SIR EDWARD GREY'S MOMENTOUS SPEECH DEFINING GREAT BRITAIN'S POSITION.

Britain Worked Earnestly and Resolutely for Peace But Germany's Wanton Disregard of the International Guarantee of Belgium's Independence Would Be "The Direst Crime That Ever Stained Pages of History"

LONDON, Aug. 3—Rather less than two hours sufficed today for the essential passages of the strangest, the most moving, and in every sense of the word the most fateful sitting of Parliament within living memory. In some of its accessories the scene was almost theatrical. Although there have been half-a-dozen occasions this session when the House has been more crowded, it had been thought necessary to revive a precedent not previously invoked since the Home Rule Bill of 1893, and to cover the centre of the floor with double rows of chairs. Moreover, the peers had been admitted to their gallery before prayers, a privilege which spared them the indignity of a rush-and-tumble invasion in common with the general public.

In an atmosphere thus prepared for the great event of the day, Sir Edward Grey rose to take the nation into the confidence of the Cabinet. Every word of his skilfully phrased and profoundly moving argument had been committed to manuscript, the pages of which now lay open before its author on the box at the corner of the table. As could be perceived from the placidity with which they endured the suspense of a narrative that kept less privileged hearers in an agony of alternating encouragement and despair, the Opposition leaders were already aware of what was coming. Consequently they took no part in the rival demonstrations—neither in the faint applause of the Ministerialists as some fitful gleam of hope seemed to brighten the horizon nor in the fierce outbursts of acclamation with which the Unionists hailed every additional portent of the gathering storm. Ministers sat through it all in the tense attitude of men oppressed by a sense of heavy and solemn responsibility.

THE SPEECH IN FULL

Sir E. Grey who was loudly cheered said:—Last week I stated that we were working for peace not only for this country but to preserve the peace of Europe. To-day events move so rapidly it is exceedingly difficult to state with technical accuracy the actual state of affairs. It is clear that the peace of Europe cannot be preserved. Russia and Germany have declared war on each other. Before I proceed to state the position of the Government I would like to clear the ground so that the House may realize, before I come to state what our attitude is with regard to the present crisis, exactly under what obligations the Government is. First of all, let me say very shortly we have persistently worked with a single mind with all the earnestness in our power, to preserve peace (cheers). The House may be satisfied on that point. We have always done it, and in these last years, so far as His Majesty's Government are concerned, we should have no difficulty in proving it.

Through the Balkan crisis we worked for peace. The co-operation of the Great Powers of Europe was successful then, It is true that some of the Powers had great difficulty in adjusting their points of view. It took much time, labor and discussion before they could settle their differences; but peace was secured because peace was their main object and they were willing to give time and and trouble rather than accentuate differences.

Working for Peace

In the present crisis unhappily, it has not been possible to secure the peace of Europe because there has been a disposition at any rate in some quarters on which I will not dwell to force things rapidly to an issue, at any rate to the great risk of peace. The result we now know. The policy of peace as far as the Great Powers generally are concerned has failed. I do not want to dwell upon it and say where the blame seems to us to lie—which Powers were most in favor of peace and which were most disposed to endanger peace, because I would like the House to approach the crisis from the point of view of British interests, British honor (loud cheers) and British obligations (renewed cheers), free from all passion (cheers). As to why peace has not been preserved we shall publish papers as soon as we can regarding what took place last week, when we were working for peace and when these papers are published I have no doubt that to every human being they will make it clear how strenuous and genuine whole-hearted our own efforts for peace were (cheers), and they will enable people to form their own judgment as to what forces were at work which operated against peace.

British Obligations

I come first now to the question of British obligations. I have assured the House, and the Prime Minister has assured the House more than once, that if any crisis such as this arose we could come before the House of Commons and be able to say that it was free to decide what the British attitude should be (hear, hear)— that we could have we could spring upon the House, and then say to the House that because we had entered into that engagement there was an obligation of honor up on the country. I will deal with that point to clear the ground first.

There have been in Europe two diplomatic groups—the Triple Alliance and what came to be called the Triple Entente—for some years past. The Triple Entente was not alliance; it was a diplomatic group. The House will remember that in 1908 there was a crisis (also a Balkan crisis) originating in the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Russian Minister, M. Izvolsky, happened to come to London—his visit had been planned before the crisis broke out—and I told him definitely then that, this being a Balkan affair, I did not consider that public opinion in this country would justify us in promising anything more than diplomatic support. More was never asked from us, more was never given, and more was never promised. In this present crisis, up till yesterday, with which I will come to deal we had also given no promise of anything more than diplomatic support (hear, hear).

The Morocco Crisis

I must make this question of obligation clear to the House. I must go back first to the Morocco crisis of 1906. That was the time of the Algeciras Conference. It came at a time very difficult to his Majesty's Government. A general election was in progress. Ministers were scattered over the country. I was spending three days a week in my constituency and three days at the Foreign Office. I was asked the question whether, if that crisis developed into a war between France and Germany, we would give armed support. I said then that I could promise nothing to a foreign Power unless it was subsequently to receive the whole'hearted support of public opinion here when the occasion arose (Ministerial cheers.) I said that, in my opinion, if a war was forced upon France then on the question of Morocco—a question which had just been the subject of agreement between this country and France—an agreement exceedingly popular on both sides—that if out of that agreement a war was forced upon France at that time, in my opinion, public opinion in this country would have rallied to the material support of France (cheers). But I gave no promise. I expressed that opinion, and I expressed it through that crisis, as far as I remember, almost in the same words to the French Ambassador and the German Ambassador at the time. I made no promise and I used no threat, but I expressed that opinion.

The Agadir Crisis

That position was accepted by the French Government, but they said to me at the time—I think very reasonably:—"If you think it possible that public opinion in Great Britain might when a sudden crisis arose justify you in giving to France the armed support which you cannot promise in advance, unless between the military and naval experts some conversations had taken place, you will not be able to give that support, even if you wish to give it, when the time comes." There was force in that. I agreed to it, and authorized those conversations to take place, but on the distinct understanding that nothing which passed between the military and naval experts should bind either Government or restrict in any way their freedom to come to a decision as to whether or not they were to give that support when the time arose.

I have told the House that on that occasion a general election was in prospect. I had to take the responsibility of doing that without a Cabinet, which could not be summoned, and an answer had to be given. I consulted Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, then Prime Minister; I consulted, I remember Lord Haldane, who was then Secretary for War, and the present Prime Minister, who was then Chancellor of the Exchequer. That was the most I could do. That was authorised, but on the distinct understanding that it left the hands of the Government free whenever a crisis arose. The fact that conversations between the military and naval experts took place was later on—I think much later on, because that crisis passed and the thing ceased to be of importance—was later on brought to the knowledge of the Cabinet. The Agadir crisis came—another Morocco crisis—and throughout that I took precisely the same line as had been taken in 1906. Subsequently in 1912 after discussing the situation with the Cabinet, it was decided that we ought to have a definite understanding in writing, though it was only to be in the form of an official letter, that these conversations were not binding upon the freedom of either Government, and on November 22, 1912, I wrote a letter which I will now read to the House, to the French Ambassador, and I received from him a letter in similiar terms in reply.

Understanding With France

The letter which I will read will be known to the public now as the record that whatever took place between the military and naval experts they were not binding engagements. The letter was:

My dear Ambassador,—From time to time in recent years the French and British naval and military experts have consulted together. It has always been understood that such consultation does not restrict the freedom of either Government to decide at any future time whether or not to assist the other by armed force. We have agreed that consultation between the experts is not, and ought not to be regarded as an onegadment that commits either Government to action in a contingency that has not yet arisea and may never arise. The disposition, for instance, of the French and British fleets based upon an engagement to co-operate in war.

You have, however, pointed out that if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power it might become essential to know whether it could in that event depend upon the armed assistance of the other. I agree that if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, or something that threatened the general peace, it should immediately discuss with the other whether both Governments should act together to prevent aggression and to preserve peace, and, if so, what measures they would be prepared to take in common.

That is the starting point for the Government with regard to the present crisis, I think that makes it perfectly clear that what the Prime Minister and I have said to the House of Commons was perfectly justified, and that as regards our freedom to decide in a crisis what our line should be—whether we should intervene or whether we should abstain—the Government remained perfectly free and a fortiori the House of Commons remained perfectly free (Ministerial cheers.)

That I say to clear the ground from the point of view of obligation, and I think it was due to prove our good faith to the House of Commons that I should give that full information to the House now, and say, what I think is obvious from the letter just read, that we do not construe anything which has previously taken place in our diplomatic relations with other Powers in this matter as restricting the freedom of the Government to decide what attitude they should take now or restricting the freedom of the House of Commons to decide what their attitude will be (hear, hear).

Origin of Present Dispute

I will go further, and say this: The situation in the present crisis is not precisely the same as it was in the Morocco question. In the Morocco question it was primarily a dispute which concerned France—a dispute it seemed to us fastened upon France out of an agreement existing between us and France and published to the whole world, under which we engaged to give France diplomatic support. No doubt we were pledged to nothing but diplomatic support but we were at any rate pledged by definite published agreement to side with France diplomatically in that question The present crisis has originated differently. It has not originated with regard to Morocco. It has not originated as regards anything about which we had special agreement with France; it has not originated with anything which primarily concerned France. It originated in a dispute between Austria and Servia.

I can say this with the most absolute confidence no Government and no country has less desire to be involved in war or with the dispute between Austria and Servia than the Government and country of France (loud cheers). They are involved in it because of their obligation of honor (renewed cheers), under a definite alliance with Russia. It is only fair to say to the House this: that obligation of honor cannot apply in the same way to us (some cheers). We are not parties to the Franco-Russian alliance. We do not even know the terms of that alliance.

Long Standing Friendship

So far I have faithfully and completely cleared the ground with regard to the question of obligations. I now come to what we think the situation requires. We have had for many years a long-standing friendship with France (cheers, and Mr. Wedgewood: And with Germany.) I remember well when the late Government made their agreement with France the warm and cordial feeling resulting from the fact that these two nations, who had had perpetual differences in the past, had cleared those differences away and become friends. I remember saying at that time that it seemed to me that some Divine influence had been at work to produce the cordial atmosphere which had made that result possible, but how far that friendship entails obligation—and it has been a friendship between the two nations (cheers) ratified by the nations—let every man look into his own heart and his own feelings and construe the extent of the obligation to himself (cheers.) I construe it to myself as I feel it, but I do not wish to urge that upon anyone else more than their own feelings do as naturally from hour to hour from date as to what they should feel about it. The House individually and collectively may judge for itself. But now I speak for myself, from the point of view of feeling.

Could Not Stand Aside

The French fleet is now in the Mediterranean. The northern and western coasts of France are absolutely undefended. With the French fleet concentrated in the Mediterranean the situation is very different from what it used to be, because the friendship which grew up between the two countries gave them a sense of security that there was nothing to be feared from us. My own feeling is this, that if a foreign fleet engaged in a war which France had not sought, and in which she had not been the aggressor, came down the English Channel and bombarded and battered the undefended coasts of France, we could not stand aside (loud and prolonged cheering. Many Opposition members waved handkerchiefs and order papers, as did also Mr. Robert Harcourt on the Ministerial side)—the thing going on practically within sight of our eyes, with our arms folded, looking on dispassionately, doing nothing; and I believe that would be the feeling of this country (loud cheers.) There are times when one's own individual feeling makes one feel that if the circumstances actually did arise it would be a feeling which would spread with irresistible force to others in the face of the thing happening. But I want to look at the thing also without sentiment from the point of view of British interests, and it is on that I am going to base and justify what I am presently going to say to the House.

Life and Death War

If we say nothing at this moment what is France to do with her fleet in the Mediterranean? She leaves it there with no statement from us of what we will do. She sees her northern and western coasts absolutely undefended, at the mercy of the German fleet coming down the channel to do as it pleases in a war which is a war of life and death to her. We say nothing, it may be, and the French fleet is withdrawn from the Mediterranean. We are in the pressure of a European conflagration. Can anybody set limits to the consequences which may arise out of it? Just assume that today we stand aside in an attitude of neutrality, saying, "No, we cannot engage to help either party in this conflict." Let us suppose the French fleet is withdrawn from the Mediterranean and let us assume that the consequences which are already tremendous even to countries which are at peace, in fact, equal to the consequences to many which are at war—let us assume that out of that come consequences unforeseen which make it necessary at a sudden moment that in defence of vital British interests we should go to war, and let us assume what is quite possible, that Italy, which is now neutral—because I understand she considers this war is an aggressive war (cheers), and that the Triple Alliance, being a defensive alliance, her obligations do not arise—that Italy, legitimately consulting her own interests, may depart from her attitude of neutrality at a time when we are forced to fight ourselves. What will be the position in the Mediterranean then? It might be that these consequences would be forced upon us at some critical moment when the trade routes in the Mediterranean might be vital to this country.

Nobody can say that in the course of the next few weeks there is any particular trade route the opening of which might not be vital to this country. What would our position be then? We have not kept in the Mediterranean a fleet which is equal to deal alone with a combination of other fleets there. That would be the very moment when we could not detach more ships for the Mediterranean, and we might have exposed this country through our negative attitude at the present moment to a most appalling risk (cheers). I say that from the point of view of British interests.

Promise to France

Well, we felt strongly that France was entitled to know, and to know at once (loud cheers), whether or not in the event of an attack upon her unprotected northern and western coasts she could depend upon British support, and in that emergency and under those compelling circumstances yesterday afternoon I gave to the French Ambassador the following statement:—

I am authorised to give an assurance that if the German fleet comes into the Channel or through the North Sea to undertake hostile operations against the French coasts or shipping the British Fleet will give all the protection in its power (loud cheers). This assurance is, of course, subject to the policy of his Majesty's Government receiving the support of Parliament, and must not be taken as binding upon his Majesty's Government to take any action until the above contingency of action by the German fleet takes place.

I read that to the House not as a declaration of war on our part, not as entailing immediate agreement to action on our part, but as binding us to take aggressive action should that contingency arise. Things move so hurriedly from hour to hour from news comes in, and I cannot give this in a very formal way, but I understand that the German Government would be prepared, if we would pledge ourselves to neutrality, to agree that its fleet would not attack the northern coasts of France (some Ministerial and Labor cheers). I have only heard that shortly before I came to the House, but it is far too narrow an engagement for us (loud cheers). And there is a more serious condition — it is becoming more serious every hour.

Neutrality of Belgium

There is the question of the neutrality of Belgium (cheers). I shall have to put before the House at some length what our position with regard to Belgium is. The governing factor is a treaty of 1839. That is a treaty with a history—a history accumulated since. In 1870, when there was war between France and Germany, the question of the neutrality of Belgium arose. Various things were said. Amongst other things, Prince Bismarck gave an assurance confirming his verbal assurance. He gave in writing a declaration which he said was superfluous in the presence of the treaty in existence, that the German Confederation and allies would respect the neutrality of Belgium, it being always understood that that neutrality would be respected by other belligerent Powers. This is valuable as a recognition in 1870 on the part of Germany of the sacredness of these treaty rights.

What was our own attitude? The people who laid down the attitude of the British Government were Lord Granville in the House of Lords and Mr. Gladstone in the House of Commons. Lord Granville, on August 7, said: "We might have explained to the country and to foreign nations that we did not think this country was bound either morally or internationally, or that its interests were concerned, in the maintenance of the neutrality of Belgium. Though that course might have had some convenience, though it might have been easy to adhere to it, though it might have saved us from some immediate danger, it is a course which Her Majesty's Government thought it impossible to adopt in the name of the country with any due regard to the country's honor and to the country's interests" (cheers). Mr. Gladstone spoke as follows two days later:—"There is, I admit, an obligation of the treaty. It is not necessary, nor would time permit me to enter into the complicated question of the nature of the obligations of the treaty. But I am not able to subscribe to the doctrine of those who have held in this House what plainly amounts to an assertion that the simple fact of the existence of the guarantee was binding on every party to it, irrespective altogether of the particular position in which they find themselves at the time when the occasion for acting on the guarantee arises. The great authorities on foreign policy to whom I have been accustomed to listen—Lord Aberdeen and Lord Palmerston—never to my knowledge took that rigid and impracticable view of a guarantee. The circumstance that there is already existing a guarantee in force is of necessity an important fact, and an element in the case to which we are bound to give full and ample consideration. There is also the further consideration, which we must all feel most deeply, and that is the common interest against the extreme aggrandisement of any Power whatever". (cheers).

Honor and Interest

I put the matter to myself thus: The treaty is an old treaty. It is one of those treaties which are founded not only on consideration for Belgium, which benefits by it, but in the interests of those who guarantee the neutrality of Belgium (cheers). Honor and interest are at least as strong today as in 1870, and we cannot take a more narrow view or a less serious view of our obligations and of the importance of those obligations than was taken by Mr. Gladstone's Government in 1870. I will read to the House what took place last week on this subject. When mobilization was beginning I knew that this question must be a most important element in our policy and a most important subject for the House of Commons. I telegraphed at the same time and in similar terms both to Paris and Berlin to say it was essential for us to know whether the French and German Governments respectively were prepared to undertake an engagement in respect to the neutrality of Belgium. The French Government replied:—

The French Government are resolved to respect the neutrality of Belgium, and it would only be in the event of some other Power violating that neutrality that France might find herself under the necessity, in order to secure the defense of her security, to act otherwise. This assurance has been given several times. The President of the Republic spoke of it to the King of the Belgians, and the French Minister at Brussels spontaneously renewed the assurance to the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.—(Cheers)

German Evasive Reply

From the German Government the reply was:—

The Secretaro for Foreign Ahairs could not possibly give an answer before consulting the Emperor and the Chancellor.

Sir E. Goschen said that he hoped the answer would not be too long delayed. The German Minister for Foreign Affairs then gave Sir E. Goschen to understand that he rather doubted whether they could answer at all, as any reply they might give could not fail, in the event of war, to have the undesirable effect of disclosing part of their campaign (Opposition laughter). I telegraphed at the same time to Brussels to the Belgian Government and got the following reply from our Ambassador:—

The Minister of Foreign Affairs thanked me for the communication, and replied that Belgium would, to the utmost of her power, maintain neutrality. He begged me to add that the Belgian Government, believed they were in a position to defend the neutrality of their country in case of violation (cheers).

Now there is the news I have received today, though it has come quite recently, and I am not yet quite sure it has reached me in an accurate form. The news is that an ultimatum has been given to Belgium by Germany, the object of which was to offer Belgium friendly relations with Germany on condition that she facilitate the passage of German troops through Belgium. Until one has seen these things absolutely definitely, I do not wish to say all that one would say if one was in a position to give the House full, complete, and absolute information on the point. We were sounded in the course of last week as to whether if a guarantee was given that after the war Belgian integrity would be observed that would content us. We replied that we could not bargain away whatever interests or obligations we had in Belgian neutrality (cheerl). Shortly before I reached the House I was informed that the following telegram had been received from the King of the Belgians by King George:—

Remembering the numerous proofs of your Majesty's friendship and that of your predecessor, and the friendly attitude of England in 1870 and the proof of friendship she has just given us, I make a supreme appeal to the diplomatic intervention of your Majesty's Government to safeguard the integrity of Belgium (cheers).

Neutrality Violated

Diplomatic intervention took place last week on our part. What can diplomatic intervention do now? We have a great and vital interest in the independence and integrity—integrity is the least part of it—of Belgium. If Belgium is compelled to allow her neutrality to be violated, of course the situation is clear. Even if by agreement she admitted the violation of her neutrality, it is clear that she could only do so under duress. The smaller States in that region of Europe ask but one thing. Their desire is that they should be left alone (cheers). The one thing they fear, I think, not so much that their integrity as that their independence should be interfered with. If in the war which is before Europe the neutrality of one of these countries is violated, if the troops of one of the combatants violate its neutrality and no action is taken to resent it, at the end of the war, whatever the integrity may be, the independence will be gone (cheers).

I have one further quotation also from Mr. Gladstone, as to what he thought about the independence of Belgium. He said—

"We have an interest in the independence of Belgium which is wider than that which we might have in the literal operation of the guarantee. It is found in the answer to the question whether, under the circumstances of the case, this country, endowed as it is with influence and power, would quietly stand by and witness the perpetration of the direst crime that ever stained the pages of history, and thus became participators in the sin." (Opposition cheers.)

Now, if that be the case that there has been anything in the nature of an ultimatum to Belgium asking her to compromise or violate her neutrality, whatever may have been offered to her in return, her independence is gone if that holds. And if her independence goes the independence of Holland will follow. Now, I ask the House, from the point of view of British interests, to consider what may be at stake (cheers). If France is beaten in a struggle for life and death, beaten to her knees, loses her position as a Great Power and becomes subordinate to the will and to the power of one greater than herself — consequences which I do not anticipate (cheers)—because I am sure that France has the power to defend herself with all the energy, ability, and patriotism which she has shown so often (cheers)—well, if that were to happen, if Belgium fell under the same dominating influence, and then Holland and Denmark, would not Mr. Gladstone's words, which I have already quoted, come true?

Danger in Delay

It will be said, I suppose, that we might stand aside, husband our strength, and, whatever happens in the course of this war, at the end of it intervene with effect and put things right and adjust them to our point of view. If in a crisis like this we run away (loud and prolonged cheers) from those obligations of honor and interest as regards Belgium, I doubt whether, whatever material force we might have at the end of it would be of very much value in face of the respect that we should have lost (renewed cheers.) And I do not believe that, whether a great Power stands outside this war or not, it is going to be in a position at the end of this war to exert its material strength (cheers.) For us, with a powerful Fleet which we believe is able to protect our commerce and protect our shores and protect our interests, if we engage in war, we shall suffer but little more than we shall suffer if we stand aside. We are going to suffer, I am afraid, terribly in this war whether we are in it or whether we are not. Foreign trade is going to stop, not because trade routes are closed but because there is no trade at the other end, and Continental nations engaged in war, with all their populations, all their energies, all their wealth engaged in a desperate struggle, cannot carry on trade with us which they carry on in time of peace. At the end of this war, even if we have stood aside, I do not believe for a moment that we should be in a material position to use our force decisively to undo what had happened in the course of the war—to prevent the whole of the West of Europe opposite us, if that had been the result of the war, from falling under the domination of a single Power, and I am quite sure our moral position would be such that we could not do so (cheers.)

Fleet Mobilized

As to the question of Belgium—which is somewhat hypothetical, because I am not sure of all the facts—if the facts turn out to be as they have reached us at present it is quite clear that there is an obligation on this country to do its utmost to prevent the consequences to which those facts will lead if they are undisputed (cheers.) I have read to the House the only engagement that we have yet taken definitely with regard to the use of force. I think it is due to the House that I should say that we have taken no engagement yet to send an expeditionary armed force out of the country. The mobilization of the Fleet has taken place (cheers.) The mobilization of the Army is taking place (renewed cheers.) But we have as yet taken no engagement, because I do not feel that in a case of a European conflagration such as is without precedent, with our enormous responsibilities in India and other parts of the Empire, and all the unknown factors, we must take very carefully into consideration the use which we make of sending an expeditionary force out of the country until we know how we stand.

One thing I would say: the one bright spot in the whole of this terrible situation is Ireland (loud cheers.) The general feeling throughout Ireland—and I would like this to be clearly understood abroad (loud and prolonged cheers)—does not make that a consideration that we have to take into account (renewed cheers.)

I have told the House how far we have at present gone in commitments and the conditions which influence our policy, and I have dwelt at length upon how vital the condition of the neutrality of Belgium is. What other policy is there before the House? There is only one way in which the Government could make certain at the present moment of keeping out side this war, and that would be to it should immediately issue a proclamation of unconditional neutrality. We cannot do that (loud cheers.) We have made the commitment to France which I have read to the House which prevents us doing that, and we have got the consideration of Belgium which prevents us also from any unconditional neutrality. We cannot shrink from proceeding to the use of all the force in our power (cheers.) But if we did take that line of saying that we will have nothing to do with this matter under any conditions, notwithstanding Belgian treaty obligations, the possible position in the Mediterranean, the damage to British interests, what may happen to France—if we said all these things were as nothing to us, and that we are to stand aside, then I believe we should sacrifice our respect, our good name, our reputation throughout the world, so that we should not escape the most serious and grave economic consequences.

The Issue and the Choice

My object has been to explain the view of the Government and to place before the House the issue and the choice. I do not for a moment conceal, after what I have said and after the information, incomplete as it is, that I have given to the House with regard to Belgium, that we must be prepared, and we are prepared (loud cheers) for the consequences of having to use all the strength we have at any moment, we know not how soon, to defend ourselves and to take our part. We know that, the facts all being as I have stated them, that I have announced no impending aggressive action on our part, no final decision, no resort to force at a moment's notice until we know the whole case—we know the use of it may be forced upon us.

So far as the forces of the Crown are concerned we are

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