

GREAT SPEECH BY SENATOR LOUGHEED ON NAVAL QUESTION

MAGNIFICENT EXPOSITION OF THE GOVERNMENT'S POLICY SHOWS IN ELOQUENT PERIODS, THE GRAVE NECESSITY FOR THE EMERGENCY, AND HOW EMERGENCY OCCASIONED. OUR SELF-RESPECT, DIGNITY AND PRIDE AT STAKE. ALL BRITISH CANADIANS FEEL HUMILIATED AND ASHAMED AT SENATE'S DECISION.

In moving the second reading of the Naval Aid bill in the Senate, Hon. J. A. Lougheed, the government leader, said: This is a bill providing that there may be paid and applied out of the consolidated revenue fund of Canada, a sum not exceeding thirty-five million dollars for the purpose of immediately increasing the effective naval forces of the Empire. It proposes that this sum shall be used and applied under the direction of the governor-in-council, in the construction of battleships or armoured cruisers of the most modern and powerful type; that the ships when constructed and equipped shall be placed by the governor-in-council at the disposal of His Majesty for the common defence of the Empire, and when so placed, they shall be subject to such terms, conditions and arrangements as may be agreed upon between the governor-in-council and His Majesty's government, thus giving to the government of Canada the control of the entire subject.

Both political parties in Canada until the year 1909, seem to have been indifferent to seriously entering on the question of naval defense, having been so engrossed with the development of the natural resources, public works and the internal trade of our country that no public interest was taken in the question. It was not until 1909, that the parliament of Canada made any pronouncement upon our obligations to enter upon a system of naval defense. This action is undoubtedly attributable to the fact of naval defense in England having become a much more serious question than it had before assumed. When the German Naval bill of 1898 was passed, European attention was not seriously aroused, and the program therein outlined was apparently a comparatively modest one, but in 1909 and the years immediately following, the program became so enlarged, and the original expenditure so alarmingly increased, that not only Great Britain, but other European powers awakened to the fact that Germany had outstripped the organization of a navy calculated at some time to dispute the supremacy of the seas with Great Britain. Public sentiment, particularly in Great Britain, became so aroused as to this situation that at the imperial conference in 1907, particular stress was laid upon the necessity of co-operation by the overseas dominions with the imperial admiralty. Even at that conference, Canada's representatives discouraged any hope of Canada participating in any sense, and did not hesitate to so pronounce themselves, but by 1909 public sentiment in Canada had so increased, and become so intensified as to result in the declaration and resolutions passed by the house of commons, and reading as follows: "This house fully recognizes the duty of the people of Canada, as they increase in numbers and wealth, to assume in large measure the responsibilities of national defense. The house is of opinion that under the present constitutional relations between the mother country, and the self-governing dominions, the payment of regular and periodical contributions to the imperial treasury for naval and military purposes would not, so far as Canada is concerned, be the most satisfactory solution of the question of defense. The house will cordially approve of any necessary expenditure desired to promote the speedy organization of a Canadian naval service in co-operation with and in close relation to the imperial navy, along the lines suggested by the admiralty at the last imperial conference, and in full sympathy with the view that the naval supremacy of Britain is essential to the security of commerce, the safety of the empire and the peace of the world. The house expresses its firm conviction that whenever the need arises the Canadian people will be found ready and willing to make any sacrifice that is required to give to the imperial authorities, the most loyal and hearty co-operation in every movement for the maintenance of the integrity and honor of the empire." In pursuance of this the government

dequate for the construction of a fleet unit, which was regarded at the time in England, and by those familiar with the subject in Canada, as the least that Canada could have entered upon with due regard to her dignity and self-respect. The admiralty gave its best advice so far as the construction of ships with the proposed expenditure was concerned, but it was obvious that such a scheme was not regarded as an acquisition to imperial naval defense. This infirmity must have impressed itself upon the late government, inasmuch as having received tenders for the construction of the ships in question, no action had been taken by the government of Canada to proceed with their construction. In fact it seems apparent that the government abandoned the idea of proceeding with the scheme which it had evolved inasmuch as the experts of the department charged with the carrying out of the scheme reported that if the construction had proceeded with, the ships would have been obsolete by the time of their completion. The scheme was anaemic and destitute in its constitution of the iron and blood which must ever characterize the fighting navy. It died of inanition.

AN ABANDONED SCHEME.

It is not with unfriendly or captious criticism that I say the late government exhibited more statesmanship when they permitted it to die than the statesmanship they exhibited when they gave it birth. This departure from the program decided upon by the late government was not at all strange, and found its parallel in the German Naval Bill. This latter was passed in 1898, and proposed a program of naval defense which was practically abandoned in almost the second year from that date. Up to 1912, over five amendments have been introduced, radically departing from the original scheme, and thus involving practically an amendment of the former in entering upon an expansion and expenditure that had not originally been contemplated. It is, therefore, not surprising that when the late government came to office, in the autumn of 1911, the scheme of 1910 was abandoned. When this scheme was being discussed before parliament, the then opposition strongly opposed the scheme for the reasons then set forth. The present prime minister was then leading the opposition, and no policy was more clearly defined than that which he laid before the house in 1910, and which in brief was that the scheme then before parliament was inadequate and unsuited to the conditions that had arisen, and that under the emergency that faced the empire he proposed that a substantial contribution should be made to the imperial government; and further, that, in the approaching elections he came into office, he would commit himself to an emergency contribution being made, and to the promulgation of a permanent policy, which, before its adoption, he would submit to the electorate.

CLEARLY DEFINED POLICY.

In the general elections of September, 1911, there was no plank in the conservative platform more clearly defined than that laid down by the present prime minister, and constituting the policy which the government is now pursuing, and which is embodied in this bill. The attitude of the conservative party was as clearly defined upon this subject as their policy upon the question of reciprocity. Upon coming into office in October, 1911, the prime minister at once took steps to implement the pledge he had given to parliament in 1910, and which we have right to say was approved by the electorate in the general election of 1911. Immediately upon the close of the session of 1912, the prime minister and three of his ministers, with a view to giving practical effect to the policy which he had previously laid down upon this subject, proceeded to England, and took up with the admiralty authorities the consideration of the whole subject, as he promised parliament to do. The situation as defined by the admiralty authorities is clearly laid down in a memorandum on naval defense requirements prepared by the admiralty for the government of Canada, dated December, 1912. Mr. Lougheed read essential extracts from the memorandum. The grant in the bill before us is an "emergency" grant. This question of emergency is one with which it is somewhat difficult to deal, owing to the opposition to such a grant practically taking the position that this emergency should be demonstrated with mathematical exactitude. The general facts upon which it is based are known to the world. We have a fleet being built by Germany, the largest that has ever been built under one program. The preamble of the German Naval Bill, as already pointed out, makes no con-

clamation that in effectiveness, "even for the most powerful naval adversary a war would involve such risks as to make that power's own supremacy doubtful."

EVIDENCES OF AN EMERGENCY.

We have before us the increased naval program of the other two states of the triple alliance, namely Austria and Italy. We know of the withdrawal of the Mediterranean squadron from that sea for concentration in home waters. In 1902, there were one hundred and sixty British vessels on the overseas stations, against seventy-six of today. That is to say, that over eighty of these ships have been withdrawn from the overseas stations to add to the fleet now stationed in the home waters. We see the German fleet strong as it is today, massed in full permanent commission in the North Sea. We likewise have in the home water practically the whole of the British fleet, and all these engines of destruction in a state of war. In addition to this, we have practically every shipyard in Europe running day and night in building ships of war for this armageddon of the sea, which cannot be far distant. These are the outward and visible evidences of an "emergency" that we have to face.

In addition to this mass of evidence, powerful as it is, we have what even transcends the volume of facts which I have pointed out, namely, the knowledge and opinions of the admiralty authorities of such facts as are necessary on the subject and manifestly cannot be disclosed, but of which they must be the depository. The art of diplomacy and state craft and espionage in Europe is such that it is difficult for one nation to conceal from another the secrets of the state. No more satisfactory evidence should be required than from the fact that Great Britain today is straining every nerve in building up and increasing, and making efficient its fleet to meet a crisis which she believes must shortly come. Therefore, entirely apart from those outward and visible signs which I have pointed out, the statements of the admiralty authorities alone should be accepted by Canada and any of the self-governing dominions as incontrovertible on this subject of "emergency." This bill proposes making provision sufficiently large for the building of three capital ships that can at any time be recalled by Canada. For manifest reasons, it is impossible to construct these ships in time within our own country, so as to meet the emergency, which is the fundamental principle of the bill. It is imperative that those ships should be built where they can be constructed in the shortest possible time. I am aware that that which has been pronounced an "emergency" by the admiralty authorities, by the imperial government, by the press of Great Britain and by public opinion in the overseas dominions, does not meet the view of an emergency entertained by the opponents of the bill. To satisfy them that there is an emergency, they would require rival fleets to be in the line of battle, they would want to hear the booming of the guns, the tearing noise of shot and shell, and the crash of the torpedoes, and the agonized cry of the wounded. Nothing less than this would satisfy the captious critics of an emergency. Suffice it to say that when the admiralty authorities charged with the staggering responsibility of protecting this empire and all that it means, not only to us, but to the entire world, say there is an emergency, they are straining every part in preparing for it, then no patriotic subject of the empire can intelligently say "nay!"

THE SINE QUA NON

There can be no two opinions that for the empire to maintain its naval supremacy, its command of the seas, that she will have to build up and maintain a fleet so vastly superior to that of Germany, Austria and Italy, (the triple alliance), as to place her defeat beyond all human probability. At the present time it is estimated by the British admiralty that the minimum factor of safety would be 60 per cent. beyond the probable combination against her, or in other words, the security of the empire, which means the security of Canada, is dependent upon the maintenance of such a fleet by Great Britain; and falling this, the security which we today enjoy in Canada, must be proportionately lessened. We have before us, placed on the table of parliament, a memorandum on naval defense requirements prepared by the admiralty for the government of Canada. This is an official document setting forth facts which cannot be gainsaid, as to the relative strength of the German fleet by Germany of the Naval bill of 1898, and the five amendments which have since been passed, both extending and accelerating the original pro-

gram, have naturally created a situation in the naval affairs of our empire which, previous to 1898 could not have been anticipated. It does not necessarily follow that between Germany and Great Britain there must be hostile relations to produce a rivalry in the building of competitive fleets with the ultimate intention in view of wresting the command of the sea from Great Britain. Nations are but aggregations of individuals, and the same feelings and laws of rivalry that produce in individuals an emulation to overcome each other have their reflex in nations. This is brought about by those fixed laws in human nature common to individuals as well as to nations. The extraordinary growth and development of the German empire since its war with France in 1870, as with our precedent in the history of the world. The expansion of its population, of its manufacturers, of its trade, and of its world-wide influence, demand an outflow which can only be secured through the strength of its arms, on land, and of its ships on the sea. Geographically, Germany is more handi-capped than any nation in Europe. It is the last of the great powers to have come upon the theater of empire building, only to find that the other powers, and particularly Great Britain, have practically absorbed in their march of conquest and achievement those great stretches of continent, today so coveted by Germany. Should Great Britain part from its tradition of naval supremacy, then, as surely as the sun will rise on the morrow must there be a conflict between those two great powers. This is the inevitable operation of a fixed law of two great forces in motion converging towards each other with studied rapidity.

AN OMINOUS PREAMBLE.

From a perusal of the document to which I have referred, it will be observed that the preamble of the great naval law may implicitly be construed as a declaration of war against Great Britain. The preamble reads as follows: "In order to protect German trade and commerce under existing conditions, only one thing will suffice, namely, Germany must possess a battle fleet of such strength that even for the most powerful naval adversary a war would involve such risks as to make that power's own supremacy doubtful. For this purpose it is not absolutely necessary that the German fleet should be as strong as that of the greatest naval power, for, as a rule, a great naval power will not be in a position to concentrate all its forces against us."

No language could more plainly express the intention of Germany to ultimately make herself equal to Great Britain on the sea. This being the case, what should be the attitude of Canada? What should be the attitude of all the self-governing dominions beyond the sea? Are these dominions, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and India, to rely upon the forty-five millions of people in the United Kingdom, to furnish a fleet for the defense of this empire, of which we all form a part, much as the people of Great Britain? It is estimated that Great Britain will spend during the current year on her navy, fifty millions of pounds. To keep pace with the expanding program of Germany, as well as that of Austria and Italy, (constituting the triple alliance), increased expenditure will necessarily have to be made. This is a race in the building of armaments between these great powers. In 1906 Great Britain proposed a reduction in armaments, but Germany would have none of it. In 1906, 1907 and 1908, Great Britain reduced her shipbuilding to almost a minimum. This was answered by Germany accelerating her program; and further by the adoption of increased armaments determined upon by Italy and Austria. Great Britain cannot, therefore, rely upon any diminution in naval expenditure, but on the contrary, upon an ascending ratio of increasing expenditure. (Already the straining point has been reached by Great Britain, and yet the existence of the empire is absolutely dependent upon the maintenance of the armaments.)

OUR INTERESTS AT STAKE.

Under these grave conditions, conditions affecting the entire empire, is Canada to stand idly by as a spectator while the fleet of Great Britain is thus being called upon to strain all its sources to maintain the integrity of the empire? Those are conditions affecting Canada as seriously as they affect Great Britain or any other part of the empire, and our material interests demand that we shall at once take an attitude upon this question. The fundamental cause of Canada's rapid development is, in a word, our relation to the empire and the consequent advantages that we enjoy therefrom. The security which we enjoy from the interference of outside powers gives a permanency and a

flexity to our internal development, not exceeded by any people in the world. The security which our trade enjoys on the ocean's highway is equal to the security enjoyed by Great Britain. In other words, the security of life and prosperity within Canada and the security of her trade on every sea and as real as permanent, there is no public sentiment in the empire that Canada is considering the command of the sea in the light of independence. We may therefore, further assume that the premises so laid down as to Canada's intention to remain with the empire are so basic that we, therefore, have further enlarged upon that foundation of our national destiny, superstructure of our national destiny, thought of participating in, or contributing to its cause. Hence it is that we in Canada within the last few years, have awakened from our dreams of security without defense at our own cost to the necessity of dealing with the largest question which we today have to face; that of the system of naval defense which we shall adopt for the protection and integrity of our interests.

CANADA'S RESPONSIBILITIES.

Canada, through a process of growth has reached that stage of national responsibility in which she has become a self-governing part of the empire, and with such growth has reached that position where responsibilities of a national character must be assumed by her. Canada is as much a part of the empire as Great Britain herself. We are interested in the development of the different parts of the empire. Their development reflects correspondingly upon our growth and prosperity. We are as much interested in the commanding importance and fate of the empire as Great Britain herself. There is no deeper interest left in the British Isles on any important question affecting the empire than is felt in Canada. The loyalty and patriotism and fealty to the crown existing in Canada are as great as will be found in any part of the empire.

True, we have not the same voice in the administration of imperial affairs as Great Britain, notwithstanding that our sentimental interests are equally great. Yet non-participation in the councils of the empire is not owing to any reluctance on the part of Great Britain to deprive or suppress the self-governing dominions from thus having a voice in the empire's councils, but rather as a logical outcome of the evolution and growth of British institutions. In the first place the parent state had to be sufficiently strong to acquire the colonial possessions which today constitute the empire. These possessions naturally in their infancy, were dependent upon the parent state, and looked entirely to Great Britain for their administration and defense. Through a series of stages of growth, many of these possessions have developed into self-governing dominions, exercising within their respective boundaries the same sovereign rights, powers and freedom of government that the people of Great Britain exercise within their own kingdom. At no time within recent years, has there been a general demand on the part of the self-governing possessions upon the parent state, to concede a right in government which has not been granted to them, and the assertion may be confidently made that if today, a request on the part of the self-governing possessions were made to the parliament of Great Britain to give us a voice in the councils of the empire, that request would be granted to the full extent of the demand which might be made. As Canada and the other self-governing dominions occupy the status in the empire which I have thus briefly outlined, the further question arises to what our attitude must necessarily be in the growth of our national affairs with respect to the empire. With the rapidly growing population of Canada, with its wealth of natural resources, with the development of its national wealth, and with a consciousness that we stand upon the threshold of having to determine through the great development of those factors which I have pointed out, what our national attitude must be within this empire of which we are an integral part. It is unnecessary to elaborate upon the proposition that Canada can no longer occupy the passive and dependent relation to the empire that she has done in the past. She has arrived at the cross roads when she must positively elect to assume new responsibilities and to share in the burdens of the empire, or to repudiate those obligations and responsibilities which logically belong to the increased importance and power which she now exercises internationally as well as in the affairs of the empire.

OUR DESTINY.

To adopt this latter position, viz., to repudiate those obligations which she is logically and nationally expected to assume, must mean, if we will hold our self-respect, the withdrawal from the empire, to which it may be assumed with the greatest confidence that the determination of Canada is to remain within the empire. It may be further assumed that the community warranting an expenditure far exceeding that involved in the present bill. In addition to this consideration there is the cost of manning and maintenance, which in the immediate future would further involve a doubling of the expenditure. The carrying out of such program must admittedly mean a delay of years that would preclude such action by Canada being of any service to the empire in the immediate future. Having arrived at that stage of national growth, importance and confidence, and having determined that our destiny is to be within the empire, the question of participating in imperial defense becomes paramount, and its solution as a problem is imperative. If the self-governing parts of the empire are satisfied that their destiny lies within the empire, then nothing is more manifest than that their duty in this emergency is to participate in a system of common defense. It is almost unnecessary to say that a common and co-operative system of naval defense is not only necessary, but imperative. There will not be found any authority on naval tactics who will pronounce in favor of distinctly separate national fleets. The imperial government, the admiralty authorities, and all writers on naval tactics agree in common on all important subjects. This is becoming more apparent every day in European waters. We find today the British fleet and the German fleet practically massed in the North Sea. Great Britain has found it necessary to withdraw most of her fleet from the Mediterranean and from the navies of the empire. Their development reflects correspondingly upon our growth and prosperity. We are as much interested in the commanding importance and fate of the empire as Great Britain herself. There is no deeper interest left in the British Isles on any important question affecting the empire than is felt in Canada. The loyalty and patriotism and fealty to the crown existing in Canada are as great as will be found in any part of the empire.

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FLOUTING PUBLIC SENTIMENT.

The question of "emergency" under such a policy would thus be denied and ignored, and this is essentially pre-eminently the subject, which Canada is called upon at the present moment to consider. Assuming that such a program as that outlined by the Laurier amendment is adopted, it at once means that Canada sets at naught, not only British sentiment, but the deliberate views of the admiralty expressed to the government of Canada at the time of the gravest crisis which has arisen in the last one hundred years. It means that it flaunts public sentiment in Great Britain, and the deliberate views of the imperial government at a time when it is straining every nerve financial and moral to meet a condition in Europe that she has never been called upon heretofore to face, and which, if she successfully confronts, may not arise again for a generation. Is Canada prepared to assume this responsibility? Is she prepared to set up her opinion and judgment upon a question of imperial naval defense, at a time when no other authoritative voice should be heard, than that of the admiralty authority of the British government? Is Canada prepared to say that notwithstanding the representations of the imperial admiralty made to us, that notwithstanding the serious menace which threatens the supremacy of the British fleet, and thereby the existence of the empire, that we in Canada, in defiance of this mass of evidence, and in defiance of the representations and the imperial sentiment, are prepared to reject a modest contribution of ships such as that involved in the bill, and to enter upon a program of building up a navy for ourselves, which admittedly must take years to do, and then when built would be futile and hopeless against any or every naval power that would be found within reach of our coasts, either on the Atlantic or the Pacific? Against what power could such a navy prevail? To meet what power do we dream of building such a navy? Would such a navy guard Canada's coasts against the fleets of any of the European powers, much less that of Japan, or of the United States? No navy which Canada can build for a generation to come could seriously think of entering upon an engagement with any of the naval fleets of today.

THE ONLY EFFECTIVE DEFENSE.

If, therefore, in naval tactics the defense of the empire should be a system common to the entire empire, then the corollary of this is indisputable that such a system should be maintained at the cost of the empire, and not alone of Great Britain. This question of contribution is one that has never been urged by Great Britain upon the self-governing dominions. Cheerfully have the defenses of the empire been borne by Great Britain herself, and not until the passage of the German naval bill has this most important of all imperial subjects been taken up by its very necessity upon the attention of the self-governing dominions. If a common defense is the only effective system of defense, so must it necessarily be the least expensive upon the participants. The maintenance of separate national defenses by the self-governing dominions, entirely apart from the weakness and infirmity of such a system, must necessarily involve the maximum of expense and the minimum of security. If a scheme of co-operation were promulgated throughout the empire by which its different parts should participate in a common system of naval defense commensurate with the ability of each part, or even leaving it voluntary with each part, the moral effect of such a response to a common system of defense would not only be startling amongst the powers of the world, but would be the most effective blow that could be struck to bring to an end the mad race in the building of armaments, in which today all the great powers are engaged.

Canada could not make a greater contribution to imperial consolidation than to lead the way in promulgating a scheme for the maintenance of a common naval defense of the empire. Great Britain, for the reasons set out in the papers which have been tabled, cannot well take the initial step in this direction, and it, therefore, falls upon the self-governing dominions to give recognition to this great principle which I have pointed out. Britain hereafter, that having in the time of necessity refused to answer your call, we propose to defend ourselves, and our pride compels us to solve you from any sense of duty on your part, or expectation on ours to extend to Canada heretofore the help and prestige of protection and defense by the empire. If Canada adopts such a policy as that now

the opponents of this bill. The amendment moved by Sir Wilfrid Laurier to this bill may be said to be the liberal policy upon this question. The opposition to the bill cannot be on the ground of the expenditure which the bill proposes to make, inasmuch as the amendment which calls for the building of two fleet units, one to be stationed on the Atlantic, and one on the Pacific, would mean an original expenditure far exceeding that involved in the present bill. In addition to this consideration there is the cost of manning and maintenance, which in the immediate future would further involve a doubling of the expenditure. The carrying out of such program must admittedly mean a delay of years that would preclude such action by Canada being of any service to the empire in the immediate future.

ANNOUNCING SEPARATION.

The consideration then presents itself, that if Canada refuses to answer the appeal of Great Britain, or to show any sympathetic sentiment to meet the naval crisis now pending, she no longer with any self-respect can look to the empire for naval defense. Having adopted this spirit and policy of separate action and of defiance to the representations and the sentiment of Great Britain, Canada thereafter must assume the entire responsibility of her own naval defense. She can no longer invoke the sea powers of Great Britain on the high seas. She can no longer sum, mon the strong arm of the British navy to protect her trade routes. She can no longer have any claim whatsoever upon that navy that has been supreme on the seas from the days of Trafalgar down to the present time. In other words, Canada absolutely isolates and separates herself from the ties of empire which have protected her. She deliberately adopts a policy which cannot be otherwise construed as a separation from those imperial interests which should be her destiny. If you reject this bill you not only invite but practically announce separation from Great Britain. Canada to maintain her self-respect, her dignity and her pride, must say in expressed terms to Great Britain hereafter, that having in the time of necessity refused to answer your call, we propose to defend ourselves, and our pride compels us to solve you from any sense of duty on your part, or expectation on ours to extend to Canada heretofore the help and prestige of protection and defense by the empire. If Canada adopts such a policy as that now

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