

not put fame, fortune, or fine looks in the balance—and would most likely say as a character said in one of the articles of our favourite Putnam:—"If Saak-peare loved me, and I did not love him, how could I marry him?"

"I shall hate her if she does not accept you," was the very womanly response as the young man closed the door. But dear little Mrs. Carlisle had no cause to put her threat into execution, for Anne had long appreciated that noble-hearted young gentleman too much, so she thought, with many blushes, for her own peace of mind. A few days after Edward Carlisle had been an accepted lover, Anne was returning from dinner to her work, in her much worn, and rather rusty black dress, common shawl, and last year's bonnet. She usually chose the least frequented street, because it was the nearest, but tempted by the warm spring sunshine and the bright blue sky, she turned into the fashionable thoroughfare.

Edward Carlisle was standing on the steps of the House, in company with several young men, when one of them taking his cigar from his mouth, said, with a good deal of animation:—

"By Jove, Carlisle, there's a girl fit to be a princess by her stately step," and flinging his cigar away, he sprang down the steps, saying, "I'll see her face, or my name is not Charlie Howell." She looks for Mrs. Bowen.

"Not without my leave, Charlie—that girl is my affianced wife," said Edward Carlisle, with sharpness, as he left the astonished group and hastily joined Anne.

After our heroine had served her time out with Mrs. Bowen, which she persisted in doing, they were married in church.

Mrs. Harper was deeply mortified as she remembered the stand she had taken, but she only tossed her head as she said that "such people as the Carlises could afford to marry anybody."

About this time the elder Mrs. Carlisle was summoned to her drawing room to receive a certain Mrs. Lofton with her daughter and Charlie Howell. "I know what she's come for," she said, a little indignant, to her husband.

"What?"

"O, to quiz me on account of this *mesalliance*, as she calls it. She'll find she's caught a tartar."

As she anticipated, Mrs. Lofton, after a few commonplaces, said in her smooth tones:—

"I was sorry when I heard of your brother's marriage."

"Sorry! what for! we are delighted."

"O, of course it is well to make the best of such things, but her position was so low."

"I don't know what you call position, Mrs. Lofton, when you speak of a woman like my sister-in-law, highly educated and accomplished, being beneath us; if you alluded to her occupation, I must say it is a very poor taste for us Americans to scoff at trade. Why my husband's father was a carpenter, and I believe your mother learned to make coats and pants of my grandmother."

This was a home thrust little expected, and little relished, but it wouldn't do to seem offended; for besides being a mutual disclosure, Mrs. Carlisle was too important a person to get offended with.

"By Jove, she's a sensible woman!" exclaimed Charlie Howell, as they walked home; "she might teach us all common sense—but there are few dress-makers like Mrs. Edward Carlisle."

THE RESULTS OF THE CAMPAIGN.

(From the Edinburgh Review for October, 1855.)

The War from the landing at Gallipoli to the Death of Lord Raglan. By W. H. RUSSELL, Correspondent of the Times. London: 1855.

(Continued from our last.)

It has been frequently said, however, that the war was conducted in an old-fashioned way; that our generals were the heroes of 1812 and 1815; that our artillery might have been used at the siege of Namur or figured on Uncle Toby's bowling green; and that military science had not kept pace with civil engineering. No doubt these allegations were partly true, because there had been an immense demand of late years for the application of the intellect in this country to civil rather than to military purposes. Our generals were elderly men, because they have lived through a long peace; but so, with few exceptions, are those of our antagonists and of our allies; and our means of action were not at first adapted to the magnitude of our object. But if this were our starting point, we confidently affirm that within six months from the commencement of these operations, we had advanced with enormous and incredible rapidity beyond it, and that the entire history of warfare does not afford any instance of such important changes and such extraordinary novelties in the art of war. The truth is, that far from carrying on these operations in an old-fashioned way, the novelty and multiplicity of the means placed at the disposal of the generals was so great, that the minds of those who were engaged in directing these great works could barely keep pace with them; and when we have failed it has not been from any want of such material resources as the ingenuity or resolution of the country could supply, but from the deficiency of a high standard of intellectual capacity and of professional education in the army. The intimate union of the naval and military services was new, for it was the first time that two vast armies, operating on a coast, had within sight, and under their command, a large steam fleet to supply all their wants, and to await their orders. A great part of the science of ballistics as exemplified by this extraordinary siege was new to the engineers, for never before was guns of such calibre, or projectiles of such elaborate construction, used in war; and we attempted to demonstrate at length in our last number, that the expedients resorted to both by the defence and by the attack, were practical discoveries in the art of fortifications. We have it on high authority that the French arsenals alone have sent about a million shot and shell to the East since the opening of the war, and Marshal Pelissier states that 1,600,000 rounds of ammunition have been expended in the siege; whereas the largest amount of ordnance stores ever consumed before amounted at the siege of Antwerp to about 65,000 rounds. The weight of the siege trains was equally novel and astonishing. The old 24-pounders were silenced and discarded as porgons, and the success of the siege was mainly due to the introduction of a weight of metal never seen before. To work guns of such dimensions in lines of such surprising extent, mechanical ingenuity was again applied; for nothing less than a fleet of transports and a railroad could have enabled the artillery to bring up the siege trains and the tons of metal to be hurled against the works of Sebastopol. Lastly, to organize the application and the supply of these extraordinary means of action, an instantaneous communication was established between the camp and the seat of Government 3,000 miles off. Of course these devices were not all prepared beforehand, and the torpor of official routine and professional traditions was overtaken by the vivid inventive genius and the enthusiastic interest of the nation. But these expedients arose one after another *pro re nata*; and when it is considered that barely six months had elapsed from the sailing of the expedition to the moment when our full resources were in operation, and that another six months exhausted the accumulated resistance of the Russians and compelled them to retreat, we venture to affirm that hereafter men will wonder, not at the protracted duration of the siege, but at the rapidity with which it was brought to a glorious termination.

These have proved to be the true elements of victory to the Western Powers. They had not at their command the innumerable legions of the Russian armies, for their military forces were on a peace establishment. They had not accumulated stores of war at their disposal, which it appears to have been the constant object of Alexander and of Nicholas to collect during a period of forty years, for the eventual subjugation of the East. But the Western Powers brought into action the superior energy and civilization of Europe; and there can hardly be a more vivid picture of the contrast between these antagonists than the railway train hissing from Balaklava to the camp, with the mighty stores of the besiegers, and the long convoys of *arabas* toiling painfully over the steeper of the Crimea to the relief of the besieged. Had Russia expended on railways and internal improvements one-half of the millions

she had squandered on military preparations, she would have been infinitely more formidable to Europe, and far better able to resist the present invasion of her territories. As it is, we owe the evacuation of Sebastopol to the exhaustion of the Russian armies rather than to the destruction of its works. The system of internal defence was unsuited to the last, and the fall of the place has not lessened the respect with which we regard the authors of the remarkable system of fortification thrown up around it. At the moment at which we write it is only of the fall of Sebastopol that we can speak as an accomplished fact, but we entertain the strongest hopes that before the termination of the campaign the same strategical causes which have mainly brought about this important result, will be followed by the evacuation or loss of the Crimea by the Russians.

The military results of the siege of Sebastopol, however great they may be, are of secondary interest to its political consequences. The maritime preponderance of Russia in the Black Sea for a long period destroyed: the fortress from which an embassy or an expedition perpetually threatened the shores of the Bosphorus is dismantled; but above all, England and France have shown the world that gigantic as this enterprise undoubtedly was, they had not overrated their own strength in engaging in it. To have failed in such an undertaking was impossible, for it would have dimmed the glory of the Imperial Eagles of France, and lowered the renown and influence of Britain. There was, no doubt, a moment when the disappointment of the premature hopes raised after the battle of the Alma, and the excessive hardships endured by the allied armies, induced the neutral states of the Continent to form an erroneous estimate of our strength and of our determination. The winter campaign, the impassioned appeals of the press to the sympathy of the public, the partial dissolution of the British Cabinet, the angry and dissatisfied attitude which the House of Commons retained during the session, were all construed on the Continent as proofs of the decline of our real power and the hopeless confusion of our political institutions. The world had forgotten that under a free government it is easier to heal wounds than to hide them; and that though a melancholy list of disasters was daily thrust before the nation, the nation never desisted from its heroic labours to repair them. Other armies have suffered quite as much or more in proportion than our own. The losses of the Russians were enormous; and even Austria found that the concentration of her troops in Galicia, where not a shot was fired, cost her as many men and horses as a bloody campaign. But these sufferings were concealed, and it might be supposed that the hardships of the winter campaign had fallen with tenfold severity on ourselves. If such were the expectations of the enemy, or of our more timid allies the Austrians, they were mistaken. The spring and summer found the British divisions of the allied army fully equal to every duty that could be required of them. But when such constant efforts had been made in this country, partly from ignorance, partly from misplaced zeal, and partly from less honorable motives, to misrepresent the policy of the Government and to underrate the resources it had brought into the field, we can feel no surprise that foreign States, forming their opinion of our power from this imperfect information, should have exaggerated our inefficiency, and rushed to the conclusion that the military power of England had set for ever. It is very clear that the motives which actuated the Cabinet of Vienna on the 2d of December, when a treaty was signed binding it to concert ulterior measures if the Russians did not accept the four bases before the end of that month, had materially changed when the period of action arrived; and the most rational explanation of this change is the distrust of the success of the allies, felt by the time-serving cabinets of Central Europe. This opinion was of course fostered by the indefatigable agents of the Russian Government, and it extended to every part of the globe. It was circulated among the native princes of India, and might be traced by our diplomatic agents in the United States, in South America, and even to the barbarous islands of distant seas. The greater was then the doubt, the greater is now the triumph; our victory is measured by the obstacles it has overcome and the sacrifices it has cost; and although it is possible that Sebastopol might have fallen into the hands of the allied armies by a sudden attack after the battle of the Alma, it is clear that the success of such a surprise would not have had one-tenth part of the same effect on the prestige of the Russian Empire, or on the opinion of the world, as the laborious and sanguinary triumph the allied generals have at last accomplished.

As far as this country and France are concerned, the capture of Sebastopol and the destruction of the Russian Black Sea fleet accomplish the most prominent and immediate objects of the war. Of the four principles laid down in the last negotiations as the indispensable conditions of peace, some are partially and some effectually attained. The Principalities are freed from the protectorate of Russia; the treaties imposed by the Cabinet of St. Petersburg on the Porte are annulled; the invasion of the Principalities has been punished; and it only remains for the Allied Powers to cause a form of government to be established in those fertile countries which may inaugurate a happier era than that passed under the scourge of Russian protection. The Septennial Hospodariate of Prince Stirbey terminates in May 1856, and before that time it is essential that new institutions should be established in the Principalities on the principles already agreed to at Vienna. This object is the more pressing from the extreme unpopularity of the Austrian occupation, and the inordinate corruption and profligacy of the wretched government now existing in Bucharest and Sassy. Nor can we discover any reason that the Porte and its allies should not at once take measures to place the government of these dependencies on the Ottoman Empire on a permanent foundation—an object to which the assent of Russia is indeed a matter of secondary consideration. Her recognition of the established Moldo-Wallachian government would then become one of the conditions of peace.

The navigation of the Danube was the point on which the Conference at Vienna in April last was most successful; but, as was suggested by Lord John Russell, the complete restoration of the right bank of the stream to Turkey, as it was before the treaty of Adrianople, should be an essential condition for the maintenance of this arrangement.

The events of the 8th and 9th September may be said to terminate for a lengthened period the preponderance of the Russian maritime power in the Black Sea; but they also give us the right to require, in a more peremptory form, conditions calculated to ensure and preserve the permanent and complete independence of those waters. The Crimea being once in possession of the Allies, becomes a material guarantee for these conditions. Enormous expenses and sacrifices have been incurred to conquer it; but having destroyed the Russian fleet and driven out her armies, the principal positions in the Peninsula can be held with very little cost or danger by the maritime States. Sebastopol would be secure in the hands of a French garrison of a few thousand men and a squadron to watch the Bay of Odessa; whilst a detachment of our own troops might hold Kertch and Yenikale and command the Sea of Azoff until the termination of the war. The whole of this service might be efficiently performed by the steam frigates and corvettes of the fleet, the enemy having lost his whole maritime force. By these means, if the war be prolonged, the Allied Powers may at a very small expense extinguish the trade and political influence of Southern Russia, and ultimately restore to her the liberty of navigating the Black Sea on their own conditions.

(To be continued.)

Correspondence.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE EXAMINER.

DEAR SIR,—Permit me, in your next impression, to call the attention of the Church Wardens of St. Paul's Church in this City, to the most unseemly and very irreverent custom of drying clothes on the railings enclosing the sacred edifice committed to their trust,—and to subscribe myself,
Yours truly, PARISHIONER.
Charlottetown, Christmas Day, 1855.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE EXAMINER.

SIR,—Permit me to direct your attention to a "Notice to Tenants," signed "John R. Bourke," which has appeared in the last few numbers of your paper, in which that gentleman requests all persons indebted to him for rent or arrears of rent on what he terms his part of half of Lot 37, to pay the same forthwith; and also notifies the public that he is

prepared to lease or sell any part of said property, as his titles are now duly regarded.

However plausible that notice may appear, I beg to inform the tenants and settlers on the above mentioned lot that Mr. Bourke's titles are the very identical documents, the legality of which were tested in the Supreme Court of this Island last May, at the suit of "John R. Bourke vs. Patrick Mooney and others," and were found wanting; the recording of which does not by any means render them valid. All the alteration or amendment these documents received since examined at the above suit is a few very imperfect interlineations, which appear to have been made for the purpose of leading the public into the belief that these constitute a title for Lot 37. But, Mr. Editor, the day is past for Mr. Bourke to practice on the credulity of the public, and no doubt the tenantry and settlers on Lot 37 will keep a sharp look-out for their rights, and will not be entangled by his fascinations, without taking legal advice, touching the pretended titles alluded to, which it appears consist of a lease purporting to have been given by a Mrs. Molesworth and her husband, both of the City of Dublin, in Ireland, on the one part, and Mr. Bourke of the other part, for the term of 99 years, at 10*l.* per annum rent, and dated 18th December, 1854, which lease seems to be superseded by a subsequent conveyance of the same property by the same parties to the said J. R. Bourke, dated 19th December, 1854, "for and during the natural life" of the said Mrs. Molesworth, for 100*l.* sterling.

It appears, therefore, quite evident that Mr. Bourke's title, if valid, would entirely depend upon the longevity of an old lady in Dublin. How, then, can he sell or lease her property according to his "notice to tenants?" That gentleman also requests all arrears of rent to be paid to him by the tenantry on the above property; but where is his authority to collect the rents? his power of attorney, (if he has any), is not "duly recorded" with his parchment titles; therefore he has no right whatever to receive one shilling of rent until he can produce legal power from the rightful owner or owners of the land.

I beg to remain,

Your humble servant,

A NATIVE.

H. C., December 15, 1855.

THE EXAMINER.

CHARLOTTETOWN, DECEMBER 31, 1855.

We alluded in last Monday's paper to two articles which appeared in the *Islander* of the previous Friday, unjustly and coarsely attacking His Excellency the Lieut. Governor, and we intimated that we would probably notice them somewhat in detail in this week's issue. We are fully convinced that it is not at all necessary to occupy much space in reviewing the *Islander's* animadversions. Those whose opinions we care for are never influenced by anything they may chance to read in that paper,—and as for the gentleman who is the subject of the intemperate abuse referred to, he has seen enough of public life not to disregard most thoroughly the attacks of a paper so recklessly conducted as the *Islander* is, by an individual who has no other motive than to earn his wages in some way or other—who has been disappointed in all his ambitious schemes—and who now, in his dotting old age, finds he has no character to win or lose. How degrading it is to any press to employ such assistance as that on which the *Islander* subsists! There is an individual, long since banished from the arena of public life for his political tergiversations, by a betrayed and indignant constituency—forced to bury himself in the bush, from economical and prudential considerations—without an atom of influence in any section of the Colony, and remarkable for nothing so much as unparalleled mendacity, vulgarity and impertinence—setting himself up as the censor of men in power, for no other reason than because he and the wretched faction who support him do not happen to be in power themselves! We are far from thinking that the respectable portion of the Tory party actively encourage the attacks now so frequently made upon the Lieutenant Governor; indeed several of them have been heard to express their dissatisfaction and regret at the appearance of such articles. We trust they are sincere in this expression of regret; but we must say that we think if they had a hearty will in the matter, they would find a way of abating the nuisance.

The reason, it appears, why the *Islander* is so very indignant with the Governor is, that he will persist in governing the Colony on constitutional principles—that he will co-operate with his Executive Council in carrying out, with a fidelity unsurpassed, the new principles of Colonial polity introduced by his immediate predecessor. If Governor Daly would obligingly and graciously strangle Responsible Government—if he would say to his advisers: "Gentlemen, I purpose to govern this Colony henceforth just as I may think proper, regardless of your opinions, and of the wishes of those who placed you in a parliamentary majority; and I shall select persons to fill the public situations without reference to political affinity, selecting even your opponents whenever it may please me so to do"—if His Excellency would adopt this course there is no doubt he would afford great satisfaction to the editor of the *Islander*—it is the very course, indeed, which that unscrupulous man has more than once pointed out to Her Majesty's Representative. It is needless to say that the day is never likely to arrive when His Excellency would even entertain the thought of such a thing, and hence we may be sure, that so long as Maclean is paid to do it, there will be a hash and a rebash of such abuse as the last *Islander* contained, regarding which, we feel convinced, no one in the Colony will be half so indifferent as the Lieut. Governor himself.

The "sketch of the public career of Lieut. Governor Daly," (in Friday week's *Islander*) is too absurdly false and contemptible for serious notice. One who is intimately acquainted with the history of His Excellency's career in Canada, assures us that the "sketch" is fictitious from beginning to end. The story about Lord Metcalfe's quarrel with his Executive Council is grossly misstated. His Lordship's advisers did not raise the question recently mooted by *Husard's Gazette*, as to the extent of responsibility devolving on a governor—the question was not "that the governor-general should make such appointments as his Council might recommend;" but the question was this—that he should give the Council a written pledge that he would make no appointments without their concurrence. Lord Metcalfe very properly rejected the proposal—(and where is the Governor that would not, should not, do the same?) Mr. Daly sustained his lordship, and his conduct in so doing was afterwards highly approved by all parties in Canada. To give a written pledge that the Governor-General should do nothing without consent of his Council, would be virtually to abolish the gubernatorial office. The demand was not only a highly improper, but an offensive one. If a governor chooses to act arbitrarily against the views of his

Council, in making appointments, or in any other respect, the most effectual way to bring him to his senses, is for the Council to resign, and turn the parliamentary majority against him. If he should resort to a dissolution, and his conduct be really indefensible, there is not much likelihood that the people would return a majority of his creatures. That Lord Metcalfe acted in a manner becoming the representative of Majesty, was the opinion entertained by the people of Canada, as shortly afterwards expressed at the polls, and by that opinion was Mr. Daly justified in the course he pursued. But even while his lordship differed with his council on the occasion referred to, and from that time hence, Responsible Government did not, and has not ceased to be administered in all its integrity.

From the whole tenor of the article in the *Islander*, which we have just noticed, one might suppose it impossible for the writer ever to speak or think well of His Excellency Governor Daly. But there is an old saying which reminds us how necessary it is for a certain class of people to have good memories, and we shall add one or two to the many thousand proofs that have been given to enforce the adage. We take the following extract from an editorial in the *Islander* of June 16, 1854, published, as will be remembered, shortly previous to the general election of that year, in which the hope is confidently expressed, that the people would not return a majority prepared to carry out Responsible Government as then and now understood. His Excellency was then quite a stranger amongst us, and the editor of the *Islander* was weak enough to think that fulsome flattery like the following would seduce him from the plain path of duty:—

Neither should it be forgotten that we have now a Governor who loves his duty, and will dutifully execute it, to the honor of the name which he serves, and the interests of the people whom he governs. Before his experienced and searching glance, we cannot but believe that every respectable man—if there be one—connected with the impure cause called the "Liberal Reform Association," which holds secret meetings, and has neither pronounced nor promoted a single reform of any sort that we ever heard of, however it has conspired against the national liberties of its fellow subjects, will be ashamed of his connection.

In another No. of the same paper (July 21st, 1854) we find an editorial article, headed, "a word in season," written after the election, when it was notorious that the Tory party had been signally defeated. The Government was not then changed. Messrs. Palmer, Holl & Co. still held office, although they could not procure a quorum to make an Executive Council. The *Islander* appeared to be silly enough to think, that, by raising a cry about persons leaving the Colony, in the event of the Liberals coming into power, the Governor might be induced to disregard the large majority of Liberals, and still attempt to govern with the broken and utterly routed party of the Tories. Hence the "word in season," which fell so far short of its aim, and from which the following is an extract:—

We have now a Governor who loves his duty—and Provincial politics, better than any man, or party of men, in the Island, can instruct him; and until they see His Excellency execute his duty vicariously, nobody should speak of emigrating, on political grounds.

In the leading article of the same paper, (Dec. 21), we are told that the Governor committed an act of "high treason" in enrolling the volunteers, now disbanded, when the Rent Roll Act had not become law—that his doing so was a "levying" of "war" on the inhabitants of the Colony—and that his offence in this respect was not more complete than that which led the first Charles to the block." This is not merely baldness and bluster of the most contemptible kind, but it is baldness and bluster without a particle of truth. The volunteers were not enrolled because the Rent Roll Act passed our Legislature—it is true their continuance as an armed force would depend upon the Act receiving the royal allowance; but they were enrolled because the Legislature deemed an armed force of some kind necessary, and made provision for the maintenance of such force in the autumn of last year. It is also true the words "constabulary force" are used in the Appropriation Act; but it would have been impossible for the Government, to have procured constables at so cheap a rate, and so efficient for the service, as the Newfoundland pensioners, who were allowed each only two shillings a day, and were well drilled and experienced men. The *Islander* also falsely asserts that those pensioners were sent for—"imported here" by our Government. The men arrived here before they were discharged from Her Majesty's service, but not at the direction of our local Executive, and of course had a right to Barrack accommodation. It was only after they had received their discharge, that the Government here organized a force of twenty-five men, taking half that number from the body of Newfoundland pensioners and the other half from pensioners previously in the Colony.

Who does not remember the hue and cry made by the Tories, in which the *Islander* joined more lustily than any, about the time Her Majesty's Government had decided on withdrawing the regulars from the colony? "It was all the fault of Responsible Government," said they; "if we lose the troops, the Snatchers must be held accountable for the loss, for there will be no protection for life and property." This was the cry raised by the discontented and unprincipled set, and yelled with the utmost discord and ferocity by the *Islander*. When the Liberals did organize a small force, in obedience to the expressed desire of the Legislature, for the protection of life and property, should any sudden emergency require their intervention, they are again honored with the maledictions and Billingsgate of the *Islander*. But why? because it was the intention of the Liberal Government to make the *Islander's* masters, the proprietors, provide the means necessary for maintaining the force.

And who does not remember the time, while we had a regular force in the Colony, when the Holl & Palmer Government caused a legion of special constables to be sworn in, provided with staves, and the military in the Barracks to be served with ball cartridges, and be ready on the following morning with fixed bayonets, to stab or shoot down any refractory Liberals who might interfere with Palmer's and Longworth's election? Did any Act of Parliament authorize them to resort to such high-handed measures? No, servile and cringing as the Assembly of the day was, it dared not sanction such a despotic proceeding, and an honest public opinion revolted at the assumption, and soon after wrested from the despots their short-lived authority. The shameless organ of that party displays a wretched taste and total want of judgment in thus reminding us of facts and occurrences which must ever cover with disgrace the recollection of their short but arbitrary career.

TALE-BEARING AND SPYING.

We were of opinion that the editor of the *Islander* had long since exhausted all his ammunition and means of attack against the Government, and that he would betake himself, from week to week, to re-asserting his old falsehoods and repeating his customary Billingsgate slang. To be sure he does the latter, without a week's intermission, and we have no doubt