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FULL 2"“

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dhsdhicfoommiaaionarzQwl-io nottoecmsboywdtllstankt-a. Tiuagant whowaatheraattbe

goiothetank. (Oontinuedmmhlal).

r

' shows that during the previous » (week there had been my heavy- snow and drifts on the western. 0f

v Tignish end of the line. All the wit- neses are agreed that on Saturday, the 20th, preceding the ascidmt. ' very high winds and a heavy ground drift with a temperature a- bout zero prevailed. Iraln No. 54 which left Tlgnish

at 7.30 that morning was stalled in Handrahaffs Cutting and required a gang o! ahovellers to release her. No. Ell left slmmersids at the usual hour, and at Wellington picked up twelve snow shoveilers who had boarded No. 54 after having releas- ed her at l-landrahulfls Cutting in the morning. when No. 211 reached Handrahaxrs Cutting shortly before '1 p. m. she became stalled in the snow, where she remained until 1J5 a. m. the following morning, when she was run info by No. 53.

msthatllafltralnwlsstillin Summcrsidc. that No. 53 had not lsft Sulqmeu-slde. I told him to loll them not to come beyond the tank. and the operator at Tilnlbh llhd mswoulditbeallrighttocoms totbetanlnaadlsaidycaandl replied to this question to not come beyond the tank. Q. You made that r0000“. 1101 to come beyond the tankii-A. Those were my words. Qftwasallrighttoeomsto the tankiM-A. But not beyond the tank. Q. Did you remain in the office at ‘Plgnish while this communica- tion with the despatcher was 8°‘ ing on?-A. Yes, all the time. Q. What information came back to youf-A. Be told ms that No. 53 was getting an order, that he was giving No. 68 an order. Q. The despatcher at Charlotte-

the despaicher.

oswaaoomicgtothstank."

or at Charlottetown,

after they got to work."

only what the dcIPliohsr told ms. that he was isttifll N0- 53

Q. You left that malls! with your aniatant, McOarthyi-A.

ahouldreturntotbsoffice again. ‘rhatwasafterfwasthroughwith

m. McCarthy in ilis evidence says that he told Murray “that No.

McOormack, the train despatch- says that "about 8.45 or 9 o'clock the agent at Tignish reported that No. 211. was stalled, and they had a bunch of snow ahovellers with them. I don't know how many. 'I‘ha.t it was drifting quite heavily and at the present time they could not work, but if it abated they would not have much trouble in getting out,

Q. Did you state definitely to Tignlsll that you would allow No. 58 to go to the tank?--A.' The idea in asking that was that sometimes in a cutting they out off the rear oars before they got into it, and I was wanting to be sure that she

nel-sarssomanylditilfll“ the case which indicate loose N13 eereleumeebesaofovarltimih“, indsalinlwiththemitlldlfllvll" toknowiMWhMWWIIIL

it became stalled in the llww. In the first place it was the duty o! 111g engineer b0 Whllfld 011B U18 nsgmsn, This was not done.

Rule D9 Cited

Rulspa of the Operating Rules of the Canadian National Railways lays down specific instructions as so the protection required in a case where a train stops on the main line undel- circumstances in which it may be overtaken by an- other train. It provides:- 99. When a train stops on the main track under circumstances in which it may be overtaken by an- other train a flagman must im- mediately go back with flagmazfs signals to protect the train. Under the conditions specified the distance should be at least:

In day time, if there is no down

-,rns§ssnun1nnuscuesmeu.n

Immufl] some distriotswhcrof-hfi

u“; any conscientious and proper- ly trained railway man would al- low his train to so unprotected even undel- thb extreme circum- 1 games; suggested by w. Hibblts.

which occurred at ‘P18111511 W119" Murray went there and reported the condition of his train. Briefly. his evidence is that he asked Mc- Tagus that No. 52 should not coma beyond the tank. and was inform- ed by MsTagus that No. 68 was getting an order. He neither asked for nor received a copy of this 0r- der, but wassatisfied to assume that the order was that No. 53 should not come beyond the tank. subsequently, ils saw the porfor, McCarthy, and said to him. ."5he wontcomeindabgerifahedoss not go beyond the tank, and he said he would notify her."

ting in the morning. According to his evidence the r0110" 111“ 1" 1'" o'clock that evsninl was II 1°1- lowa:—

thatthsrewsrstraias 0901111118

temperature feud was ea...- hw- low asm. and that under aushoir- qumstandos “it is humanly impos-

- of i they ' ' ' i 1m '. "m" ”°‘ ”° °°“’ w“ m m“ ‘"1 ugeulelun: Jiifufiii‘. l? t2? 1;...- "m ‘°' “m”? '° '° m" ‘Qd ...'."‘t 13.1.1.1.“ 018$? simagvsilsra "We M" “Warsaw avenue Renee. it being .1.“ ;, The collision hspPaned at 155 m. Spencer! Q- Whl‘ d“ 7°“ Q. To tell Conductor lilurrayf- ' ‘baud fill 1111111 iehm- 59"" 119m ° h that it was protection wl hi4 20 arranged and pmvgqed; u : u. 111.. 1n the murninl of sunday. refer to when you said not to some L h m, oondum, mm“ g1 h; 119° °! we pmmtnnwmg?‘ when fast that the observation has no with them. I don't klflruuwhfimmnl" m: out for, and if film ll F1! anowplowh owned by°inby 5' - reel-um- 21. 1m. no evidence beyond the tankf-A. m. informed * 1'1" m“ 11"” °' belrinl’ whatever 011 "111 "11- 1‘ in" 1‘ ""‘ “W” q ' ans

and at the present time thvy could notworhbutifitabatedthfly would not have much trouble in getting out, after they 801 10 W011" Aatothslatterpartofhistaato- ment, namely, that "if the storm abated they would not have mush trouble getting_out," neither Mur- ray nor MoTague mention that any such statement was made. and in the light of the evidence as to ibp actual position of No. 211 it is more than doubtful if any such stato- ment wersever made. However that may be, lat us consider what he ~. am.- carefully lnquirina wheth- er there were any cars east-of the tank, he told McTague to toll Mur- ray, “we are going to let No. 53 go to the tank." Following this mes- sage one would expect that he would have issued an order auth- orising No, 531:0 go to the tank,

and crew not handling up," in the train. w. Barker ‘1 out that on many of thou-w! Win01! 111160 where the mm" 13519111017 lllht and there _. operation at night, that u. 0,4," Ijlrt the train ou in he m

VII 119008511‘? l0 put a srlgwplm (wedsc type) on the (m, on traintoenableitiogsi, ' llde l3 “I! majority of m branch linaa operated only ‘D

would take a lot to convince m0

We next’ come to the events

trains, that if they were

operate the anowgviougl. other ears i‘. would mean g calling the regular train cr . 1 it In"! the mains could my. . run over tho branch and M gala, which is some Cases

take hours, tho regular train vies would be badly disor .1. whereas where the use s1 , anowploughs was permitted were able to run the trains t».

trouble is where the ordea- aaya it I.

Qlsityourview ihatthistrain No. as, not finding m. 211 twohun- dred yardswsstofthetankhadiul. filled that cedar-Nomi: boss-lac I-Iandnbanh Quitting was mention- ed in the order, and on the evidence

d t L wmm, ,1 _ _ before the "Superintendent the men ing to schedule and perf ,

Tignish tank is at mileage “L towm-A‘ Yes’ would be up m the mnk m ca” 381i: utgziareza ‘tilelre is a. e112: sic; “cording tome evidence o‘ both 50mm: :1; 8:0‘: 1,2,0 If: mg“ swore that they understood N0. 211 service. In many cases thtelzlymis

Hnndrahafgs cuttlnk is 81111131511: o; Q. He was sivinB No. 53 an Ord- it would be a long time there, to or m “m; 6,000 “at ‘mm m hi” sligTsggevfil-ne: til; m Hamburg Cumn-g w“ m nmdnhufi out”... “d 1 m” h“ veg-y few, if any, ..... six hundre yards west o an err-A. Yes. see that the track was clear, be- ° m“ '

preaching train, 1,500 feet (about 12 telegraph poles). At other times and places. if there is no down gradc towards train within one mile of its rear, 3,600 feet (about 2B telegraph poles). If there is a down grade towards the train within one mile of its rear, 5,400 feet (about 42 telegraph poles).

would not consider that the order was fulfilled until that train had arrived at Handrahanh Cutting and explored it thoroughly to us wheth- er the train was there or not. Interpretation of Order

On the other hand meoormsek My! that in giving the order he wanted to convey the idea to them fobecarefutaothatthsywouldbe

ers." _ "In my opinion the operation" the small branch lines, where trains lay up at the dead end o night, and whore the main . connection is not a divisional -.- nothing better than to put wedge plough ahead of the ... motive of the mixed train could provided for, but, where the .

and about one mils from Tignish. I! is about one-quarter of a mile in length. McLeod, the roadmaster in charge from Charlottetown to 'I‘ig- nish gives the following description of 1t:

In the light of the order he ac- tually issued, what pouible object had he in giving the message he did to Murray? The only effect it possibly could have, and which in fact it did have, waseio mislead Murray into thinking that No. b8 would not be permitted to go be- yond ths tank. In attempting to explain his message‘ McOormack'

Q. For what? A-That is Just all I know, that he was giving No. 53 an order. My, Spencer; Q. 'l‘hs.t was the answer to you in response to your requestiL-A. Yes.

Q-Is it s contTuous cutting, or Q, was s. copy of that order de- does l; vary with the topography llvered to you'll-db. No sir, it was oi the ground line?—A——It is just a not, conlimlous cutting. In other words

the despatcher was letting No. 58 go to the tank. The despstcher ad- mits that this is correct, so we can take it as established that this was the message given to Murray. Murray returned to his train fully convinced that No. 53 would have orders not to go beyond the tank. Kelly the fireman on No. 211 says that when Murray returned he said

cause it might be there for s time: 1 wanted to make sure that there were no cars cast of the tank. Q. You heard the evidence of McCarthyi-A. Yes. Q. He said that the agent told him to tell Conductor Murray that No. 53 was being allowed to come to the tanki-A. Yes. Q. Is that correctl-A. That she

_ Th n” an must, ‘m, _ “m; ‘ ,___ careful to look out for signals, No. line connection of the branch I V, w, there is no great embankment. it is further Lyidsnos Quoicd would be allowed to come to the backs“, ‘Qnecmed duhm". m“ l‘ to him ‘at Charlottetown I sot an "fun. 1B not “y!” m“ m‘ an.‘ an“. u h. mum m . ca“ a n dmfloan, pom,‘ and m v a but e level niece of around. no deep tank. pom,“ when mm w,“ be u, u,” 01'1" "1" "°- 53 ""11 °°111° 1' of that kind. case of Dartmouth subdi "

would not go farther than that." Surely the reasonable inference to be drawn from the words of the

010v Cutlifls- Murray than left the station and Q—-What i8 the height 0f 1t?11—1l returning shortly afterwards had would not be any more than three “m; conversation with one Justin

.fs.ras the tank and stay at the tank unless we get through." Mur- ray aays: “When I cams back from

Q. Was that correctil-A. If the 1111B Wis 0108s she would go to the tank, that there were no cars left

obstructed view of him from an approaching train of, if possible,

.Had u... order simply read “Look out for-No. :11 stalled in Handra-

which is 81.80 miles long, the c trsvilla Subdivision between 5__

. , 1.600 feet. first blooms two tor- T, I, ' is th t h uld m" °““111¢"- "11" 001114 1M by 101m m0 Fredericton. the lv‘ OTV , or rour feet, that is, the clay cut- Mpcgffljy’ . pofflfi at tbs station. behind No. 211, that she would B0 pedces not less than 10o nor more x “at w the “b o! me :81?“ “L, a e W0 not so any question about its meaning. waak Subdivision, 109.75 miles c0111 tzng. m. evidence as to the oeuvereetion to the tank. That is not gayin ' ‘ “w” 111° ‘"11" ‘"1 11°‘ ‘hm’ y ' This ian is in v l u. st tin s bdi ' ' one, m m a mo“ h,_A_m _ _ m 8 than zoo feet sport. on the rail on bu, I ‘om, mm m the ban", When No. 211 was first stalled "'1' 11° ‘"1 “'1' ° m“ " ‘"1101 1°} m,“ o Q“ ° w y g L‘ "5 mum” “t ‘he “mud 3° n° “"11" "m" the same side as the engineman of shortly before 7 pm. her crow no 3mm‘ It 1' m" 111d simple. 21b miles, should I think be taken i» - pulls of it. Q, Whey; you came back bu the that. car’ I 9317111111911 V1151 11311 175-115‘. ' m,“ 1|; ma.“ vb“ M h o! b ma l I ' rem; Th‘ m d an approaching train 800.feet be- pa,“ at “mm, and Wu” we doubt surmised that the only train w" '57‘ ° y “me ca“ ° 591w“ “m D01 McLeod. the roadmas . who ha station it was McCarthy you talked yond such pwtimm The flumm t um ‘bout Mn No a ‘allowing them that night w“ no‘ undmwod n‘ to m“. w“ ma“ h Ewen on the mm “m! L ‘ m” m“, been oler the line the same week, wlthil-A Yes sir. Analysis of Evidence mun loam”, in ma, posluon mm “d”?! I f u “it l: 53’ which mm,‘ at Hummus add words which are not there. It that the prohibition should not i WW1 _ FL says that the snow 1n I-Iandrahans Q, Was that when you were told moaned or tenant _ ma“; ote 000!’ be d w can,“ about mm pm“ md m,‘ would not be possible to operate absolute in cases of severe s. . l ~ Dom ~ 1.; Cutting was then between five and mat No. bswould stay at the tank? Taking the evidence of all the n recalled mo” “other mm I ex ‘silnbdwthnalt w Li; I s tanklm‘. probably accounts m! ma“ [mm mm; “my 1g gvqymmmm w“; occurring when the motive m Q mm m,‘ seven feet where it had been _,q_ yo, g1; witnesses it is clear beyond ques- wives. he must’ m addlum w the ed t; t. m kflelfllm to put out “human immedutem to be permitted to" interpret train isnot available torun both a .. Ii. Wm‘ . 10,. thrown up by the plough. Q, Nag by the agentr-A. No sir, tion that whatever Mccqmack-s two mrpedoeé’ leave a ‘we bum- H 1;" e engine vsr . But n m inconceivable m“ u “up orders as meaning something other train and a snowplough. 1 u i ope 0810611 the 500M011 P0111111» 11 I was not told by the wot- inkniicn may have been. the mes- m ' than what they actually . Hers that the Tormentinc Subdivision l cf ti , ing red at the point he returns Mun,” on m. "m", mm up ray had not received the message l" _ , my m", Tigrbsh, who was in charge of the Q, You say you were not told by sage he sent to Murray was that 1mm, and whu, “turning u, m‘ u” m“ M am m "n, mm by Mwormuk. he would however, the words “200 yards west now operated by wing plough! At 1101 B“? °f mm whm‘ Tana“ N“ 54 1110 limn-sd- N0 811- h’ ""111 111°" N0- 53 W 80 l0 111° train (when snow ploughs or flang- homa “Marian,” who h not have later on put out the ns- d mum “u” 7"" “mid- n ‘m’ u m‘ ma“ “"91 “d w I a cc ‘m. in the morning, says that there was Q, men my statement that No. tank. On the faith of this message m may be running, curvature, 2am d u h, re e m‘ cegggyy pmgeuflm, may be that 1,1115 “an”, to "m, guggggt time this be oominuedy ;~' u... )Mr. :1: "x111 lime l": 0r foebt or!‘ slllélw 53 would not g9 beyond the tank lidurllay assumed that No. 58 would weather, or other conditions gov- Avie“ 2,0218 m; muk” ugh“ on In my view the order given to “u” d°°°iv°d u” m" ‘"1 N“ 53- 5 w” °’ m“ memmmdm " q ; aces over e ra on o s es we w ou by Mccarthyll-A- reoe vs orders not to c b ' One is ' t to Mr B 'an c1,“ m, p was m y s eyond the gfnlng) s, ms” burning m; mugi; m a No. 58 should never have been giv- m" 9'7"“? 111°"- Wl "n - ‘Wm- 11"’ W“ do“ mo“ ~05 mo track. Gaudet went through H, ‘m; mo, 53 wgg still in suln- tank. I-Ia returned tohis train and b, 91m‘, a “ch pom“ or “m” Lresr, no protec on whatever an‘ n” m,’ mu,” “m,” m’ com thscrewcarfoss wiisntbayrouns ad if he would urlo-rtako to The, w, u. Summerside on No. s4 and re- mgrgide, u... z said to h‘m "she save his tail brakeman, McDonald, “m, 1158mm; mgy m... new", f”, 81"“ m‘ m m“ u" m“ ditions existing on the mun. u, 110 Protection out torso- m n. out the nrcwwl encasement . 1mm \ F "turned c: No. 53. h m” won-g some 1n danger u she do: leave to go homo to Tignish for to insure full protection. ' m’ gflfixlilmed up w the um‘ o’ question was to have kept the ag- u” m h m 7"“ b°¢w°°n 111° “t ‘mt m m” m°m°mnd“m' . Onecelswll-wvwflfl sl-ioe dtbtenkfland chissuper. tetlle . - ‘ tank dth bl . i): section foreman in Gaudet’: absent!!! Said life Dials notify her. Donald, claim?’ he hsdabegrinsurlc To maintain the proper inter"! Costain, an engine cleaner at m“ both at “hem” ma 113mm m a mmu’ Wm “my y "m. under date o! February

atgpbetweanl trains a fusee burning red "11 1°11’ 0f N0- 111 providing the must be lore by the protected train 911110011081 required by the rules at the point from which it moves. 1 "m 11°“ V1111 11118 Phase later. The flagman must always on the

Murray thovsht that Protection approach fo a train display stop at the rear of his train was no signals and, if not already done, 1011801‘ 1100088811! and n0l11111I W115 place two torpedoes on the rail as 11100011" done to Drotect at. before described, and than return 101N111! No. 211 stalled in I-Ian- 300 feet nearer the protected train. 0111111110 Cvti-ins with no nroiec- The front of the train must be 11°11 °1 511i’ 1111101. 101 I18 return to protected in the same way when 11°- 53- Dfilflyed two hours and for- necessary by the front brakeman or, 1'7 mum” °n “M11111 01 111010118 if there is no front brskeman, by

convinced that Ne. 211 had got out of the snow. It also further appears 1111i they intlfwcisd tbs order to mean that they were so 1mg sue Only 1'01‘ protection. However that mlfbblcllwtbyanyzssauabsld them blameless for doing what they did. They knew that when they 10ft ‘ Bummersids, N0. 211 w" stalled 1g I-Iandrahanh Cutting. When they arrived It ‘$110 ti!!! thpy could lee no indication of nay protection for her, but one would expect cal-gm]