§*9u?‘iEiE- ' e. A_. e FULL 2"“ Nu dhsdhicfoommiaaionarzQwl-io nottoecmsboywdtllstankt-a. Tiuagant whowaatheraattbe goiothetank. (Oontinuedmmhlal). r ' shows that during the previous » (week there had been my heavy- snow and drifts on the western. 0f v Tignish end of the line. All the wit- neses are agreed that on Saturday, the 20th, preceding the ascidmt. ' very high winds and a heavy ground drift with a temperature a- bout zero prevailed. Iraln No. 54 which left Tlgnish at 7.30 that morning was stalled in Handrahaffs Cutting and required a gang o! ahovellers to release her. No. Ell left slmmersids at the usual hour, and at Wellington picked up twelve snow shoveilers who had boarded No. 54 after having releas- ed her at l-landrahulfls Cutting in the morning. when No. 211 reached Handrahaxrs Cutting shortly before '1 p. m. she became stalled in the snow, where she remained until 1J5 a. m. the following morning, when she was run info by No. 53. msthatllafltralnwlsstillin Summcrsidc. that No. 53 had not lsft Sulqmeu-slde. I told him to loll them not to come beyond the tank. and the operator at Tilnlbh llhd mswoulditbeallrighttocoms totbetanlnaadlsaidycaandl replied to this question to not come beyond the tank. Q. You made that r0000“. 1101 to come beyond the tankii-A. Those were my words. Qftwasallrighttoeomsto the tankiM-A. But not beyond the tank. Q. Did you remain in the office at ‘Plgnish while this communica- tion with the despatcher was 8°‘ ing on?-A. Yes, all the time. Q. What information came back to youf-A. Be told ms that No. 53 was getting an order, that he was giving No. 68 an order. Q. The despatcher at Charlotte- the despaicher. oswaaoomicgtothstank." or at Charlottetown, after they got to work." only what the dcIPliohsr told ms. that he was isttifll N0- 53 Q. You left that malls! with your aniatant, McOarthyi-A. ahouldreturntotbsoffice again. ‘rhatwasafterfwasthroughwith m. McCarthy in ilis evidence says that he told Murray “that No. McOormack, the train despatch- says that "about 8.45 or 9 o'clock the agent at Tignish reported that No. 211. was stalled, and they had a bunch of snow ahovellers with them. I don't know how many. 'I‘ha.t it was drifting quite heavily and at the present time they could not work, but if it abated they would not have much trouble in getting out, Q. Did you state definitely to Tignlsll that you would allow No. 58 to go to the tank?--A.' The idea in asking that was that sometimes in a cutting they out off the rear oars before they got into it, and I was wanting to be sure that she nel-sarssomanylditilfll“ the case which indicate loose N13 eereleumeebesaofovarltimih“, indsalinlwiththemitlldlfllvll" toknowiMWhMWWIIIL it became stalled in the llww. In the first place it was the duty o! 111g engineer b0 Whllfld 011B U18 nsgmsn, This was not done. Rule D9 Cited Rulspa of the Operating Rules of the Canadian National Railways lays down specific instructions as so the protection required in a case where a train stops on the main line undel- circumstances in which it may be overtaken by an- other train. It provides:- 99. When a train stops on the main track under circumstances in which it may be overtaken by an- other train a flagman must im- mediately go back with flagmazfs signals to protect the train. Under the conditions specified the distance should be at least: In day time, if there is no down -,rns§ssnun1nnuscuesmeu.n Immufl] some distriotswhcrof-hfi u“; any conscientious and proper- ly trained railway man would al- low his train to so unprotected even undel- thb extreme circum- 1 games; suggested by w. Hibblts. which occurred at ‘P18111511 W119" Murray went there and reported the condition of his train. Briefly. his evidence is that he asked Mc- Tagus that No. 52 should not coma beyond the tank. and was inform- ed by MsTagus that No. 68 was getting an order. He neither asked for nor received a copy of this 0r- der, but wassatisfied to assume that the order was that No. 53 should not come beyond the tank. subsequently, ils saw the porfor, McCarthy, and said to him. ."5he wontcomeindabgerifahedoss not go beyond the tank, and he said he would notify her." ting in the morning. According to his evidence the r0110" 111“ 1" 1'" o'clock that evsninl was II 1°1- lowa:— thatthsrewsrstraias 0901111118 temperature feud was ea...- hw- low asm. and that under aushoir- qumstandos “it is humanly impos- - of i they ' ' ' i 1m '. "m" ”°‘ ”° °°“’ w“ m m“ ‘"1 ugeulelun: Jiifufiii‘. l? t2? 1;...- "m ‘°' “m”? '° '° m" ‘Qd ...'."‘t 13.1.1.1.“ 018$? simagvsilsra "We M" “Warsaw avenue Renee. it being .1.“ ;, The collision hspPaned at 155 m. Spencer! Q- Whl‘ d“ 7°“ Q. To tell Conductor lilurrayf- ' ‘baud fill 1111111 iehm- 59"" 119m ° h that it was protection wl hi4 20 arranged and pmvgqed; u : u. 111.. 1n the murninl of sunday. refer to when you said not to some L h m, oondum, mm“ g1 h; 119° °! we pmmtnnwmg?‘ when fast that the observation has no with them. I don't klflruuwhfimmnl" m: out for, and if film ll F1! anowplowh owned by°inby 5' - reel-um- 21. 1m. no evidence beyond the tankf-A. m. informed * 1'1" m“ 11"” °' belrinl’ whatever 011 "111 "11- 1‘ in" 1‘ ""‘ “W” q ' ans and at the present time thvy could notworhbutifitabatedthfly would not have much trouble in getting out, after they 801 10 W011" Aatothslatterpartofhistaato- ment, namely, that "if the storm abated they would not have mush trouble getting_out," neither Mur- ray nor MoTague mention that any such statement was made. and in the light of the evidence as to ibp actual position of No. 211 it is more than doubtful if any such stato- ment wersever made. However that may be, lat us consider what he ~. am.- carefully lnquirina wheth- er there were any cars east-of the tank, he told McTague to toll Mur- ray, “we are going to let No. 53 go to the tank." Following this mes- sage one would expect that he would have issued an order auth- orising No, 531:0 go to the tank, and crew not handling up," in the train. w. Barker ‘1 out that on many of thou-w! Win01! 111160 where the mm" 13519111017 lllht and there _. operation at night, that u. 0,4," Ijlrt the train ou in he m VII 119008511‘? l0 put a srlgwplm (wedsc type) on the (m, on traintoenableitiogsi, ' llde l3 “I! majority of m branch linaa operated only ‘D would take a lot to convince m0 We next’ come to the events trains, that if they were operate the anowgviougl. other ears i‘. would mean g calling the regular train cr . 1 it In"! the mains could my. . run over tho branch and M gala, which is some Cases take hours, tho regular train vies would be badly disor .1. whereas where the use s1 , anowploughs was permitted were able to run the trains t». trouble is where the ordea- aaya it I. Qlsityourview ihatthistrain No. as, not finding m. 211 twohun- dred yardswsstofthetankhadiul. filled that cedar-Nomi: boss-lac I-Iandnbanh Quitting was mention- ed in the order, and on the evidence d t L wmm, ,1 _ _ before the "Superintendent the men ing to schedule and perf , Tignish tank is at mileage “L towm-A‘ Yes’ would be up m the mnk m ca” 381i: utgziareza ‘tilelre is a. e112: sic; “cording tome evidence o‘ both 50mm: :1; 8:0‘: 1,2,0 If: mg“ swore that they understood N0. 211 service. In many cases thtelzlymis Hnndrahafgs cuttlnk is 81111131511: o; Q. He was sivinB No. 53 an Ord- it would be a long time there, to or m “m; 6,000 “at ‘mm m hi” sligTsggevfil-ne: til; m Hamburg Cumn-g w“ m nmdnhufi out”... “d 1 m” h“ veg-y few, if any, ..... six hundre yards west o an err-A. Yes. see that the track was clear, be- ° m“ ' preaching train, 1,500 feet (about 12 telegraph poles). At other times and places. if there is no down gradc towards train within one mile of its rear, 3,600 feet (about 2B telegraph poles). If there is a down grade towards the train within one mile of its rear, 5,400 feet (about 42 telegraph poles). would not consider that the order was fulfilled until that train had arrived at Handrahanh Cutting and explored it thoroughly to us wheth- er the train was there or not. Interpretation of Order On the other hand meoormsek My! that in giving the order he wanted to convey the idea to them fobecarefutaothatthsywouldbe ers." _ "In my opinion the operation" the small branch lines, where trains lay up at the dead end o night, and whore the main . connection is not a divisional -.- nothing better than to put wedge plough ahead of the ... motive of the mixed train could provided for, but, where the . and about one mils from Tignish. I! is about one-quarter of a mile in length. McLeod, the roadmaster in charge from Charlottetown to 'I‘ig- nish gives the following description of 1t: In the light of the order he ac- tually issued, what pouible object had he in giving the message he did to Murray? The only effect it possibly could have, and which in fact it did have, waseio mislead Murray into thinking that No. b8 would not be permitted to go be- yond ths tank. In attempting to explain his message‘ McOormack' Q. For what? A-That is Just all I know, that he was giving No. 53 an order. My, Spencer; Q. 'l‘hs.t was the answer to you in response to your requestiL-A. Yes. Q-Is it s contTuous cutting, or Q, was s. copy of that order de- does l; vary with the topography llvered to you'll-db. No sir, it was oi the ground line?—A——It is just a not, conlimlous cutting. In other words the despatcher was letting No. 58 go to the tank. The despstcher ad- mits that this is correct, so we can take it as established that this was the message given to Murray. Murray returned to his train fully convinced that No. 53 would have orders not to go beyond the tank. Kelly the fireman on No. 211 says that when Murray returned he said cause it might be there for s time: 1 wanted to make sure that there were no cars cast of the tank. Q. You heard the evidence of McCarthyi-A. Yes. Q. He said that the agent told him to tell Conductor Murray that No. 53 was being allowed to come to the tanki-A. Yes. Q. Is that correctl-A. That she _ Th n” an must, ‘m, _ “m; ‘ ,___ careful to look out for signals, No. line connection of the branch I V, w, there is no great embankment. it is further Lyidsnos Quoicd would be allowed to come to the backs“, ‘Qnecmed duhm". m“ l‘ to him ‘at Charlottetown I sot an "fun. 1B not “y!” m“ m‘ an.‘ an“. u h. mum m . ca“ a n dmfloan, pom,‘ and m v a but e level niece of around. no deep tank. pom,“ when mm w,“ be u, u,” 01'1" "1" "°- 53 ""11 °°111° 1' of that kind. case of Dartmouth subdi " would not go farther than that." Surely the reasonable inference to be drawn from the words of the 010v Cutlifls- Murray than left the station and Q—-What i8 the height 0f 1t?11—1l returning shortly afterwards had would not be any more than three “m; conversation with one Justin .fs.ras the tank and stay at the tank unless we get through." Mur- ray aays: “When I cams back from Q. Was that correctil-A. If the 1111B Wis 0108s she would go to the tank, that there were no cars left obstructed view of him from an approaching train of, if possible, .Had u... order simply read “Look out for-No. :11 stalled in Handra- which is 81.80 miles long, the c trsvilla Subdivision between 5__ . , 1.600 feet. first blooms two tor- T, I, ' is th t h uld m" °““111¢"- "11" 001114 1M by 101m m0 Fredericton. the lv‘ OTV , or rour feet, that is, the clay cut- Mpcgffljy’ . pofflfi at tbs station. behind No. 211, that she would B0 pedces not less than 10o nor more x “at w the “b o! me :81?“ “L, a e W0 not so any question about its meaning. waak Subdivision, 109.75 miles c0111 tzng. m. evidence as to the oeuvereetion to the tank. That is not gayin ' ‘ “w” 111° ‘"11" ‘"1 11°‘ ‘hm’ y ' This ian is in v l u. st tin s bdi ' ' one, m m a mo“ h,_A_m _ _ m 8 than zoo feet sport. on the rail on bu, I ‘om, mm m the ban", When No. 211 was first stalled "'1' 11° ‘"1 “'1' ° m“ " ‘"1101 1°} m,“ o Q“ ° w y g L‘ "5 mum” “t ‘he “mud 3° n° “"11" "m" the same side as the engineman of shortly before 7 pm. her crow no 3mm‘ It 1' m" 111d simple. 21b miles, should I think be taken i» - pulls of it. Q, Whey; you came back bu the that. car’ I 9317111111911 V1151 11311 175-115‘. ' m,“ 1|; ma.“ vb“ M h o! b ma l I ' rem; Th‘ m d an approaching train 800.feet be- pa,“ at “mm, and Wu” we doubt surmised that the only train w" '57‘ ° y “me ca“ ° 591w“ “m D01 McLeod. the roadmas . who ha station it was McCarthy you talked yond such pwtimm The flumm t um ‘bout Mn No a ‘allowing them that night w“ no‘ undmwod n‘ to m“. w“ ma“ h Ewen on the mm “m! L ‘ m” m“, been oler the line the same week, wlthil-A Yes sir. Analysis of Evidence mun loam”, in ma, posluon mm “d”?! I f u “it l: 53’ which mm,‘ at Hummus add words which are not there. It that the prohibition should not i WW1 _ FL says that the snow 1n I-Iandrahans Q, Was that when you were told moaned or tenant _ ma“; ote 000!’ be d w can,“ about mm pm“ md m,‘ would not be possible to operate absolute in cases of severe s. . l ~ Dom ~ 1.; Cutting was then between five and mat No. bswould stay at the tank? Taking the evidence of all the n recalled mo” “other mm I ex ‘silnbdwthnalt w Li; I s tanklm‘. probably accounts m! ma“ [mm mm; “my 1g gvqymmmm w“; occurring when the motive m Q mm m,‘ seven feet where it had been _,q_ yo, g1; witnesses it is clear beyond ques- wives. he must’ m addlum w the ed t; t. m kflelfllm to put out “human immedutem to be permitted to" interpret train isnot available torun both a .. Ii. Wm‘ . 10,. thrown up by the plough. Q, Nag by the agentr-A. No sir, tion that whatever Mccqmack-s two mrpedoeé’ leave a ‘we bum- H 1;" e engine vsr . But n m inconceivable m“ u “up orders as meaning something other train and a snowplough. 1 u i ope 0810611 the 500M011 P0111111» 11 I was not told by the wot- inkniicn may have been. the mes- m ' than what they actually . Hers that the Tormentinc Subdivision l cf ti , ing red at the point he returns Mun,” on m. "m", mm up ray had not received the message l" _ , my m", Tigrbsh, who was in charge of the Q, You say you were not told by sage he sent to Murray was that 1mm, and whu, “turning u, m‘ u” m“ M am m "n, mm by Mwormuk. he would however, the words “200 yards west now operated by wing plough! At 1101 B“? °f mm whm‘ Tana“ N“ 54 1110 limn-sd- N0 811- h’ ""111 111°" N0- 53 W 80 l0 111° train (when snow ploughs or flang- homa “Marian,” who h not have later on put out the ns- d mum “u” 7"" “mid- n ‘m’ u m‘ ma“ “"91 “d w I a cc ‘m. in the morning, says that there was Q, men my statement that No. tank. On the faith of this message m may be running, curvature, 2am d u h, re e m‘ cegggyy pmgeuflm, may be that 1,1115 “an”, to "m, guggggt time this be oominuedy ;~' u... )Mr. :1: "x111 lime l": 0r foebt or!‘ slllélw 53 would not g9 beyond the tank lidurllay assumed that No. 58 would weather, or other conditions gov- Avie“ 2,0218 m; muk” ugh“ on In my view the order given to “u” d°°°iv°d u” m" ‘"1 N“ 53- 5 w” °’ m“ memmmdm " q ; aces over e ra on o s es we w ou by Mccarthyll-A- reoe vs orders not to c b ' One is ' t to Mr B 'an c1,“ m, p was m y s eyond the gfnlng) s, ms” burning m; mugi; m a No. 58 should never have been giv- m" 9'7"“? 111°"- Wl "n - ‘Wm- 11"’ W“ do“ mo“ ~05 mo track. Gaudet went through H, ‘m; mo, 53 wgg still in suln- tank. I-Ia returned tohis train and b, 91m‘, a “ch pom“ or “m” Lresr, no protec on whatever an‘ n” m,’ mu,” “m,” m’ com thscrewcarfoss wiisntbayrouns ad if he would urlo-rtako to The, w, u. Summerside on No. s4 and re- mgrgide, u... z said to h‘m "she save his tail brakeman, McDonald, “m, 1158mm; mgy m... new", f”, 81"“ m‘ m m“ u" m“ ditions existing on the mun. u, 110 Protection out torso- m n. out the nrcwwl encasement . 1mm \ F "turned c: No. 53. h m” won-g some 1n danger u she do: leave to go homo to Tignish for to insure full protection. ' m’ gflfixlilmed up w the um‘ o’ question was to have kept the ag- u” m h m 7"“ b°¢w°°n 111° “t ‘mt m m” m°m°mnd“m' . Onecelswll-wvwflfl sl-ioe dtbtenkfland chissuper. tetlle . - ‘ tank dth bl . i): section foreman in Gaudet’: absent!!! Said life Dials notify her. Donald, claim?’ he hsdabegrinsurlc To maintain the proper inter"! Costain, an engine cleaner at m“ both at “hem” ma 113mm m a mmu’ Wm “my y "m. under date o! February atgpbetweanl trains a fusee burning red "11 1°11’ 0f N0- 111 providing the must be lore by the protected train 911110011081 required by the rules at the point from which it moves. 1 "m 11°“ V1111 11118 Phase later. The flagman must always on the Murray thovsht that Protection approach fo a train display stop at the rear of his train was no signals and, if not already done, 1011801‘ 1100088811! and n0l11111I W115 place two torpedoes on the rail as 11100011" done to Drotect at. before described, and than return 101N111! No. 211 stalled in I-Ian- 300 feet nearer the protected train. 0111111110 Cvti-ins with no nroiec- The front of the train must be 11°11 °1 511i’ 1111101. 101 I18 return to protected in the same way when 11°- 53- Dfilflyed two hours and for- necessary by the front brakeman or, 1'7 mum” °n “M11111 01 111010118 if there is no front brskeman, by convinced that Ne. 211 had got out of the snow. It also further appears 1111i they intlfwcisd tbs order to mean that they were so 1mg sue Only 1'01‘ protection. However that mlfbblcllwtbyanyzssauabsld them blameless for doing what they did. They knew that when they 10ft ‘ Bummersids, N0. 211 w" stalled 1g I-Iandrahanh Cutting. When they arrived It ‘$110 ti!!! thpy could lee no indication of nay protection for her, but one would expect cal-gm] 1824, he replied that "we will deavor to carry out the pro arrangement." If this arrangement had - adhered to and no plough had l‘ attached to No. 53, 1t is pose that the engineer would have . the marker lights of No. 211 in - to prevent the collision. While I appreciate that the 1 ficials in sanding out No. 53 with snowplough ahead of the en were actinrin what they belie- on duty and not to havs peg-mit- ted No. as to leave Alherton until No. 211 reached Tianieh. In the alternative the despatcher might have given No. 53 an order to 11m to Tlgnish tank and to protest against No. 211 from Tlgnish tank to Tigflish. was engaged that day with a. gang of ten men shovelling out the ' yards at Tignish. He heard No. 211 blowing for help and with his ten men went out to the cutting and assisted the men who were trying to releaseflo. 211. Chaisson gives V the following description of snow conditions in the cutting:- Q-I-Iow deep was the snow along beside that train?—A. It was six ‘or seven feet deep. Q-Was there any room for the Tignish, heard that No. 211 was stalled andjrom ‘I‘ignish walked out to the cutting arriving there after 11 pm, and remaining there until after the accident. He found Kelly, the fireman, alone in the engine, and Conductor Murray, Hessian the engineer, and Harper a brakeman on No. 211, together with the snow shovellers. all in the car. In his evidence he said that one of the snow shovellers cams up to the engine and said that the MoTague, the agent at Tiknl-Bh. gives the following account:- Q. What was the first intimation you had of train No. 211 being in troubieil-A. I was called on duty by our freight porter, somewhere around 8.45. He told me that Con- ductor Murray was there. and that his train wag stalled and wanted me to come on duty and report to the despstcher at Charlottetown. Q. What report did he ask you to make to the train despatciler a- Protection or Equipment Now let us examine the amuse but forward by the crew of No. 58. connection with the boat com, No. the fireman. In the first lac men to make sure that alas had e f0 b0 11 the 11km" 0f @1110 g . m"! 141 W011‘ 0015mm 11101111” bout No. 2112-11. I-Is told ms to s3 was still at Srwnmerside when Flgamen must each be equipped g?mgs1ltlhzash:twiixilzgtznréauzzggn engineer on f“ 353313;“? :3: out of the cutting bsfors they theg- m‘ ""11 h" 5110"" 1° w 1" 1 2:? *- m’ * m ..l"..:r:."; :::..:::".::":...:: 1:: "w ~ m» Mu».- M» "v meow v v~ sale-r: “M; fr» v v» 1 ' 1 Q-Where were they shovellins?-— “mg u m; dsspstchsr and told being stalled at I-landrahada ‘Cut- 1 on a Stan’ at least w‘ wr- Hmper we" were‘ He asked than It“ a y" ‘Sued w hmnkflm what shauld wnm" u w the aotics of attachin and 1 o u. They started at the we of lbs him 1t w? still there The desoeton- tin Asked "what actio did pedm and n" "d mm!‘ “d M “ m” “n” “w” N“ 53 “m3 tallreads’ Look out M No’ m o do“ “m” m. w‘ sic ‘is to passen tgin t? cutting and shovel-led dvwfl- asked” e 1f the ‘main line was car's-r" llsooormssk re 11nd v1.50“ mum time “d whm ‘mum a 11 111° @1113 I114 i110? 801d yes. a ed m Banal-mm.‘ Gama" m mama“, u“ m“. m u singsbsuld be ab s: d" I Q-‘Ilo set down to the rail-A. c1- behiid if there wen my ecaution m pie I- l other condition! 0mm d“ “a. “m” knew’ ‘when h; I“ o” m‘ yum we“ o! 11mm‘ mm." Moo" “new” rmlurhw.‘ Iibrth ' t: tmlwh. iv ' ‘Yes 1 u“ ' tank a his train we u“; mu" "we m m“ Wm‘ a M 119m» 1 While 1180B. o...- he could see the headlight of “a” 1° mm“ 1° 1°“ w" m" 9"‘ mm “m” u” mm“ I “at th a reasons a m g 1 ‘I v - - cars behind the an h“ or es to o. s-No. ill-tn look out a supply of matches, at least six m, 53 ‘t the m,‘ He “an” to tection. McEwen, the Chief m- to observe that to my mind the ° 5°11“ 111""! 11111 111° C“ ‘i zen “mpeflmc z askefiiOogidllitlfitli/lllgtgm .1?” $01-$10. 221010 stalled 1n rlilndfihlnfl torpedoes and fivs red fueesa. “u; down u, u“ “m, and Na n spatcher ahfiharlottatown, "y; n management in handling No. 6s in i‘; 11:12:11“ 31111111" t“? p, _ he aa . o. d m‘ “idem” “braking, yards wes cf Tigniah a train should not stop between mud mm u“ m, ,4" of u“ m“ means to look out for equipmgug. tbs way u.” 414 n" “m, w; d s smp oymen v ‘y 1 wh clear. and the 08110 10‘ - - stations at a place where the view “my. H, m“ h an" n but “m Moors puts his case in this wgy, sideratisn to the safely and dea- m ‘mammal 111° °°“d“°'°‘ " v - i en No. 211 stalled there was m1 him m say that we are B01118 It. should be explained hers that from a following train 1s obsvrlwg. He sayg;_ brakeman of No. 211; and th Warren, the conductor, and Moo and Coyle, the two engineers of 58. be suspended for a period six months. The Board further directs til Mcdormack, the train dcspatch at Charlottetown, be suspended i a period of six months. patch cf the passengers carried by that train. she was sent out of sumrileeslde headed for Tignlsh with full koowledse ofthe fact that Nodllwasatailsdfnthsanowat Handrahads matting, and without bowing when aha was likely to be released. Under such conditions it is bard to undsrstandwhy every operator on the lino; including tbs Despatchsr at Oharlotiotown, should hava been psrmittod to go off dilly. a very heavy northwest wind blow- . ing and the temperature was about new. The men worked until about ~ nine o'clock but finding they were - making no headway, knocked off, and went into the baggage car, the intention being to resume work ywhen the weather should moderate Murray. the conductor of No. 211, got a. team and drove into Tlgnish a station. l-Ie says he left about 8.40 - and arrived at the station between ed. I believe the evidence of this witness and accept. his story as true. It shows clearly two things:- (1) Thai: the headlight of No. 52 at the tank could be seen from No. 211, sud v (2) That the crew of No. 211 were not evsn keeping a lockout for the arrival cf No. ss at the tank. Murray had no justification for relying on verbal information from thoagent or anyone else, or for ns- to let No. 53 go to the tank. I 8W6 that ihstrllittiflfl to Mr. Mun-a)’ that the despatcher said he was letting No. 53 to go to the tank. Q. No 53 was to B0 to the 1411i? __a_ 1g w“ u. go to the tank. Q. Was that communicated to Y0“ in the gm-m (y! n train orderf-A». Ne verbally, talking to the deepatch- er over the wire. Q. What about the train order that Conductor Mllfffly 111114 l‘ when McOormack was talking to McTsgue, he asked him where No. 211 was stalled and McTagus told him 200 yards west of the tank, which explains why l-Iandrshanb Cutting was described in the order as 200 yards west of the tank. In addition to issuing the so- called 81. order to No. 58 McCor- mack sly! he sot in touch with Conductor Warren, who was in charge of No. 58, and advised him ed. When a train is moving undo» circumstances in which it may be 11101113011 by another train, such action must be taken as may be 1100055011’ to insure full protection; lighted fusees, red o1- yellow as the 0150 mil’ "quire. must be thrown off at proper intervals. When a flsgmsn goes out to prg- test a train his place will be filled by the person designated by the “There seems to be‘ quits g 41g. ference of opinion, especially 1n 1g.- Iffld to the way Ohief “Train pa. Watcher McEwen givsg m; mm, Dretation of ‘the fulfilling o: m“ order ws held. We claim. and have always been led to believe, that 11; was the protection we had to 100k 11111 101'. not the equipment. As- 001111-08 to Mr. Mcflwarra definition, "5 15 111° Bqllllimsnt regardless of the‘ protection. 8s claims that ws BLAST FROM TRAIN WHIS SENDS INDIANS ON TIIE ‘ l! and 0-1! p- m. McTcsue. the new bout?-A. 1 don't know anything that Ne. 211 was stalled 1n Han- conductor. glecting to obey the Opdrating M” should have gone to tbs pump‘ McTagus was sailed on duty at L“ 11¢ T180111» “Y5 1001i 1-41- but "11 about that. I did not tell him any" draharfs Cutting. Warren gives the mum“ mm to mm, m, mm um». night expecting so m4 ‘Ilgnish at s.4a m, g, u; T“ m," s exact time |does not matter. What thing about a train order. There u" n m PA!’ Mb.’ Aw conversation as follows:- "He told me that No. 211 was stalled west of the tank, and that he was going to let us go: Murray said that we were all right to the tank. I-Ie meant by that that there were none of his cars extending east of the tank, that he had not drawn his train and gone ahead with the engine, that he had his train with him." McDonald's Evidence 8s admits he knew that rear end protection could bs obtained by means of an order, and that with~ out such order Rule Oil sbovs qudt- ed applied. Knowing all this he aimpiytookaohaocsonthsds- spatohsr-not per-slitting 11o. as to go beyond the tank. While it in no way excuses him, I am satisfied that he was, as ha says, fully con- vinced that the dslpltcher had train still stalled there. m gum Of order we held was put out 1n 1'5. ll stances on the main lino, m; d times. Rule 100 states that it is not safstolsaveasal-snghgmm 11110. evsn under train proipgflgp, It must be pmpgud iyhrpodoea’ ‘"1101! lives the trainmsn a char-mg, A110 Form 3 orders are vol-y m... 111' in res-rd to their definitions, that the second u- ‘ “u; “m. took place between McTagus and ' Murray has a very important bear- ‘, fng and for that reason I will quote ‘Jthe evidence at some length:- "V Murray's account of his interview Kxjwith McTague as follows: " Q-What report did you make? lA-I told them exactly the condit- i ion, the position our train was in, " and the condition where we were __,stalled, and that it was impcssbls was no train order mentioned ‘It all. Q. Did you not tell Conductor Murray that they were sivih! £15111 No. 53 an orderf-A. No, I did not. Q. Was he there all the time 7°" were communicating with the de- spatcher?-—A. He was there when I got that word from the dsspatch- er. Tell him, he says. we are c0108 The marvels of modem civlllzat - ‘ were presented for the first time l two fanllliea of OhlDOWYBn India from far, north of Lake du B10011 in northern Baskatchewan -- their arrival hero after a 50v m1 trip by canos from their northe home. no two families were seated - the aids of the railway tracks he when the Canadian National R McDonald, the rear braksman on N0- 311. stated in his evidence that when the train stopped be w“; 11103 9.500 yards and pllocd tor. Dedoes on the rails He says ha yo. mauled out until 9.30 or 0.1a, when he returned to his train on account of the cold. but he admits he left no fusees burning red as rsquu-gg Modormack want off duty at 10.30. Thsacoidentwaaatlsoanband tbsrsiisf didnotraachtha wrackuntil lioamoaitbough the dlataneswaaonlyflmiiea. o-blda they could not work at all. Q-What did you ask for in the gzlhayof help or protection. or both? ,..>.“_1 “as so got more help, more a-‘f-‘mesl to some out and shovel out {fifths train, besides the number we had. the train started w vvll 01"» ‘ families rushed halter shelter 1W from tho iron monster. 100W“ quiating equalling child”!!- ,Thafami1iaaarethw°1“ loia Benauni and M11100" '1" They came down on the 1°"! “n trip to brine Mule!“ W1“ l" I found that Mr. Murray was not there. I then went to work and saw the porter, Mr. McCarthy, and fold him that if Mr. Murray came hack again to tell him that than was nothing further, only what the dsspatcher said, that he was let- assumed that she had managed to set through to Timiab. They ac- cordingly started for Tignish. Moore, the driver of the leading wline on No. s8 was looking out of the window until the -plough went into the cutting, when on Murray to ass that his train was Dropdfly Protected, but-ha was un. able to say whether McDonald ever was out._ i Mr. Hlbbits. who represented the R011?” Employees. struck a note during the hearing which rather aoisiy responsible for this convic- tion cn his part. _Now, let us examine McOormacPa connection with the matter with a view to seeing whether any re- sponsibility {cats on him. 0n sat- urday, February 20, KcOormack _..v1 21 . to let No. s3 go to the tank. I gave Copies of this order issued to No. by the rules. Irom his demeanor Ilvm orders to No. b3 not to some 1°°m1l 011i for the first train ahead 111111 “Bil-II IIIIIIIIII. On the 7'" 111111 prepared to pull out a P: rvlcr’ the men to work mat word to Murray. and then he as were delivered to the two en- on the witness-stand and the very beyond the tank. "111" 1110 order is fulfilled, 11 1g hearing, Ir. l. I. Mitchell, General m“ cmmhu" “o mam“ ». 11-1 5 "I" 1110!1114'W°'1‘°‘1 1° 1°“! m” left tho office somewhere 9110146 sineera and the rest of the crew "nlil-llflctory manner in which he - 1' 111° Nillvmcnt that has u; b; Chairman cf tbs Brotbisilood of ‘d ‘um “mm” u m the pt a» ~11 ‘"1 111P°""1'° 1°’ ‘"11" 1° W“ nine o'clock. I was still talkink with knew of its contents before the B0" his evidence. I am satisfied Durham Men-re "m" °‘" 1°11 1i 1| imwlsibla to M01100" I '1' “M m“ m’ “amazon: t I ,.,,ln the cold, that they were shoveling m’ desplmhe,’ and he mm m, "m, 1,“ s e_ m; 53 than that he 1s no; mun‘ u" ma, ma , . "In trains over m, mm m." m4 m“ . m“. my.‘ "mm train, unable to compre a ne eswilllvm “101110-1114 11°01" that I would not be required 9n wwedvfl t0 ‘P1101111 .111“. wok "111 h’ MM at any time want rile mousse mm the duoawh- m" 1"” “"1" “Mule time‘, flu emcee sf» enew- WW‘ ‘ ‘ W, m. .1 "n. fiiwouid come 1n faster m... they 4...; any longer. oz course then 1 wster and, seeing nothing in the back w protect bu train. er, Mcficrmack, eeslnunloueos o. the regular mule on that ordor nlceahe ahead of ensues ca pu- m“ m,°u°“"f'if§, whml, u. m r-rlfllla put 1t out. and that 0n 0M w“ going to my own home, and nature of protection for No. 211., It was the duty of Conductor him by the agent, asdrague, was “d m" ""11 mlking it right longer ia-aiaa. “m” b t ° F. a. Id P‘ I ST q-wbat slur-Ii. 1 also iold him ting No. s3 go to the ma. There account of the flying snow he ‘abut surprised me and, I think, must was on duty from iso lmtii 10.20. 9mm? ""1 111°" 111011‘! few milaa "l1 with IE 1a.!- IMIII. 1.1m ham. The Indians 31141‘ that the condition for setting out‘ was no order given by ms that she his window and went in blind hit- have surprised the tralnmen pres- Rs knew of the weather conditions u‘ M“ 917W!“ 11"" P100011‘ 00110711 "will! 0! ilil day and night in shifts to r7108 ' thére did not look very 800d. that. was 801118 to stay at the tank, bc- ' ' ting the rear of No. 211 approxim- ihemensouldnotworkustilthayondtbsianhoranythlngalaalWlyflooyardainaidcthscutting. I ent at the hearing. Having McDon- aid‘s interacts 112 mind, hi lffllfl The observations made by Mr, limes with 1001.13 no train ma. lid 0! H10 fact that N0. H hlfl- ham and in Enhlmh aisk woman bars for medical at ~' tin, . I 1.