By James Young Peace Issues Coordinator Canadian University Press

In June 1987, when Cana- dian defence minister Perrin Beatty unveiled his fifteen year, $200 billion plan for the coun- try’s armed forces, the most powerful symbol of military committment was a fleet of 10 to 12 nuclear-powered sub- marines.

The hunter-killer attack subs would solve a number of problems for the Canadian navy, or so the youthful minis- ter thought.

Beatty argued that the fleet, coupled with other forces, would patrol the Atlantic, Pa- cific and especially the Arctic, where conventionally powered subs cannot venture under the ice.

And like the new uniforms awarded in the previous Conser- vative defence budget, the subs would give the navy a new sense of pride and purpose, replacing older vessels on the verge of “rust-out”’.

In a single daring move, the Canadian Navy would move from the embarrassment of owning fewer submarines than the West Edmonton Mall to joining the world’s five great military powers in an exclusive sub club.

While the Canadian vessels would not be nuclear armed, the plan has drawn sharp, contin- uing protest. Writing in the fall issue of Peace and Security magazine, Dalhousie political science professor James Eayars calls the fleet “the most bizarre decision in Canadian weapons policy since (1915, when) the premier of British Columbia bought two submarines, origi- nally built in Seattle for Chile.”

In the political arena, both the Liberals and the New Democrats strongly oppose the subs, indicating the fleet de- serves to stand alongside free trade as an issue in the next fed- eral election. 2

Liberal defence critic Doug Frith says the subs could be a

destabilizing factor in. the con-_

tinuing submarine confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union, and recom- mends a combination of under- water sensors, increased air pa- trols and surface ships instead.

NDP defence critic Derek Blackburn goes further, accus- ing Beatty of a “mindless lust for nuclear submarines”. Like some experts, Blackburn be- lieves the Canadian fleet would become involved in a dangerous U.S. strategy to attack Soviet subs in their home ports.

And like the Liberals, Blackburn sup- ports a range of surveillance equipment, aircraft and surface ships to meet Canada's legiti-

mate defence needs, as well as ~

advocating a fleet of cheaper, conventionally powered subs.

Other critics are numerous. Despite government claims that nuclear subs have a worry-free operating record, some oppo- nents fear a Chernobyl-type ac- cident at a base — probably Victoria or Halifax — or in treacherous Arctic waters.

Arms con- trol specialists such as United Nations advisor William. Ep- stein say the highly enriched, weapons-grade uranium used as fuel would’ violate the spirit of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which Canada signed in 1968. Thus, the fleet would set a bad example to Third World coun- tries — like Libya and North Ko- rea — which may be looking for an excuse and means to develop nuclear weapons programs.

But the two most serious objections deal with strategy and cost.

Michael Wallace, a political science professor at the Univer-

sity of British Columbia, is wor- ried the Canadian subs will be- come drawn into U.S. nuclear war fighting plans, in oceans where the Soviets are challeng- ing U.S. superiority and Amer- ican forces are operating at a higher tempo than during the Vietnam War.

For example, the strat- egy of forward deployment directs American hunter-killer subs to penetrate Soviet subma-

its confidence in launching a first strike, could attack the So- viet subs and ask the new Cana-

dian fleet to join in. Canada’s participation would come from a previously defined operational plan, like NORAD, or as a last minute okay from Ottawa.

“If we are to buy these subs and operate them in conjunction with the American doctrine of escalation domination — then what we are doing is increasing the risk of strategic nuclear war"

_

rine sanctuaries in the Barents Sea in the Arctic and the Sea of Okhotsk near Japan.

“As each side deploys more submarines in a given area, the probability of a chance con- frontation increases quite sub- stantially and quickly,” says Wallace, who specializes in the study of accidental nuclear war.

In a time of international tension, like the Cuban missile crisis, the Soviets would send their large ballistic missile-firing subs from northern home ports to deep water sanctuaries — usually this would help stabi- lize against nuclear war, as the U.S.S.R. would have a secure retaliatory force and would feel no immediate need to attack.

But the U.S., depending on,

In these situations, how- ever, the Soviets might feel so nervous they would send their missiles towards North Ameri- can cities first, rather than wait- ing for an American attack.

“If we are to buy these subs and operate them in the way | suspect they will be op- erated — in conjunction with the American doctrine of esca- lation domination — then what awe are doing is increasing the risk of strategic nuclear war,” says Wallace. :

Therefore “this policy is wrong — not just a little bit wrong, but 180 degrees against the national interest of Canada,” he argues.

While defence analysts, in- cluding’ those at the Canadian

mitted that his department had

Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament in Ottawa and the Institute for Policy Studies in Washington, believe the Cana- dian fleet risks becoming in- volved in strategies undermining the nuclear balance, the gov- ernment did not give it a sec- ond thought. Admiral Charles Thomas, chief of maritime doc- trine for the Canadian Navy, ad-

not done a single detailed study on how U.S. strategy would af- fect Canadian submarine opera- tions.

Even without Wallace's dis- | aster scenario, other analysts object to the subs’ hefty price. tag, which has risen from De- partment of National Defence estimates of $5 billion in Febru- ary, to a current $8 billion. Independent sources say it

will be much more.

Scarcely a week after

the white paper was released.

British naval experts Roy Cor lett and John Moore scoffed at the Canadian estimates, say ing they grossly underestimate? real costs which would include