

Temperance has been associated, in all ages of the world, with the rise and progress of Nations. In the decline and fall of States, it has been traced the decline and fall of States, and their eventual disappearance. Whatever else may have been their vices or the ends of an Empire, the prevalence of intemperance, and the habits paved the way for their overthrow, and rendered their subjugation a work comparatively less difficult.

The histories of Greece and Rome furnish undeniable evidence in support of this proposition; while the connection between sobriety and success, on the one hand, and intemperance and ruin, is traced in the histories of Persia and Babylon, as by the finger of Omnipotence itself.

That the Persian Monarch was a chosen instrument in the hands of the Almighty, for the chastisement of the Chaldeans, was a lesson in the word of God itself; that he was frugal and temperate, that his eyes were unclouded, his strength unimpaired by the overeating influence of the intoxicating draught, and that his own strong intellect and manly will guided, preserved him from the sin of drinking, and secured his freedom from its syren influence, we learn from no less a witness than the immortal Xenophon. How the noble son of Iran reproved his father, the Astrucian King, for drinking more than what commensate skill the sage of twelve years attacked the wine-bibbing propensities of the monarch, and how he was finally expelled from the throne, and trained to thought and inured to toil; waxing in strength from the observance of the severe rules of Temperance and from repeated conflicts with the monarch, who was finally overthrown, Cyrus became the accepted head of a people predestined to become the scourge of the effete and wine-loving monarchs of the East.

Ever long those two nations confront each other in battle array, and as might be expected, the hosts of Belshazzar melt away like snow before the first onset of the invincible conquering adversaries. Defeat follows defeat, and pressed on every side by the advancing masses of the victorious armies, the haughty Babylonian walls, hitherto impregnable, and the high walls of the Golden City. — There with stores of Corn for thirty years, they look down upon the victors, and are not to be moved, and do not show about defiance. For two years, the soldiers of Cyrus essay in vain to overwhelm those lofty bastlements. For two long years the Assyrian commander, with his army of aggressive warfare, but fails to reach the taunting foe. There stand the unbroken walls, and the redoubtable towers, and the towers seem dear to the skies. No noise to the quarry than he was two years before. Baffled and discouraged, the Persian may at last retract his army from the walls. The Monarch and a thousand of his nobles are sent to celebrate a Heaton carnival. The rest of the City is left to the mercy of the City is given up to drunkenness.

In the pride and inflation of his heart, forgetful of the terrible manifestations of Divine power which his father had witnessed, the drunken monarch shouts for the sacred vessels which had belonged to the Temple of God at Jerusalem; they are desecrated with the most profane confusions, and the vessels of his so impious lips; at that moment a shadowy hand is seen tracing mystic characters on the wall. Three voices upon the desecrated. Quaking with fear, he listens to their interpretation by the aged Daniel. The fulfillment is at hand. The sound of strife is heard in the air, and confusion follows. The king and his attendants are slaughtered in their festal chamber, and the Empire of Babylon ceases to exist!

Reference to the history of Cyrus is the history of Mahomet. That far-saging man, being resolved on conquest, and sensible of the importance of enforcing habits of sobriety among his followers, and of abstaining from wine, he endeavored to do so, and to prevent any one from jeopardizing their safety and ruin his schemes of aggrandizement, issued the prohibition of wine an article of Religion, which has been observed by his followers, and has come down to the present time. Some silly persons, with little brains and less logic, have endeavored to prove that Mahomet was a hypocrite, because they resemble the followers of the false Prophet in respect to their rejection of the wine-cup, just as though abstinence constituted the essence of his religion. It is to be regretted, in the code of Mahomet more objectionable than this, we opine that it would scarcely prove a disadvantage to being, in prohibiting the intoxicating cup, and giving, in the Koran, the author of the Koran only borrowed a leaf from the Word of God itself; and that every nation, and every individual, who wish to prosper, to follow his example. While the Mohammedans act up to their faith in respect to the wine-drinking, they so far do well; but we regret to find that the Mohammedans in the English and French is beginning to effect a change in their habits; that many of them have relaxed the strictness of their faith, and have introduced the wine-drinking in drink introduced by their west-

ern allies.—Will the Christian say, that they are any better for the example and influence of Mahomet? In respect to the use of intoxicating liquors? — This reminds us of the conduct of our own Government—how different from that of Mahomet, and how different from that of the rulers who took care that the diet of their soldiers should be such as to promote all the good habits, and to suppress the evil ones. The rulers of Britain are playing the game of Allah with the fiery draught which is consuming their strength and rendering them, in other respects and in other directions, the most obedient and arduous duties that devolve upon the soldier during the period of war; which has had as much to do with the prevalence of cholera, and with the great loss which our brave fellows have met, and the disappointments they have been called upon to sustain, as the deficiency of the ration, and the short supply of food and clothing and other commissariat mismanagement that have occurred since the siege of Sebastopol first commenced.

Had our army been Mahomedan in one respect, its ranks had not been so effectually thinned by the deficiency of the ration, and the part of our sentinels and outposts might have saved the loss of many lives; and the cross of St. George might have waved long ere this, over the ruins of Sebastopol, *Telegraph.*

DEATH OF DR. COLE.—REV. SHERMAN H. COLE, President of the American Bible Union, died at New York on the morning of the 28th ult., from Paralysis.

MACHINERY IN THE WESTERN STATES.—REAPING MACHINES are almost altogether used at the West. They cost \$170. They will cut fourteen acres of wheat per day. Contracts for reaping are made at 62¢ cents per acre. The contractor furnishes the horse and the driver, and the farmer has two horses, five binders, and two sheaves. THRESHING MACHINES will thresh 300 bushels per day. It is generally contracted to be done at five cents per bushel, the contractor furnishing the horse and driver, and the farmer furnishing the horse and five men, making in all eight hands, viz: one driver, one feeder, one measurer, one to pitch sheaves, one to cut promotions, and three to take away straw.

PROMOTION—A GLANCE AT THE CONSAUGHT RANGERS.—A walk through Winchester Barracks the other day led to some information about promotion and the regimental records, which are very worthy of perusal. The depot of the Cannanagh Rangers (88th Foot) attracted attention.

"I was 22 years in the regiment, and have only left the depot 13 months," said Mr. P., "I never before saw that the general of the 88th Foot, which is a regular, nor one of those non-commissioned officers, all have joined as recruits and been promoted, since I left last year." An officer whose peculiar task is to drill young officers for the army, and to get them ready for regimental duty in the shortest possible time, was pointed out. This was Captain Dunning, formerly Adjutant of the Rangers. He entered as a private soldier in 1821, and rose through all the gradations of non-commissioned rank, until he was a young lieutenant under him the other day; and the barrack rumour is, that the "young swells" would rather be in the Crimea, than Dunning and sit in the inexorable Captain Dunning at Winchester.

Certain Major-General Dwyer, who the Rangers, his father having been a colour-sergeant—was commissioned as ensign soon after reaching Varna, last year. After the action of the Quarries, 7th June, 1855, and Lieutenant Colonel-Sergeant Dwyer, wounded at the vacant companies as captains, and Little stood senior lieutenant except one; he was also adjutant. The quartermaster-sergeant, who went out with the regiment, had risen to the rank of ensign, and was Lieutenant Colonel-Sergeant Dwyer, wounded at the Quarries on the 7th June, had returned to his regiment before the end of the month, and was ensign. Two of the lieutenants nominated for captains after that action had only been one, twelve, the other, twenty, and twenty, respectively.

An interesting collection of regimental letters addressed to one who was long and well respected in the Rangers informs us of these and other particulars about Criméan service. The name of the writer is Lieutenant M'Nally, who lost a leg at Inkerman, thus describes his case:—"I am

discharged on 25 a day; this, with the £20 regimental annuity, will enable me and my family to do well. The Colonel—may God bless him—has been very kind in sending me for it. It will just give me an income of £56 10s. per year. That is very nice indeed, as I am so very healthy. I will go to Castlebar, where I intend to commence some business, and do as well as I can. O'Donnell, who succeeded Mr. Little, and was killed at Inkerman, was in receipt of 7s a week from one of the London funds. Mrs. O'Donnell's only letters to the respected old soldier, whom they all address as before us. One relates a touching incident. On the 4th of November, Sergeant Major O'Donnell wrote a tender letter to his wife (who, with Mrs. M'Nally, wife of the foregoing, had parted from the regiment at Enniskillen, and returned to Castlebar), and desired a lock of hair to be cut from his baby-daughter and sent to him in the Crimea. It was affectionately done. But the mail took it to the wrong place, and the soldier, however bound, with the official lists of killed and wounded of the 5th November, of whom there was "Sergeant Major O'Donnell, killed." That lock of baby's hair still wanders from office to office, or is buried in the confusion of Ballyvaughan, and is not to be seen.

It is pleasing to observe the respect, the affection, with which all the letter-writers of the Rangers speak of their gallant colleague—Shirley, now Brigadier-General. One correspondent writes to the respected officer, who entered the colonel's holster-case, and would have wounded him severely, if not fatally, but for his prayer-book, in which it lodged. And another letter says:—"We regret to hear that Shirley has been promoted to a G. B. and major-general."

THE COST OF THE WAR.—If we turn again to the expenditure occasioned by the struggle of the Crimea, we are struck by the disconcerting heavy costs of war. From the sum of £16,300,000, which constituted, upon the average of the three years 1851, 1852, and 1853, our aggregate charges in the army, army, and ordnance departments, we have to deduct the sum of £1,000,000, and indeed, including the vote of credit of £3,000,000, to upwards of £19,000,000, showing upon the whole an excess of some £32,500,000 to the figures of the expenditure in the Crimea. Perhaps it may have occurred to the reader's remarkable, that, with forces which are represented as still undeveloped, and with an army in the field of small numerical strength, compared with our resources and population, in the next few years, we shall make such rapid advances in our outlay. The result, however, admits of easy explanation. 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