 23, 1870. 4m

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ROBERT SHAW,
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Nov. 23, 1870. p 1/2

CHARLOTTETOWN MUTUAL

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Board of Directors for the current year:
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May 7th, 1870.

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GAS FITTER,
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(Next to Old Reading Room Building.)
B. returns his thanks, to the general public, for the liberal patronage extended to him since his commencement in business, and asks for a continuance of the same. He keeps constantly on hand
A neat Assortment of Tinware, Kitchen Utensils, &c., &c.
All orders in the above business will be punctually attended to.
Having lately made large purchases in the cheapest markets, intended for House Builders, such as Gas Fittings, Water Closets, Bell Fittings, &c., &c., I am prepared to sell them at rates as low as can be had in the city, and will fit them up in a good workmanlike style.
To a generous public, I would say, that all orders in this branch of my business will be attended to with despatch.
A lot of First-class Water Coolers on hand.
Sayer's Crystal Blue,
Sold Cheaper than ever.
July 7, 1869. ex

Gold and Silver

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GOLD RINGS.
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Feb. 16, 1870. } 1y

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THE LEONARD SCOTT PUBLISHING CO.,
140 "N" Street, New York.
Sept. 15, 1870.

PUBLIC LANDS.

Townships Nos. 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 53, 54, 55 and 56.
Notice to Tenants or Holders of Government Lands on the above named Townships, and all persons desirous of purchasing Wilderness Lands.
THE Commissioner of Public Lands will attend at the following places on the days hereinafter mentioned, for the Receipt of the Deposits and Instalments from purchasers of Lands on said Townships:
On Tuesday, the 29th day of November, inst., at Mr. Finlay's, New Paris, Lot 52.
On Thursday, the 1st day of December, next, at Mr. McKinnon's, Dundas Cross Roads, Lot 55, for the tenants on Lots 53, 54 and 55.
On Friday and Saturday, the 2d and 3d days of December, next, at Lawrence Kitchin's, Esq., Souris West, for the tenants on Lots 44, 45 and 46.
On Monday, Tuesday, and Wednesday, the 5th, 6th, and 7th days of December, next, at Mr. Davidson's, Kollo Bay; Monday, for the tenants at Fortune, Little River, Little Pond and Boughton Bay, Lot 56; Tuesday, for the tenants on Lot 43, and Wednesday, for the tenants at Groschat, Birch Hill, Dundas Road, and the north end of Lot 56.
On Thursday, the 8th day of December, next, at Peter Ryan's, Esq., Head of Saint Peter's Bay, Lot 42.
On Friday, the 9th of December, next, at Phelan's, Morell, Lot 39.
I hereby notify all persons on said Townships in arrears of rent or instalments, that unless payment be made by the first day of January next, proceedings will be taken for the recovery of the same.
FRANCIS KELLY,
Commissioner.
Land Office, Nov. 16, 70. e. l. ca. till dec 1

THE WAR.

NAPOLEON'S HISTORY OF HIS CAMPAIGN.

Napoleon has given to the world his account of the Campaign of 1870, down to the capitulation of Sedan. The London Telegraph publishes the narrative entire. The following extracts will show, the light in which the Emperor regards the disasters of August, and the causes he brings forward to account for them:—

When the war was declared, and the Emperor assumed the command in chief of the French armies he frequently gave expression to the thought, reflected in his initial proclamation, that the campaign about to open would be surrounded by the greatest difficulties.

The Emperor knew that Prussia was ready to call out, in a short time, 900,000 men, and with the aid of the Southern States of Germany, could count upon 1,000,000 soldiers. France was only able to muster 600,000; and as the number of fighting men is never more than one-half the actual effective force, Germany was in a position to bring into the field 550,000 men, while we had only about 300,000 to confront the enemy.

To compensate for this numerical inferiority, it was necessary for us, by a rapid movement, to cross the Rhine, separate South Germany from the North German Confederation, and by the celerity of a first success, secure the alliance of Austria and Italy.

THE EMPEROR'S PLAN OF CAMPAIGN.

Which he confided to Paris to Marshals McMahon and LeBoeuf alone, was to mass 150,000 men at Metz, 100,000 at Strasbourg, and 50,000 at the camp of Chalons. As soon as the troops should have been concentrated at the points indicated, it was the Emperor's purpose to immediately unite the two armies of Metz and Strasbourg, and at the head of 250,000 men to cross to Rhine at Maxan, leaving at his right the fortress of Rastatt, and at his left that of Gernersheim. Reaching the other side of the Rhine, he would have forced the States of the South to observe neutrality, and would then have hurried on to encounter the Prussians. Whilst this movement was in course of execution, the 50,000 men at Chalons, under the command of Marshal Canrobert, were to proceed to Metz, to protect the rear of the army and guard the northeastern frontier. At the same time our fleet cruising in the Baltic would have held stationary, in the ports of Prussia, a part of the enemy's forces obliged to defend the coast threatened with invasion.

The sole chance of the plan's succeeding, was to surpass the enemy in rapidity of movement. To accomplish this it was necessary to muster in a very few days, at the points decided upon, not only the number of men required, but also the essential accessories of the projected campaign, such as wagon equipages, artillery parks, post-train, gunboats to cover the passage of the Rhine, and, finally, the commissariat necessary to supply a large army on the march.

THE EMPEROR RECEIVED.

The Emperor flattered himself with the hope of attaining these results, and in this he was deceived.
The delays incurred arose, in a great measure, from the defects of our military organization, as it has existed for the last fifty years, and which revealed themselves from the very beginning. Instead of having, as is the case with Prussia, army corps always in an organized state, recruited in the province itself, and possessing on the spot their material and complete accessories, in France the troops composing an army are dispersed over the whole country, while the material is stored in different cities, in crowded magazines.

The army of Metz, instead of 150,000 men, only mustered 100,000; that of Strasbourg, only 40,000, instead of 100,000; while the corps of Marshal Canrobert had still one division at Paris and another at Soissons; his artillery, as well as his cavalry, was not ready. Further, no army corps, was even yet completely furnished with the equipments necessary for taking the field. The Emperor gave precise orders to the effect that the arrival of the missing regiments should be pushed on; but he was obeyed slowly, excuse being made that it was impossible to leave Algeria, Paris and Lyons without garrisons.

Nevertheless, the hope of carrying out the (original) plan of the campaign was not lost. It was thought that the enemy would not be ready before us. His movements were not known, nor in what quarter his forces were being massed; and it was with a view of determining these things that, on the 2nd of August, tentative steps were taken at Saarbrück; but, upon the 4th, the attack upon the Douay Division at Wissembourg, by imposing forces, and, two days later, THE GLORIOUS AND FATAL BATTLE OF FREICH-WILLER, caused all uncertainty to pass away.

On the same day, the 6th of August, the army corps of Gen. Frossard had a hand-to-hand struggle with a large body of the enemy upon the Heights of Spicheren; and, although the result of this engagement may not have been favorable, it might be affirmed that, if the two divisions which were in a position

to support Gen. Frossard had executed more properly the orders which they had received from Marshal Bazaine, we should upon that day have carried off the victory.

However this may be, our position was critical. By the bold initiative of the German troops, who poured in simultaneously by the Sarre and by the Rhine, we were caught in the very act of formation. The corps of General de Failly had not had time to reinforce that of Marshal McMahon, and found itself cut off from the army of Metz; the corps of Gen. Douay, which was slowly mustering at Belfort, found itself far distant from the theatre of military operations; and the army of Marshal Canrobert was not yet completely formed at the camp of Chalons.

Under these circumstances, the Emperor resolved immediately

TO LEAD BACK THE ARMY TO CHALONS,

Where it might have gathered together the debris of Marshal McMahon's army, Failly's corps, and that of Douay. This plan, when communicated to Paris, was at first approved by the Council of Ministers; but two days afterwards a letter from M. E. Ollivier informed the Emperor that, upon mature consideration, the Council had decided that it had been too hasty in approving the retreat, and advised the Emperor to renounce his project. For the moment, therefore the Emperor yielded to this counsel.

The effective force of the army of Metz was brought up to 140,000 by the arrival of Marshal Canrobert, and it received orders for his concentration around Metz, in the hope that it might be able to fall upon one of the Prussian armies before they had effected their junction. Unfortunately, as it in this campaign all the elements of success for us were to be wanting, not only was the concentration of the army retarded by the combat at Spicheren and by the bad weather, but its action was paralyzed by the absolute ignorance in which we always remained concerning the position and strength of the hostile armies. So well did the Prussians conceal their movements behind the formidable shelter of cavalry which they deployed before them in all directions, that, notwithstanding the most persevering inquiries, it was never really known where the mass of their troops was, nor, in consequence, where our chief efforts should be directed.

The Emperor felt that he was held responsible for the wretched situation of the army, while the Emperor himself was charging Marshal LeBoeuf with the delays and the insufficiency of the organization. He therefore decided to give the command to Marshal Bazaine. At this time several Generals

pointed out that it might happen that communicating with Paris would be cut off, and that then locked up in Metz, and separated from the rest of France, the Head of the State would be incapacitated for conducting the affairs of the country or giving them proper direction, and that revolutionary agitations might arise from this situation.

These considerations had an indisputable weight which did not escape the Emperor, who, however, did not wish to leave the army until he had recrossed the Moselle to the left bank. This movement the Emperor hurried on as much as possible, but bad weather and the encumbrances of baggage delayed the execution.

Arrived at Gravelotte, the Emperor, not foreseeing a general battle, and only looking for partial engagements, which might retard the march of the army, decided to precede it to Chalons. He left on the morning of the 16th of August, and passed by Conflans and Etain, without meeting a single enemy on his route.

THE UNINTERRUPTED SUCCESSION OF DISASTERS

Produced a strong impression in Paris. The Ministers, uneasy at this state of affairs, and thinking that up to a certain point they could free themselves from the constitutional authority belonging to the Emperor only, since he had simply given to the Empress Regent restricted powers, convoked the Chambers, without even a reference to the Emperor; and from the time of their assembly it was, as it always is in public calamities, the opposition which saw its influence increase, and which paralyzed the patriotism of the majority and the progress of the Government.

From this period Ministers appeared afraid to pronounce the name of the Emperor; and he, who had quitted the army, and had only relinquished the command in order to resume the reins of Government, soon discovered that it would be impossible for him to play out the part which belonged to him.

As soon as he reached the camp of Chalons the Emperor found there the Duke of Magenta and Gen. Trochu; the latter had been nominated by the Minister of War commander of the troops at the camp. These two general officers were summoned by the Emperor to a council, at which there were present Prince Napoleon, Gen. Schmitz (Gen. Trochu's chief staff officer), and Gen. Berthaut, the Commander of the National Guard Mobile. It was decided that the Emperor should nominate Gen. Trochu to the command of the army in Paris, that the troops collected at Cha-

lons should be marched toward the capital, under the orders of Gen. McMahon; that the National Guard Mobile should go to the camp of St. Maair, at Vincennes, and that

THE EMPEROR SHOULD GO TO PARIS,

Where his duties called him. When this decision was learnt by the Government, it excited an animated opposition. Several objections were put forward. "Paris," it was said, "is in a perfect state of defence; its garrison is numerous. The army of Chalons ought to be employed in breaking the blockade of Metz; the National Guard Mobile would be a danger to the tranquillity of the capital; the character of Gen. Trochu inspires no confidence; in fact, the return of the Emperor to Paris would be very ill-interpreted by public opinion."

Nevertheless, it was decided to carry out the orders of the Emperor, while the propriety of succoring Bazaine was still insisted upon. But the Duke of Magenta informed the Minister of War that the march toward Metz would be one of the greatest impediments, and pointed out all the dangers of such an operation.

Practically, at this period, the Prussian armies occupied the two sides of a triangle, of which we had to traverse the third side. Prince Frederick Charles was blockading Metz with 240,000 men. The Crown Prince of Savoy, with 100,000 men, held the country between the Belgian frontier and Verdun, and joined on his right the army of the Crown Prince of Prussia, who, at the head of 150,000 men, had established his headquarters at Bar-le-Duc.

AN EXTREMELY PERILOUS FLANK MARCH

In the face of an enemy very superior in point of numbers, and he announced that he was going to make his way toward Rheims, from whence he could proceed either to Soissons or to Paris. The army was led toward Rheims, on the 21st, and took its position behind that city. But the language of reason was not understood in Paris; it was wished, at all hazards, to give public opinion the empty hope that Marshal Bazaine could still be succored, and the Duke of Magenta received a most pressing injunction to march toward Metz.

Marshal McMahon, a man above all things, of duty, obeyed, and resolved to run the chance which was placed before him. Anything which resembled a sacrifice for the public good recommended itself to his noble soul, and he was flattered by the idea that, by attracting toward himself all the forces of the enemy, he was for the moment delivering the means of defence. As to the Emperor, he made no opposition. He decided to follow, in person, the movements of the army, fully sensible, however, that if he met with success all the merit would in justice be ascribed to the Commander-in-Chief; and that, in case of a reverse, its responsibility would fall upon the head of the State.

The army, therefore, retraced its steps, and left Rheims on the 23rd; and scarcely had it made a march toward establishing itself on the Suipe, at Bethunville, when

COMMISSARIAT DIFFICULTIES

Obliged Marshal McMahon to reapproach the line of the railway. He made a movement on his left, and reached Rethel on the 24th in order to obtain for his troops several days' subsistence. This distribution occupied the whole of the day of the 25th.

On the 27th the army arrived at Le Chene-Populeux. At this place the army of the Prince of Saxony had effected its junction with that of the Prince Royal of Prussia, and their vanguards had already come to blows with the corps of Gen. de Failly and Douay. The Marshal, observing that the enemy was gaining upon him, resolved, in order to save the sole army which France had at her disposal, to turn back in a westerly direction. He immediately gave orders to this effect; but during the night he received by telegraph formal injunctions to continue his march toward Metz. Unquestionably the Emperor could have countermanded this order; but he was resolved not to oppose the decision of the Regency, and had resigned himself to submit to the consequences of the fatality which attached itself to all the resolutions of the Government. As for the Duke of Magenta, he again bowed to the decision made known from Paris, and once more turned toward Metz. These

ORDERED DELAYS IN THE MOVEMENTS.

Headquarters reached Stonne on the 28th. Unfortunately, the different corps d'armee, separated from each other, were unable to group themselves round this position, and those of De Failly and Douay were attacked separately.

The intention of the Marshal was to reach Stonne, and from thence to Montmedy. But the enemy was already in strength in the first of these two towns, and we were, therefore, obliged to establish headquarters at Raucourt, in order to pass the Meuse at Mouzon.

Whilst, on the morning of August 30, a portion of the army effected this move-

ment, already executed on the previous evening by Gen. Lebrun, the corps of De Failly and Douay, still on the left bank of the Meuse, became engaged near Beaumont with the vanguard of the main body of the Prussian army. De Failly's corps, sharply pushed by the attacking troops, fought well for several hours, but it was finally thrown back in disorder toward Mouzon. The brigade sent to support it was involved in the retreat. As for Gen. Douay arriving at Romilly, he was obliged to cross the narrow passage of the Meuse, which afforded the greatest difficulties. Confusion took place also among his troops. Finally, the corps of Ducrot reached Carignan after a long and painful march.

For the third time Marshal McMahon was compelled to abandon the project of going to the succor of Marshal Bazaine; and, during the night of the 30th, the events of the day having shown him the impossibility of reaching Montmedy, he

GAVE THE ORDER TO WITHDRAW UPON SEDAN.

The troops, weakened by continuous marches, effected by successive checks, fell back without much order towards Sedan, where they arrived, harassed and exhausted, on the night of the 30th and morning of the 31st.

Whilst the French army took up its position around Sedan, the Prussians, to the number of 230,000, continued their march upon our track, and arrived at nearly the same moment as ourselves in sight of the town. It was too late to avoid the battle which they offered, and which we were now obliged to accept, in the disadvantageous position where we had been driven.