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, . , . , _ .. _ ,_ _ . .  1..... ,. _, 5 ,
THE CHARLOTTETOWN GUARDIAN PA("E NINE-
v* _
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'lgll'
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' f' ocToBER1,1914' a - . - 
l A   _:T N  If  `  '~~~»< ' ~ ' _. »  .. . 1. -1 i 1- - r
I ,IT Q  ` Il    _ V ` I     g  
@ ll A ‘Jay "`.  V l ' ‘_ -, l ` l A .
>> :_ ' lt _ .  0 ‘ '. . > A V , 4 '
7~ 1
ji?
‘ 'V 1' ' Jl ,iff
__.s__`$`
force, and the enor-
mous nrmieu mo-
bilized at the mo-
ment for war in-
dicate the price de-
1nanded for the de-
fence of national in-
tegrity. More than
heniy millions of
inc world`s young
» ' if inauhuudnretraiued
'|1114 teal rvady for war. the \var tiiat al-
ways lhreatnris, :uni tlie \vorld`s fleets
indodc Citrtrfivn hundred vessels of
v=r_\'ia',' size, ene.r;'y and potcntinlitics of
éamrucuon.
Despite the variant views of experts,
the bottle ship is still the arbiter of the
11.11. More dreadnougliis than subma-
rines are being built, and yet from twenty
to thirty suhninrines can be olmiiiieil for
the price of one ilreatlnouglit. Tlicse
rn-:tt units ei’ naval warfare cost from
.21li),(ltit),UYJ0 to $I5,000,0tl0 eacl\_ brittle
ships mid brittle cruisers alike, and
cruisers from $1,500,000 to $2,5Uti,0()0.
iircat Briiain`s present navy is the
grczitcst uggregutioii of sea strength the
world has ever known, though relatively
it is not so large as _when its standard
of rea power was at lenat :z certain supe-
riority to the navii.-.fi of any two other 11n-
tlons combineil. When the present war
broke out Geru1nny'11 nary was assumed
to~hnve sixty per cent of the strength
possessed by that of Great Iiritain-
liiungli in this some llielors, noial1l_v that
of rclntive gun puiver. were nverestimiit-
ed. As proof of this here is nn official
enumeration of the latest main hat-
tcrics:--
“The heaviest guns mounted in thc Brit-
ish navy are 13.5 inrh, firing n projectile
of 1,250 pounds. '.l‘l1er<- are 124 of them
in the fleets iii lioine \v\>tei's--~l00 in hot-
ilc ships and 24 in l1ati le cruisers. The
heaviest guns mounted in the Gcrinnn
navy are 12-inch, firing n projectile of
S59 pounds. ’l‘herc are 98 of them in agai-
pletcd ships, all battle ships. 1110 b|1f'9l'~‘
cruisers having only 11-inch guns."
The main dependence of the Bri&h
empire is its sea power, and this exist/-1
for one main purpose-"command of the
ses. in war." This once set'nred>-that' B-
its particular enemy or enemies behil'
sealed in lmmo ports or shorn of I9!
i§5-F;
- 1
r Z3
W o
-15
 », .--
‘_-'-."'_'r72”'_l131if»f~7.‘.:-_
:ef f~=9.>., 
_f _
,vi
power--the navy can easily protect Brit- 1
ish eom1ner1-e, keen oven the lines of
con\nuinieat.ion between thc different
at-1.-iioiis of the empire and prevent. in-
tlfarioii nf 1-hitisli territory. ’ `
Cheat Britain's Sea Powx.
\`.'l.at, then, popularly ilcsmibed, ia tb
I.-'wi power limi Great Britain had at lb
diop1.1dtlon when war was declared?
Anil what generally are the character
and number of the units assembled in
the main fleets. the detached squadrons
and dimloua? Iflrst of all in im-
portance is tho battle ship, and this is
the outgrowth of proved need. ln old
days sea fighting was more or less of a
liapliazurd effort, wlicn the llldlvidllll-l
essay was often the determining factor.
liut as order was evolved out of chaos
in naval tactics, notably in the Dill-till
wars with England, the practice Ilovlv
withered strength of fillbtilw in I Wm'
pact or close hauled arrlY1 the lllllll
being ranged in line ahead-that is, each
succeeding uhlp following in the Willie °f
the next ahead, so ns to give free Dill!
to guns carried mainly on tho bread-
side. For purposes of mutual auPP°f¢
the ships were dilll°B°i] I' °l°“l7 t°
one another, ahead and astern. ll W"
compatible with individual freedom Of
evolution and manoeuvre. This dlSP0ll'
tion necessarily involved the exCl\10l°\1
from the line of battle of all Wllell
below a certain overuse °\‘ 9f““‘l‘“'d_°f
fighting ship. Hence the main fighting
forces camo in time to be ¢0l11P°°¢\l_°°'
tlraly of "ships, fit to lie in n llne,' or
"¢.,|“| mtg," gg they were frequently
called. Finally dials lllP¢\‘|°l‘ ¢'“ff"""
known aa "line of battle ahlvlf" ships
of tho line," and at last as “battle
lhip," an they are known in this era. _
But .need for other and liilllfvl' 'mil'
was no lou lPl>lf¢°*» “°‘“bl’ ff" 'lm
collection and transmission of - nitclli-_
nemo. such cruiaihl *Uni* ¥"““' in
liao and character from fur fx-irate: ti
crnhsrl, daltroyrl and scouts, and
finally included modern hottie cruises:
ao hoaviiy annoti and armored u to he
capable or nmol!" °\‘ °°°“""‘
1|” gg ugly, immediate aupooriu
,f ‘. mi," Qhgagthavo 0%'
1inrh¢mot»ti|1¥uk\vi1¢\°°°*"°m M
m owne a ni\\*l°-°"“°°°' '
`, ,;_.; rm wand is sun " "
.. `-/'k"1~‘_|\$\- ruled and peace is ‘__ Q, `
. W ,` sought to he pre- 1 ‘
 Mil) served by organized  '_
12-#-Y'  115'.; 1 " 
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increasing in size and power-until we
come to the battle fleet, the-eo;-,¢m.
trnted. nucleus, the movinghng of Um
whole organization,
Same authorities do not fsrvovr the
battle cruiser, but it has great-fig‘hh`|rg
qualities. can push home 1 remnants.
sauce, can hold up the lagardn in o,
chase and thus bring on n desired gen.
eral action, and, owing to its superior
speed, it can be ready as a fast wing of
the main fleet and furnish a ready
weapon for concentration on an encmy's
line where such zulditional weight might
determine victory. The functions of
other auxiliary ships are explained by
their niunes, but it must he kept in mind
“HIL other things being equal, the bigger
i the ship the better it is as an instru-
1
U"=`"U\lif¥ Of war. Moreover, for tucticull
reasons it is not expedient to lengthen
unduly the line of battle, and here again
exists thc manifest advanisfge oi concen-
trating offensive power, :ls fur as may
be, in single units; ' `
-“iff all Predictions to the contrary,
war dill not come as :1. bolt out of the blue
either to Gr(-:it Britain or to Gcimiuuy.
With (lreat Britain this prepared; ‘ess is
1 attributable to the fact that the inspeo
tion at l'orts1uoirth by the King had luff
the fleet in a state of satisfactory luov
bilinatlon, both us to the active force!
and to the reserves that had responded
to the call. Ships were in fighting condie
tion and crews were available to mail
them all. Germany was also fortunate
in that fully one»thirt| of her active per-
sonnel--und th(-se next to petty office-rn
generally included the best trained und
most skilled men of ber crew-were
still on shipboard, an their discliurge i.\it1¢
the reserve was not due until October
next. Supplemeniing this practically all
the German navy except one battle
cruiser, two armored Cruisers and 1\ few
cruisers, gunboats and destroyers, wa)
concentrated in northern waters.
Location of Fleeta. I
.liter the inspection at Spitbead, the
Iiaads of Portsmouth, the first fleet
was concentrated at Portland, the sec-
ond fleet was in its various home ports,
and, thanks to the experimental mobiliaa.
tion ot' inspection, the ships of tho
third fleet were manned with surpris-5
ing smoothness and speed when the
ascend call was made. Theiiirst fleet,;
that the-cruise-etAmphior\.h.as~been .sunk
by an anehored'mine1axid~timt a recon-1
nuisance in~fo'ncs-to the~Bi;ht~oE'Heligo-
land has been suco@hl, tho veil of
been lifted from that-day to this. lt is
known that "the command of the seo”
has been established in and around the
North Sea, that a number of army corps
have been speedily and safely trans-
ported to the Continent, that coastwise
traffic is proceeding in apparent security
and that the highways and byways in
sea and oversen are being policed in the
interests of commerce. `
The German forces have on the other
hand taken up tho role of “a fleet in be-
ing" and are Dl‘0'l1UNY Ulu! NWID
Wilhelmshavmmnd Borkum, the m£
of the liilbe and Hellgulanrl, the battle
ships, larQ¢cruisers and submarines at
anchor inshore and the light cruisers and
destroyers, aided by air machines, form-
ing an extended screen of ivntchfulness.
scouting aml' lookout. O
Now that the war is well on it may be
asked, What has the navy done? . Thin
may perhaps be best answered in on
extract from an English editorial on the
subject :-"No one in England now ask!
‘What is the navy doing? ltl ¥l`¢l¢Uf
triumph, worth more to ua than many
naval battles, ir that it him MDI the
German fleet into port, and. hlvlnii
either captured or driven off the aea all
German merchant abipr, has !lV¢D U! I
tooling of aecurity so deep that some of
us can hardly yet realise that we are
nlmost within oarahot of the cannon.
_g for our silent but all-powerful
any we should not to-day have Ml
abundance oi food at D\'l¢¢l "W0 hllh"
una in peace time, and in many caaea
actually lower than prices of ronllll! I
docado or two ago. Fiaandal and eco-
nomic conditions were pretty had I fi'
an gp. Had our navy not been road!
ng gtgsdy and strong we could not have
un ygmg going. The government,
|¢¢f,¢\q }i¥lb¢ll”"°'“‘b’
umm" .fan cpm or ¢unu.f1“°=°*°'\ "““"'°' """ ““ "'° ""“°»-
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\¢~
 A *ds ~Y _  Jr ` ~”
 \~`~`° f- /_ T1-u:l1zo1~.1 Dum;
secrecy ahrorudingxits movementsihas not~.
have worked wonders in a crisis which
when it was sprung upon us terrified
responsible men, who could see how the
whole commercial machinery might col-
lapse, but could not perceive how dis-
aster could be averted."
Well, the navy seems to have averted it.
Apparently there has never been any
secret about Germany's proposed naval
strategy and campaign, in tba event of
war with Great Britain. The Reichs
Marina Amt, or War Staff of the Ger-
man Admiralty, long ago, when its navy
was in the earliest stages of its creation,
declared that its plans were based on
two assumptions; first, that Great Brit-
ain-its probable adversary-could be
defeated in detail, because its naval
forcu would bo dispersed. or il’ concen-
trated the result would bc Great Brit-
nin'l loss of supremacy at sen. .
Gorman A1dminl’a Opinion.
The naval correspondent of 1-. British
yourual comments on these nsisumptioas
ul fol|oWl:- ` '-
"Tho firat hypothesis, then, is disper-
sion. Events have occurred otherwise.
Instead of dispersion there ls concentra-
tion. The second hypothesll is radically
unsound. The defeat al the Rusaltin
navy by the Japanese navy d_id not leave
Japan in a uealmv ‘ ‘position lu the
worid.' 9
“Upon the publii-u1...1 ot' the Navy act
of 190) Admiral von der Lloltz, a former
Chief of the Gorman Admiral (War)
Staff, wrote an explanatory eaaay on the
aubjset. He observed that war with
England was far from improbable, and
that it wal the business of Germany to
prepare for it. In the event of the Brit-
ish forces bring concentrated in bo-me
warm Admiral von der Gotta considered
that 'numerical inferiority can ho com-
pensated by offieioncy, hy excellence of__
_ iv~» , --¢‘,, , - _
_,_-11”'   -.,',~‘.~.===:1~“, .1 ‘
material, by the iffy and discipline
of the men. Careful preparation permit-
ting rapid mobilization can insure a
momentary superiority.'
"if the last sentence mean anything,
it menus n surprise attack. Wlien those
words were written there was nothing
either in international law or in the prac-
tice of nations to forbid un attack boforo
declaration of war. (ln 1907 the Hague
conference decreed that n declaration of
war must be mode before hosliitias; but
the signature of Germany to that article
did not prevent her from sowillg miner
befcro declaration, the other du.)
arise. Navy assay Ffa. '
"Tho plan of a surprise attack has in
failed. \Ve do not yet know that it was
even attempted; probably it was not.
What little is known sues to show that
the British navy was ready before the
Gernran navy.
“Attack in detail or dispersal of forces
has failed; surprise has failed. Contrary
to German expectation, the British navy
is not only concentrated in bome waters,
hut has cruisers to spare for the trade
routes. Tho ‘momentary superiority' hus
not been gained by Germany. What she
has achieved is n pt-rniaucut inferiority.
For in tho event of a general fleet action
in which the British fleet was victorious,
though weakened. this country would
atill have u sufficient navy to hold her
own, whereas Gemiuny xvould have
nothing left.
"Her initial assumptions linviug broken
down, Gerintuy has had recourse to the
strategy of attempting to reduce the
British fleet by destroyer and submarine
attacks. Her object is, of course, to
sink by these means as many ships of
the llno as ponible. But as that inten-
tion ia known, it ir not likely that the
after completing tho~eonmma:b1c stores, - V f '*"°‘\°Q.§$" -' --_Tir ,`._  _v 1 __ 
an .1 1mi°e'P¢rusas..i2uo~h a, 1 '  ‘ . __
neg? ‘for-1buW1'.rnnwr and thmxcfnthsixgll "_ ”'° l  p of G rea* `l_
German mine-l2;ver'haB"bee11~dwfr¢=yed."'\ _ _ ` ~ ’ A ~ E ._“ \ BPI QIDS HOfn€ 
rine and mining operations. But in
these branches of warfare this eou
is numerically superior. Until Germ
slice.-veils in cle\'u-i1;,; the North Sen
main fleet is inoperative. if she
force, to whose interest it is that s
action should take place as soon as
sible.” 
ln concluding this summary of Br
mind that both the British and
man navies are ln n highly efficient
dltion und that the officers of each
men of great intelligence, fine skill
to second place among the sea Pow
is phenomenal, and should it go into
tion with any of its sea enemies l
The insistencies of fair play dem
tha: this should be said.
l'l‘llE.\‘G'l‘l{ OF THE BRITISH
'rum Granular( Fl.ri1s:'l‘s.
BRITISH FLEET.
Eifective strength of navy at
moment when war was declaredz-
Super-flreudnougbt battle ships.. 10
Super-dreadnuuglit battle cruisers 3
10
5
Dreadnought battle ships. ..  .
Dreadnought battle cruisers.  .
Total drrndnoughh.. . . . . . . . . .
(Three more super-dreadnoughts
are near completion, and are
due to commission this year.)
Predreadnoughta-
Powerful ships all completed be-
mdoavor will aaonod. Again, pre|um~,
_mms moo   .,..,.,,1o
' `  _ 2;..  .”_f* »~......f» . 1' 1' ‘ -
   »-   » 
,~ "' =-.~.“k+F- "'     ze. l" " "-Je' ~» ~ '
ii
German Navy Efficient. `
1
o
ably it is her intention graduaiiy to clear
the _\'ort’h Sen by destroyer and subma-
all
iitry
any
1.1-r
suc-
ceeded, her main fleet would be forced to
fake action against a greatly superior
uch
PW'
iish
1 naval strength it will be well to keep in
‘er-
00|!-
are
and
most useful experience. The growth of
the German navy, its rise from nothing
ers,
ac-
t is
certain to give a good account of itself.
and
AND
the
13
15
is
pi
=~g=»--~~“ 
“C
completed between 1895 and
1904 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . 30
Total pre-dreadnoughts .. .. . .. -
.A
O
Total battle ships..-......-.. (SS
Armored cruisers- l 'I '
Big, heavily armcrl ships conn-
pleted between 1005 and 190-`l.. U '_
“County class," slower and loss
powerful, completed between
19o3r1n1i.1oo5...............15 Q
Drake and Crcssy class, bigger _
and better, but slightly older  D.
ships eoinplctcd between 1901 QQ
‘ and 1i)03...........-......... 10 si
Total armored croisers......¢
Cruisers- "J *_*
Big protected cruisers, Diudel ,
class, 21 knots, 0-inch guns .,,f
(1859-19(2) . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . .
_ . 0 `
Older and smaller (1880-1802).. 9
-- li'
Fnst light cruisers--
Arethusa class, .'l,a'>00 tons. .'10
knots, burning eil. completed
this ycnr. _ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. .
"Town einen," 71.400 1114.500 tons,
25 knots (li)lU~l!il-ll, .. .. .. . . .
25-knot ships, about 300 tons
tioosuoory.................
8
15
15
- 38
Other <~ln.=se.=-
20-knot aliips. 22,100 to 5,400 tons
tissio-1000)  ....... ..
1U~knot ships, -'».Ut`lU tous (lSil.'1»
189151 . . . . . . . . . . .
. . _ . . . . . .
. .
Older ships, 2,.'»t_\0 io 4,3110 tons,
K5 to 19.5 knots (lSi\0-1393)..
16
0
9
-an
,_ _.Total protected cruisers. ..._
5:
34.
‘Older and less powerful ships " .
\. ~\
Da-strl'-_vei's. _ '36 to 2515 knots _
(1-111:: 1014>  . . . . . . . . . . .
_ . M
'.l`\\1'p.~l-.1 l\r\:it.~1, '_’U io 20 ki.i0*.S
iisxz-irwm  '.109
S1i‘»n1;1ri1u-.-. from l.(00 to 200 ,
:.~1:.:, spot-11 from '_‘ii to 1l.5 ' "fl
ltnoisl suri.`nci~, l'_! i-1 7 knots
1»:11hn:< r1:1~d (]"1)-E-i913). ..  . .
Mine layers .................-
liepnir ships  . . . . . .
.. l
Not all of these ships are available lol
service in lioniu waters, init, whether il
}Curope or ui the oilu-r side of the world,
all are tnkinz part in thc struggle fog
Lhe command of the sen. _
75
1
GEii.\iA_\' FL|1:lr1'. ' ff
Super-drr'adnon|:i\bs,(Il building) - Noi
Dreadnought l1atile~ships. . _ . 13 -
Dreadnought Lnttlc cruisers.. 5 lf,
”‘ '/'_ ut
(Two other battle ships due  »
to coiiimissinn this year are __j -°~i?‘ _,
probably ready.) 1, -`-:lf
1'rc-dn-ndnought battle ships  ui
11s:11-wus)  - id
(lid 1-11.-ist defence battle ship:  _
11ss11-isfm . . . . . . . . . . . .
.. - ‘ ,I1
A1-1n111~~1 i~r11is.»n (11417-11109),  ,?,, 
.s_:1o1'1 to 1.5500 tons, 24.5 to 1'--I "
lounon................_. - ' I
liig protected cruisers (1892-
lilltli 6,000 tons, 19 knots . . U
2-l lsiiot criiisrrs (1904-1913),
3,000 to 5000 lions .........
Small cruisers, 21 knots (1003-
mio) . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . .
. . . _ '
D1-stroyers LISSU-1913), 34 to 1.
‘_‘G knots . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . - 152
Torpedo~»bonts M387-1898), 26
to'!.2lruot.s.............. - Q
Submarines about equal tn ' `
Britishln aiuaandiqeed... . 80 tal()
s
 __'-f'-~».;"'*~ _
5 ~a.',.~.- .
lan
11
its-
l£.b`»\".ag,era.,,._...,,....,.¢.-- I