

FULL TEXT

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The collision happened at 1.55 a. m., in the morning of Sunday, February 21, 1924. The evidence shows that during the previous week there had been very heavy snow and drifts on the western, or Tignish end of the line. All the witnesses are agreed that on Saturday, the 20th, preceding the accident, very high winds and a heavy ground drift with a temperature about zero prevailed.

Train No. 54 which left Tignish at 7.30 that morning was stalled in Handrahan's Cutting and required a gang of shovellers to release her. No. 211 left Summerside at the usual hour, and at Wellington picked up twelve snow shovellers who had boarded No. 54 after having released her at Handrahan's Cutting in the morning. When No. 211 reached Handrahan's Cutting shortly before 7 p. m. she became stalled in the snow, where she remained until 1.55 a. m. the following morning, when she was run into by No. 53.

Tignish tank is at mileage 66.1. Handrahan's Cutting is some five or six hundred yards west of the tank and about one mile from Tignish. It is about one-quarter of a mile in length. McLeod, the roadmaster in charge from Charlottetown to Tignish gives the following description of it:

Q—Is it a confluence cutting, or does it vary with the topography of the ground line?—A—It is just a continuous cutting. In other words there is no great embankment, it is a level piece of ground, no deep clay cutting.

Q—What is the height of it?—A—It would not be any more than three or four feet, that is, the clay cutting.

Q—All the way through?—A—In parts of it.

McLeod, the roadmaster, who had been over the line the same week says that the snow in Handrahan's Cutting was then between five and seven feet where it had been thrown up by the plough.

Gaudet, the Section Foreman, at Tignish, who was in charge of the gang of men which released No. 54 in the morning, says that there was at that time five or six feet of snow in places over the rail on both sides of the track. Gaudet went through to Summerside on No. 54 and returned on No. 53.

One Chaisson, who was acting as section foreman in Gaudet's absence was engaged that day with a gang of ten men shovelling out the yards at Tignish. He heard No. 211 blowing for help and with his ten men went out to the cutting and assisted the men who were trying to release No. 211. Chaisson gives the following description of snow conditions in the cutting:—

Q—How deep was the snow along beside that train?—A. It was six or seven feet deep.

Q—Was there any room for the men to work between the snow bank and the cars?—A. No it was full.

Q—Where were they shovelling?—A. They started at the top of the cutting and shovelled down.

Q—To get down to the rail?—A. Yes.

Zero Temperature

When No. 211 stalled there was a very heavy northwest wind blowing and the temperature was about zero. The men worked until about nine o'clock but finding they were making no headway, knocked off, and went into the baggage car, the intention being to resume work when the weather should moderate.

Murray, the conductor of No. 211, got a team and drove into Tignish Station. He says he left about 8.40 and arrived at the station between 9 and 9.15 p. m. McTague, the agent at Tignish, says about 8.45, but the exact time does not matter. What took place between McTague and Murray has a very important bearing and for that reason I will quote the evidence at some length:—

Q—What report did you make?—A—I told them exactly the condition, the position our train was in, and the condition where we were stalled, and that it was impossible for the men to work.

Q—That they had worked so long that it was impossible for them to work in the cold, that they were shovelling especially on one side, and the snow would come in faster than they could put it out, and that on one side they could not work at all.

Q—What did you ask for in the way of help or protection, or both?—A—I asked to get more help, more men to come out and shovel out the train, besides the number we had.

Q—What else?—A. I also told him that the condition for getting out there did not look very good, that the men could not work until the

storm abated, I also told him to not come beyond the tank.

The Chief Commissioner: Q. Who not to come beyond the tank?—A. The agent who was there at the time, not to come beyond the tank.

Mr. Spencer: Q. What did you refer to when you said not to come beyond the tank?—A. He informed me that No. 53 train was still in Summerside, that No. 53 had not left Summerside. I told him to tell them not to come beyond the tank, and the operator at Tignish asked me would it be all right to come to the tank, and I said yes, and I replied to this question to not come beyond the tank.

Q. You made that request, not to come beyond the tank?—A. Those were my words.

Q. It was all right to come to the tank?—A. But not beyond the tank.

Q. Did you remain in the office at Tignish while this communication with the despatcher was going on?—A. Yes, all the time.

Q. What information came back to you?—A. He told me that No. 53 was getting an order, that he was giving No. 53 an order.

Q. The despatcher at Charlottetown?—A. Yes.

Q. He was giving No. 53 an Order?—A. Yes.

Q. For what?—A—That is just all I know, that he was giving No. 53 an order.

Mr. Spencer: Q. That was the answer to you in response to your request?—A. Yes.

Q. Was a copy of that order delivered to you?—A. No sir, it was not.

Further Evidence Quoted

Murray then left the station and returning shortly afterwards had some conversation with one Justin McCarthy, a porter at the station. His evidence as to the conversation is as follows:—

Q. When you came back to the station it was McCarthy you talked with?—A. Yes sir.

Q. Was that when you were told that No. 53 would stay at the tank?—A. Yes sir.

Q. Not by the agent?—A. No sir, I was not told by the agent.

Q. You say you were not told by the agent?—A. No sir.

Q. Then any statement that No. 53 would not go beyond the tank was made to you by McCarthy?—A. He said No. 53 was still in Summerside, and I said to him "She won't come in danger if she does not go beyond the tank," and he said he would notify her.

McTague, the agent at Tignish, gives the following account:—

Q. What was the first intimation you had of train No. 211 being in trouble?—A. I was called on duty by our freight porter, somewhere around 8.45. He told me that Conductor Murray was there, and that his train was stalled and wanted me to come on duty and report to the despatcher at Charlottetown.

Q. What report did he ask you to make to the train despatcher about No. 211?—A. He told me to tell Charlottetown that his train was stalled west of Tignish tank. I called up the despatcher and told him it was still there. The despatcher asked me if the main line was clear behind, if there were any cars behind the tank and his train. I asked Conductor Murray that, and he said, No, that everything was clear, and the despatcher said then, tell him to say that we are going to let No. 53 go to the tank. I gave that instruction to Mr. Murray that the despatcher said he was letting No. 53 to go to the tank.

Q. No 53 was to go to the tank?—A. It was to go to the tank.

Q. Was that communicated to you in the form of a train order?—A. No verbally, talking to the despatcher over the wire.

Q. What about the train order that Conductor Murray heard about?—A. I don't know anything about that. I did not tell him anything about a train order. There was no train order mentioned at all.

Q. Did you not tell Conductor Murray that you were giving train No. 53 an order?—A. No, I did not.

Q. Was he there all the time you were communicating with the despatcher?—A. He was there when I got that word from the despatcher. Tell him, he says, we are going to let No. 53 go to the tank. I gave that word to Murray, and then he left the office somewhere about nine o'clock. I was still talking with the despatcher, and he told me that I would not be required on duty any longer. Of course then I was going to my own home, and I found that Mr. Murray was not there. I then went to work and saw the porter, Mr. McCarthy, and told him that if Mr. Murray came back again to tell him that there was nothing further, only what the despatcher said, that he was letting No. 53 to go to the tank. There was no order given by me that she was going to stay at the tank, beyond the tank, or anything else. I

only repeated what the despatcher told me, that he was letting No. 53 to go to the tank.

Q. You left that message with your assistant, Mr. McCarthy?—A. Yes.

Q. To tell Conductor Murray?—A. To tell Conductor Murray if he should return to the office again. That was after I was through with the despatcher.

Mr. McCarthy in his evidence says that he told Murray "that No. 53 was coming to the tank."

McCormack, the train despatcher at Charlottetown, says that "about 8.45 or 9 o'clock the agent at Tignish reported that No. 211 was stalled, and they had a bunch of snow shovellers with them. I don't know how many. That it was drifting quite heavily and at the present time they could not work, but if it abated they would not have much trouble in getting out, after they got to work."

Q. Did you state definitely to Tignish that you would allow No. 53 to go to the tank?—A. The idea in asking that was that sometimes in a cutting they cut off the rear cars before they got into it, and I was wanting to be sure that they would be up to the tank in case it would be a long time there, to see that the track was clear, because it might be there for a time; I wanted to make sure that there were no cars east of the tank.

Q. You heard the evidence of McCarthy?—A. Yes.

Q. He said that the agent told him to tell Conductor Murray that No. 53 was being allowed to come to the tank?—A. Yes.

Q. Is that correct?—A. That she would be allowed to come to the tank.

Q. Was that correct?—A. If the line was clear she would go to the tank, that there were no cars left behind No. 211, that she would go to the tank. That is not saying that she would go no further than that.

Analysis of Evidence

Taking the evidence of all the witnesses it is clear beyond question that whatever McCormack's intention may have been, the message he sent to Murray was that he would allow No. 53 to go to the tank. On the faith of this message Murray assumed that No. 53 would receive orders not to go beyond the tank. He returned to his train and gave his tall brakeman, McDonald, leave to go home to Tignish for his supper. Up to that time McDonald claims he had been out at the rear of No. 211 providing the protection required by the rules. I will deal with this phase later.

Murray thought that protection at the rear of his train was no longer necessary and nothing was thereafter done to protect it.

Leaving No. 211 stalled in Handrahan's Cutting with no protection of any kind, let us return to No. 53. Delayed two hours and forty minutes on account of making connection with the boat train, No. 53 was still at Summerside when the despatcher at Charlottetown received the report about No. 211 being stalled at Handrahan's Cutting. Asked "what action did you take?" McCormack replied,—"As a precautionary measure I gave an order to No. 53—No. 31—to look out for No. 211 stalled in Handrahan's Cutting, 200 yards west of Tignish tank."

It should be explained here that when McCormack was talking to McTague, he asked him where No. 211 was stalled and McTague told him 200 yards west of the tank, which explains why Handrahan's Cutting was described in the order as 200 yards west of the tank.

In addition to issuing the so-called 31 order to No. 53 McCormack says he got in touch with Conductor Warren, who was in charge of No. 53, and advised him that No. 211 was stalled in Handrahan's Cutting. Warren gives the conversation as follows:—

"He told me that No. 211 was stalled west of the tank, and that he was going to let us go; Murray said that we were all right to the tank. He meant by that that there were none of his cars extending east of the tank, that he had not drawn his train and gone ahead with the engine, that he had his train with him."

Copies of this order issued to No. 53 were delivered to the two engineers and the rest of the crew knew of its contents before the train left Summerside. No. 53 then proceeded to Tignish tank, took water and, seeing nothing in the nature of protection for No. 211, assumed that she had managed to get through to Tignish. They accordingly started for Tignish. Moore, the driver of the leading engine on No. 53 was looking out of the window until the plough went into the cutting, when on account of the flying snow he shut his window and went in blind hitting the rear of No. 211 approximately 350 yards inside the cutting.

There are so many features of the case which indicate loose and careless methods of operation that in dealing with them it is difficult to know just where to begin.

Dealing with them in order of time, the first matter is the question of the protection which should have been given to No. 211 when it became stalled in the snow. In the first place it was the duty of the engineer to whistle out the flagman. This was not done.

Rule 99 Cited

Rule 99 of the Operating Rules of the Canadian National Railways lays down specific instructions as to the protection required in a case where a train stops on the main line under circumstances in which it may be overtaken by another train. It provides:—

99. When a train stops on the main track under circumstances in which it may be overtaken by another train a flagman must immediately go back with flagman's signals to protect the train. Under the conditions specified the distance should be at least:—

In day time, if there is no down grade towards train within one mile of its rear, and there is a clear view of its rear 6,000 feet from an approaching train, 1,500 feet (about 12 telegraph poles).

At other times and places, if there is no down grade towards train within one mile of its rear, 3,600 feet (about 28 telegraph poles).

If there is a down grade towards the train within one mile of its rear, 5,400 feet (about 42 telegraph poles).

The flagman must, after going back the specified distance, take a position where there will be an unobstructed view of him from an approaching train of, if possible, 1,500 feet, first placing two torpedoes, not less than 100 nor more than 200 feet apart, on the rail on the same side as the engineman of an approaching train 300 feet beyond such position. The flagman must remain in such position until recalled or relieved.

If recalled before another train arrives, he must, in addition to the two torpedoes, leave a fuse burning red at the point he returns from, and while returning to his train (when snow ploughs or flangers may be running, curvature, weather, or other conditions governing) a fuse burning red must be placed at such points or times as the flagman may find necessary to insure full protection.

To maintain the proper interval between trains a fuse burning red must be left by the protected train at the point from which it moves.

The flagman must always on the approach of a train display stop signals and, if not already done, place two torpedoes on the rail as before described, and then return 300 feet nearer the protected train.

The front of the train must be protected in the same way when necessary by the front brakeman or, if there is no front brakeman, by the fireman.

Figures must each be equipped for day time with a red flag 22" x 28", on a staff, at least six torpedoes and five red fuses, and for night time and when weather or other conditions obscure day signals with a red light, a white light, a supply of matches, at least six torpedoes and five red fuses.

A train should not stop between stations at a place where the view from a following train is obstructed.

When a train is moving under circumstances in which it may be overtaken by another train, such action must be taken as may be necessary to insure full protection; lighted fuses, red or yellow as the case may require, must be thrown off at proper intervals.

When a flagman goes out to protect a train his place will be filled by the person designated by the conductor.

McDonald's Evidence

McDonald, the rear brakeman on No. 211, stated in his evidence that when the train stopped he went back 2,800 yards and placed torpedoes on the rails. He says he remained out until 9.30 or 9.15, when he returned to his train on account of the cold, but he admits he left no fuses burning red as required by the rules. From his demeanor on the witness-stand and the very unsatisfactory manner in which he gave his evidence, I am satisfied that he is not telling the truth and that he never at any time went back to protect his train.

It was the duty of Conductor Murray to see that his train was properly protected, but he was unable to say whether McDonald ever was out.

Mr. Hibbits, who represented the Railway Employees, struck a note during the hearing which rather surprised me and, I think, must have surprised the trainmen present at the hearing. Having McDonald's interests in mind, he argued

that there were trains operating through some districts where the temperature falls to 65 degrees below zero, and that under such circumstances "it is humanly impossible for trainmen to go out and flag trains there." Apart from the fact that the observation has no bearing whatever on this case, it would take a lot to convince me that any conscientious and properly trained railway man would allow his train to go unprotected even under the extreme circumstances suggested by Mr. Hibbits.

We next come to the events which occurred at Tignish when Murray went there and reported the condition of his train. Briefly, his evidence is that he asked McTague that No. 53 should not come beyond the tank, and was informed by McTague that No. 53 was getting an order. He neither asked for nor received a copy of this order, but was satisfied to assume that the order was that No. 53 should not come beyond the tank. Subsequently, he saw the porter, McCarthy, and said to him, "She won't come in danger if she does not go beyond the tank, and he said he would notify her."

According to the evidence of both McTague and McCarthy, the message delivered to Murray was that the despatcher was letting No. 53 go to the tank. The despatcher admits that this is correct, so we can take it as established that this was the message given to Murray.

Murray returned to his train fully convinced that No. 53 would have orders not to go beyond the tank. Kelly the fireman on No. 211 says that when Murray returned he said to him "at Charlottetown I got an order that No. 53 would come as far as the tank and stay at the tank unless we get through." Murray says: "When I came back from Tignish I went to the cab of the engine; the driver was not there, but I found him in the baggage car. I explained what had transpired at Tignish and what the agent said about giving No. 53 an order. I felt confident that she would not come beyond the tank. I explained that to the engine driver Mr. Hessian."

Murray on his return from Tignish also permitted McDonald to go home to Tignish where he remained all night.

Apart from the marker lights on the rear, no protection whatever was given No. 211 from the time Murray returned up to the time of the collision.

Costain, an engine cleaner at Tignish, heard that No. 211 was stalled and from Tignish walked out to the cutting arriving there after 11 p. m., and remaining there until after the accident. He found Kelly, the fireman, alone in the engine, and Conductor Murray, Hessian, the engineer, and Harper a brakeman on No. 211, together with the snow shovellers, all in the car. In his evidence he said that one of the snow shovellers came up to the engine and said that the other train was at the tank. When he heard that he went to the baggage car. Murray, Hessian and Harper were there. He asked them if they knew about No. 53 being at the tank and they said yes, they knew. When he got off the car he could see the headlight of No. 53 at the tank. He started to walk down to the tank and No. 53 passed him "at the edge of the cutting." He tried to signal it but failed. I believe the evidence of this witness and accept his story as true. It shows clearly two things:—

(1) That the headlight of No. 53 at the tank could be seen from No. 211, and

(2) That the crew of No. 211 were not even keeping a lookout for the arrival of No. 53 at the tank.

Murray had no justification for relying on verbal information from the agent or anyone else, or for neglecting to obey the operating rules requiring him to protect his train. He admits he knew that rear end protection could be obtained by means of an order, and that without such order Rule 99 above quoted applied. Knowing all this he simply took a chance on the despatcher not permitting No. 53 to go beyond the tank. While it is in no way excusable him, I am satisfied that he was, as he says, fully convinced that the despatcher had given orders to No. 53 not to come beyond the tank.

Despatcher's Message

The message from the despatcher, McCormack, communicated to him by the agent, McTague, was solely responsible for this conviction on his part.

Now, let us examine McCormack's connection with the matter with a view to seeing whether any responsibility rests on him. On Saturday, February 20, McCormack was on duty from 1.30 until 10.30. He knew of the weather conditions and of the fact that No. 54 had been stalled in Handrahan's Cut-

ting in the morning. According to his evidence the report that he received from McTague about nine o'clock that evening was as follows:—

"No. 211 was stalled, and they had a bunch of snow shovellers with them, I don't know how many, that it was drifting quite heavily, and at the present time they could not work, but if it abated they would not have much trouble in getting out, after they got to work."

As to the latter part of his statement, namely, that "if the storm abated they would not have much trouble getting out," neither Murray nor McTague mention that any such statement was made, and in the light of the evidence as to the actual position of No. 211 it is more than doubtful if any such statement were ever made. However that may be, let us consider what he did.

After carefully inquiring whether there were any cars east of the tank, he told McTague to tell Murray, "we are going to let No. 53 go to the tank." Following this message one would expect that he would have issued an order authorizing No. 53 to go to the tank, but instead he gave No. 53 an order to look out for No. 211 stalled in Handrahan's Cutting.

In the light of the order he actually issued, what possible object had he in giving the message he did to Murray? The only effect it possibly could have, and which in fact it did have, was to mislead Murray into thinking that No. 53 would not be permitted to go beyond the tank. In attempting to explain his message McCormack says:—

"That is not saying that she would not go farther than that." Surely the reasonable inference to be drawn from the words of the message is that she would not go beyond the tank.

When No. 211 was first stalled shortly before 7 p. m., her crew no doubt surmised that the only train following them that night was No. 53, which was due at Handrahan's Cutting about 10.10 p. m., and this probably accounts for their failure to put out protection immediately. But it is inconceivable that if Murray had not received the message sent him by McCormack, he would not have later on put out the necessary protection.

In my view the order given to No. 53 should never have been given. The safe course under the conditions existing on the night in question was to have kept the agents both at Alberton and Tignish on duty and not to have permitted No. 53 to leave Alberton until No. 211 reached Tignish. In the alternative the despatcher might have given No. 53 an order to run to Tignish tank and to protect against No. 211 from Tignish tank to Tignish.

Protection or Equipment

Now let us examine the excuse put forward by the crew of No. 53. In the first place Moore, the head engineer on No. 53, raises a question as to the meaning of the order that was issued to his train. It reads, "Look out for No. 211 stalled in Handrahan's Cutting, 200 yards west of Tignish tank." Moore says it means to look out for protection. McEwen, the Chief Despatcher at Charlottetown, says it means to look out for equipment. Moore puts his case in this way. He says:—

"There seems to be quite a difference of opinion, especially in regard to the way Chief Train Despatcher McEwen gives his interpretation of the fulfilling of that order we held. We claim, and have always been led to believe, that it was the protection we had to look out for, not the equipment. According to Mr. McEwen's definition, it is the equipment regardless of the protection. He claims that we should have gone to the cutting that night expecting to find the train still stalled there. The form of order we held was put out in instances on the main line, lots of times. Rule 100 states that it is not safe to leave a car on the main line, even under train protection. It must be protected by torpedoes, which gives the trainmen a chance. Also Form B orders are very similar in regard to their definitions, that the second train must run, looking out for the first train ahead until the order is fulfilled. If it is the equipment that has to be looked out for, it is impossible to run trains over the line. Trains have been making schedule time, the regular trains on that order and have been making it right along. If it is equipment that has to be looked out for regardless of protection, it is impossible to do it. If it is the equipment that has to be looked out for, every point is a point of restriction, all curves, at any place. A regular train cannot possibly run more than a few miles an hour through these places."

The observations made by Mr. Moore with regard to a train fol-

lowing another train have no application to a case when the train ahead is known to be stalled in a definite place. In answer to a question put by Mr. Commissioner Stone, he said:—

"We have always been instructed that it was protection we had to look out for, and if there is any change we are not aware of the fact, as far as the form of the order is concerned."

Mr. McEwen gives his interpretation of the order as follows:—

Q. What do you consider is a proper fulfillment of the order?—A. When they arrive at the locality they are to keep a sharp lookout for either the train or the crew, which may be on the main line, or if the trouble is ahead, and if the train arrives at the locality and do not find an obstruction there, I would say the order was fulfilled, and they were at liberty to go ahead. But they have to make sure the trouble is where the order says it is.

Q. Is it your view that this train No. 53, not finding No. 211 two hundred yards west of the tank, had fulfilled that order?—No, sir, because Handrahan's Cutting was mentioned in the order, and on the evidence before the Superintendent the men swore that they understood No. 211 was in Handrahan's Cutting, and I would not consider that the order was fulfilled until that train had arrived at Handrahan's Cutting and explored it thoroughly to see whether the train was there or not.

Interpretation of Order

On the other hand McCormack says that in giving the order he wanted to convey the idea to them to be careful, so that they would be careful to look out for signals, No. 211's signals, as he would in a case of that kind.

Had the order simply read "Look out for No. 211 stalled in Handrahan's Cutting," there could not be any question as to its meaning. This language is in no way ambiguous. It is clear and simple. To make it mean what Moore says he understood it to mean, you must add words which are not there. It would not be possible to operate trains safely if every trainman were to be permitted to interpret train orders as meaning something other than what they actually say. Here however, the words "200 yards west of Tignish Tank" were added. It may be that this reference to some extent deceived the crew on No. 53. One thing is perfectly clear, that the crew on No. 53 when they found no protection out for No. 211 in the 500 to 600 yards between the tank and the cutting, were fully convinced that No. 211 had got out of the snow. It also further appears that they interpreted the order to mean that they were to look out only for protection. However that may be, I cannot by any means hold them blameless for doing what they did. They knew that when they left Summerside, No. 211 was stalled in Handrahan's Cutting. When they arrived at the tank they could see no indication of any protection for her, but one would expect careful men to make sure that she had got out of the cutting before they themselves rushed blindly into it. They did not even consult together as to what should be done under the circumstances, which strikes me as somewhat remarkable.

Before leaving the subject, I want to observe that to my mind the management in handling No. 53 in the way they did gave little consideration to the safety and despatch of the passengers carried by that train. She was sent out of Summerside headed for Tignish with full knowledge of the fact that No. 211 was stalled in the snow at Handrahan's Cutting, and without knowing when she was likely to be released. Under such conditions it is hard to understand why every operator on the line, including the Despatcher at Charlottetown, should have been permitted to go off duty.

McTague was called on duty at Tignish at 8.45 p. m. to deliver Murray's message to Despatcher McCormack, and was relieved from duty by McCormack about 9.15. McCormack went off duty at 10.30. The accident was at 1.55 a. m. and the relief train did not reach the wreck until 9.10 a. m., although the distance was only 87 miles.

Another element which may have contributed to the accident was the snowplough on No. 53, which was a train carrying passengers. On the hearing, Mr. J. E. Mitchell, General Chairman of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, appeared and filed a strong protest against the practice of operating snowploughs ahead of engines on passenger trains.

Snowplough Operation

Not only is the view of the enginemen obscured, but the danger of derailment is much greater. In the year 1924, the Brotherhood complained about this practice to the Board, and the matter was taken up with Mr. L. S. Brown, then General Manager of the Atlantic Division. At that time, Mr. Spencer, the Chief Operating Officer of the

Board, prepared a memorandum for the guidance of the company which reads in part as follows:—

"There is no complaint and no question about the snowplough operation on the main lines of the Atlantic Region, it being definitely arranged and provided for by snowplough operated by an engine and crew not handling other traffic in the train. Mr. Barker pointed out that on many of their branch lines where the traffic is extremely light and there was operation at night, that in order to start the train out in the morning it was necessary to put a snowplough (wedge type) on the front of the train to enable it to get through and, as the majority of the branch lines operated only at night, that if they were required to operate the snowplough with other cars it would mean collecting the regular train or delaying it until the engine could make it run over the branch and back again, which is some cases causes take hours, the regular train as a result would be badly disorganized whereas where the use of the snowploughs was permitted they were able to run the trains according to schedule and perform service. In many cases they found they had very few, if any, passengers."

"In my opinion the operation of the small branch lines, where trains lay up at the dead end at night, and where the main line connection is not a divisional point, is nothing better than to put a wedge plough ahead of the locomotive of the mixed train or provide for, but, where the main line connection of the branch is a divisional point, and in the case of Dartmouth subdivision which is 81.80 miles long, the Co. treville Subdivision between St. John and Fredericton, the New. waak Subdivision, 109.75 miles, at the St. Quentin Subdivision 109.10 miles, should I think be taken care of by the same class