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Established 1823.

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Charlottetown, Prince Edward Island, Wednesday, January!‘ iii l f A ‘(New S°1'l9S- N0- 205-

aisronxcan suxlanx OF THE RUSSIAN WAR.

IBOK ITS COKMENCEMENT TO THE PREENT TIME‘.

sinus or sn.is;;u.—(Cont.ined.)

All this, in substance, was true; and our allusion to the incidents here will save us the necessity of recurring to them hereafter. Let us quote a few words more from the electric messages of the time. They are at present both interesting and slucidatory. “The wonderful garrison of Silistria is said to be now reduced nearly one-half. ’ On the ‘ " ‘they made another amazing sally, and routed the Russians at the south front. This cannot last much longer. The next mail will probably record the surrender of the fortress. The terms will be mild, it is thought; the garrison, at least, are certain to have the honours of war.” (They were, indeed. Of- those honours the heroes made sure.) “ On the 24th, the Marechal do St. Arnaud, Lord Raglan, and Omer Pacha reviewed together the Turkish army at Schumla.” (This was true.) “ The troops were found to be in splendid condition.” (True- an exact and just description.) “Next day, the 25th, the Russians succeeded at length in interpo- sin oen Varna a ' ' trio.” True again— bot the facts and the dates.) “The fortress must now hoist the white fl ; the continuous bombard- ment isterrific; a com ined assault by storming columns thirty thousand stron is to take place immediatel . Of course, it wil prove successful. The brave efenders are worn to skeletons. Nothing can exceed the elficieucy of both the Anglo-French and the Turkish troops now lying respectively at Varna and at Schumla. Among them the muster,

rhaps 80,000, or even 90,000. The ha f of such a host would soon give an account of the Russian force who are storming Silistria. Postcript. A most incomprehensible rumour prevails, that the grand assault has failed. N.B. This must naturally

received with caution.” We think that our readers will feel obliged to us for this rapid retro- spective sketch; and now we can finish the historical reasonin to which facts drove us, and ove us reluctant y. In three short sentences the whole case can be stated. Firstly, the conviction prevalent said, at that time, a most rational conviction) was

° , that Silistria would fall, unless a movement of the troops collected in Bul 'a was made for its relief; secondly, the conviction was prevalent (and it was equally just, equally rational) that if such a movement was made, it would most certainly raise the siege; thirdly, no such movement was Silistria could be saved by a iven measure, which was perfectly racticable. ithout that measure Silistria woul be lost. That measure was avoided. Therefore, may we not fairly ask—was it the intention, was it the wish, that Silistria should in fact be lost’! We fear that, if the re ly was honestly given, it would be aflirmative. ut what motives could exist’! They could not be strategical. No; but they might be Tpolitical, or, rather, they might_be diplomatic. e Emperor of Russia saw by this time, that his calculations, based upo exsected dissensions between En land and France, an on the weakness of “the sic man”—in short, that all his calculations were quite illusory. He was willing to accept the terms then offered. But his honour must be saved-he must not be degraded in the eyes of Europe, or desecrated in those of his own people. His pride must be humoured. Some great success must be achieved, and then he would proclaim that he was satisfied; and that, not from the stressof defeat, or compulsion, but under the influence of his “ habitual moderation,” he wanted to terminate this quarrel, and relieve the anxieties of the world. Peace, it was thought, would im- mediately follow the capture of Silistria.

If this vile deference to the vainglory and selfish- ness of the man who had indicted so man injuries upon the community of nations was in ulged at the cost of that community, if the feelin s of the tyrant and the despoiler were honoured a ve the interests of his victims, above the interests, indeed, o_f,the world at large, above the claims of the most righteous of causes, and (let us not forget it) above the blood of the faithful and valiant garrison of 8 ia, doomed thus to destruction am’ to ‘lllndonment, wemay at least console ourselves with two t'acts—flrst, the conduct of Omer Pacha; find» 3°°0ndiy, the conduct and the fate (combined) of the troops in Silistria. Whatever restraints may have imposed upon Omer Pacha’s movements by instructions, originating in some forei Embassy at Constantinople, endorsed or ado tedlliy the Di- van, and then sent in authoritative orm to Schum- la, they but weakened and relaxed, they could not wholly prevent, the Turkish Genet-alissimo’s oper- ations. . A grand and decisive movement ending in the annihilation of the whole Russian army, was,

, averted ; but the disgrace and the discom- turs which might have been deemed so impolitic, lupervened all the same, in spite of the subtle Precautions of an i oble and ignominious diplo- . Mussa Pac a’s dull valour, and Omer’s _ _ to activity, defeated all these supposititious W ' of the closet--if they ever existed. ithont suspecting them to have existed, the page ‘V3!!! now to write will remain one of the most " , , in militlry history. questions which wehave already described 5115 shown to a discern‘ reader that the . evscus:d‘Iawsr Wsllacliis, Mia L. ' '.

3

in order to collect an irresistible force for the crowning exploit of the campaign. Political and warlike considerations coalesced in ronouncing this exploit the most im rtant of all. Pfhe withdrawal of the right wing 0 their Army of Occu ation, the amassing of troopsbetween Bucharest an Slobodzie, the advance of Luders, with the Danube on his right, and their own main advance towards that river in front (as the river flows due east before it turns northwards,)-—all betokened that the enemy was now making a great and last endeavour, in the most elaborate form of combination. But here we must note a curious circumstance, which soldiers will easily appreciate. Omer Pacha, in the face of this grand advance, did _not recall his,left wing. We have sutiicieutly explained his probable motives. He felt, so far as he himself was concerned, that he could deal with the Russians, and yet not bring another man to Schumla. Now, when such a large proportion of the invadin force retired across the Aluta, this left wing of e Turks became at once an independent army, and, like Half-of-the-Wynd, could “ii ht on its own hand.” All that Omer asked of t cm was to operate on the right flank of the enemy, to make as man diversions as possible, and perhaps, ultimately, to arass, or even to inter- cept, his retreat. We want this to be borne in mind.

General Luders was rather more forward, and rather readier, than the comrades whose movement he was destined to protect. It was not their fault; six days before his own check at Czemavoda, they had broken through the Danube, between Rassova and Silistria. On a misty day (the 19th of A 'l), Omer Pacha encountered this enemy. It is re ated that, in the midst of the action, a body of Turks, whom he had ordered to make a considerable circuit to the east, and then to assail the left flank of the Russians, ap ared as if marching straight from the coast, gui ed b the noise of cannon, and the uproar of combat. e English were known to have recentl landed at Vama; perhaps some had landed at altschik; perhaps, even some not much below Kustendjeh. Who could these be, these columns from the east, except the English? While the doubt arose and prevailed, a portentous sign seemed to afi'or the answer. A flag, not clearly distinguishable, but strikin ly similar to the colours of En land, waved at e head of the advaucingr y. Panic seized the columns of Russia. hey wavered, they broke their ranks, a considerable loss was incurred, an

d the field re- mained in possession of the Turks.

But yet, the main movement throve. So early as the 14th, great batteries had been erected on the north bank of the Danube, opposite Silistria; and the town was bombarded from morning till night; and, undoubtedly, the Russians now began to show themselves in force on both banks of the Danube, near and around that fatal fortress. On the 28th of April, the Russians, bein completely established on the south bank attacked t e outworks of Silistria. On the same day, one hundred miles to the west, at Nicopolis, Sali Pacha had a battle with the Russians, who had neglected all the country lying to their right, because they were endeavouring to envelope Silistria in every direction, and they thought they had excluded the western or left wing of the Turkish army from the real business then in

and. Sali Pacha defeated the enemy, killing nearly 2000 of them. In conformity with their usual strategy, straggling and indecisive, the Russians, at the same time that they were thus endeavouring to force the Danube from Turna, tried also to exhibit themselves in apparent strength at Radowan, nearly sixty miles to the right. Suleiman Bey, whose rank was that of a Colonel, stormed Radowan, and had the glory of beating the invaders with almost as much slaughter in this place as Sali Pacha had inflicted on them at Nico- polis and Turna. But these reverses on the Russian right might have been expected, when they were weakening it, in order to strengthen the divisions destined by them to take Silistria. The assault on the outworks was so hotly received, that full three weeks elapsed before General Schilders had com- pleted the investment. On the adverse shore he piled up batteries of heavy guns, which maintained a continual bombardment; and with those guns he left his portable hospitals (or ambulances) and his reserves. The forces which be transported over the Danube to form the actual leaguer were not less than 53,000 men, while the garrison mustered 8000 only. His artillery, which was numerous and heavy, has been variously corn uted. Probably the most effective batteries were i ose which he directed against the south-west fronts; and here, indeed, the fire was severe and terrible. On this side the ground rises in a series of platforms, which could not be surrendered to the enemy with safety to the town. They are occupied, therefore, by outwork which are all-important; for, on the day when they are taken, Silistria is virtually taken. The outworks are called respectively Arab Tabia and lllanli. They are of earth. The Turkish artillery protecting them was repeatedly silenced; the walls behind them were repeatedly breached;

larger and lar r force, committed one of the. I110!‘ incredible mi itary blunders on record. qy advanced in heavy costume, and even with their knapsacks on their shoulders. Theymet those, therefore, who soon neutralized and reversed the effects of General Schilders' artillery. The slaughter on these occasions (and from May the 11th to true the 29th they were numerous) is hardly to be believed. Always bearing in mind this , es of inter-act, we may describe in one sentence nearly a month’s operations before Silistria: to,w_it,.it WM alternately bombarded and assaulted- Armed only with their temperance and their fanaticiln, the small Turkish garrison flinched not for As the earth-works were damaged,'it'wa,I. to repair them and as the Russians mieod.(sJ_ut resource), it was indie nsable to countermine.-i Enormous hardships an evident risk! were ‘ to ‘be’ encountered in these duties. For tli_e'j'.p§r_t, the patient Osmanli displayed the '8piri_t'_,o ta trite soldier. As he smoked, or rs. or all . -.a " in which there was no longer any tobacco (the . have been witnessed), he lay at the bottom of ‘a trench watching, with envy, the bette'_' p ed comrade whose tarboosh rose above the Ievelo niargin—because that comrade worked ,wi the spade, and was therefore on his le . A cannon- ball sweeps away the red cap and t e head within it. The recumbent spectator arises, sayin that “Allah is great! He takes the spade from t e yet warm hand, disengagcs the nargilly from the clenched teeth, and fills the brief vaeancy—his own tarboosh now surmounting the clay embankment. Soon, the place is again vacant, and a successor equally intrepid and equally rene, continues the excavation; and in ten minutes, it has thus taken, as it were, three generations of valiant Osmanli: to fortify one soldier’s post in a bombarded intrench- ment, and, while doing so, to smoke one pipeful of Latakia tobacco. But when we say that these noble soldiers flinched not, we would confine our observation to that one month which we have mentioned. At length, they showed signs of flagging. The odds were great; the work was incessant ; the fatigue was overpowering; the enemy was near, and seemed ever day to increase in power; their friends were istant, and had ap- patently forgotten them. Four men met this natural epression with, in war, that priceless resource, that resource above all treasures in vs.lue—intel- lectual bravery and thoroughbred resistance. Of these four men one was a German, two were British oflicers (Lieiitenants Nasmyth and Butler), and the last was the heroic Mussa Pacha. is man was destined to save Silistria, but not to know it; to triumph conclusively, completely, gloriously, and not to witness his own success; towin im- perishable praise, and die without hearing the first cheer. Butler, Nasmyth, and the Prussian engineer told the Turks that they must not despond, because the besiegers were laying powder under the sur- rounding works. Against those mines other mines could be wrought, and all the enemy's labour would be more than lost; for before they ap rosched near enough to do damage, the would emselves be blown into the air. The urks took heart again, saying that Allah was indeed great. On the 11th of May, Silistria itself was assaulted.

thousand men. Meanwhile, however, were incessantly advanced; and, so conver were the movements with a view to storm or

Russian army of occu tion was consigned to every mischance; whereas t e Turkish left _wing, as we have said, was transformed, virtually, into a ful and dangerous army. On the 21st 0 M8 another eneral assault was repulsed.

of May e left wing, being of Omer Pacha’s force, fe t its way _out\V8Yd3y_ '0 Turna, Semnitza, and Giurgevo-in all which laces it found, and severely defeated, the enemy. me such results Omer Pacha had foreseen, when (if we may use the phrase) he had abandoned this rt of his forces to themselves. We must not con- ound these Turks with the Turks_ defending, originally, that part of the Danube which on_ the other shore, corresponded with the present position of the advancing victors. Quite otherwise; ‘the conquerors had come from the west, not straight across the river; and their “ 'vot" was, properly speaking, Widdin. The ussians ms in disregarding such casualties; and, on e 29th of May, only three days afterwards-—a very fatal date to choose for a contest with the Mussulman—-Prince Gortschakoff and General Schilders ordered a com- bined assault upon the south-east the south, and the west fronts of Silistria. llurled from the breaches, the enemy himself acknowled that he lost that day, between one thousan and two thousand Grenadiers. We are convinced that the loss amounted to near five thousand men. They had used thirt thousand in the attack. It was the anniversary o the Turkish con nest of Constanti- nople. On the 29th of May, 453, Iahomet ll. took forcible possession of that European territory which his descendants were now defending with so

but, burrowing in the cavities of that redoubt, the indomitable defenders waited only till the thunder of the guns had ceased, and till the tramp of the storming columns made the ground about them tremble, when they appeared swarming out of the bowels of the earth, and—dagger in hand, rather than sword in hand——flnn themselves upon the

assailants. The Russians in these great assaults- progresssd, conducted in

which,astliesisgI were

much heroism. Two days after the assault just mentioned, the last day in the month (Kay 81st), the outflanking left wing of the Ottoman as-my had ‘pushed to Slatina, and there had won another l victory; and, indeed, on the revious do , which

-was the day immediately allowing J II

till! his

The assailants were beaten, and lost more than two renew _ _ , k the works General Schilders, not again destined to in e :1

nt fortress, the capture of which twenty-five years uce before had been the commencement of his reputation,

this great fortress, that the right wing of the general was stru

now an isolated division v_ery batteries.

hoiisand Russians. Truly, the position was growing serious, but Silistria “ mustbe taken.” At the beginnin of June, when this unfair, this most cruel contrast ad lasted more than a month, Omer. Pacha, whatever diplomatic arrangements might, or might not, have been made, could resist his own feelings no longer. . He would have occu no soldier—-he would have had for his comrades no bowels of compassion, had he remained still im- passive, while beholding so much suffering, so much patience, and so much valoiir. He was moved; and he moved. On the 4th of June he put 30,009 men in action, and ordered them, with his bestwiahes, to do something for Silistria. On that suns ihe commanded his garrison at Rustchuk kbttytlreiljfoftune against the Russian works on the iclandiofbfokan; and the works were completely A detachment of the column dispatched _ _ V relief of Silistria, entered it on the 5th, partly stealing, partly breaking, throu hthe Russian lines. hemat Pac a this rein orcement. Some of the suceouring force were repulsed, and shut out; but they remained near, watching for the next sally. t took place exactly three days afterwards,- on the 8th of June. It was by night; and then, over a thousand Russian corpses, about a thousand more of the Turkish reinforcement entered Silistria. On the 13th, five days afterwards, a still more tremendous sortie was effected. Three Russian mines weres rung during the conflict: all their works were estroyed, and the carnage was enor- mous. At last an end was put to this desolating enterprise. A grand assault (through breaches rendered practicable by the artillery of General Schilders) was ordered for the 28th of June. The Russian soldiers had now been eleven months in the vinces of Turkey, and had never yet seen a Tur ’s back. They had known nothing but dis- aster, unvaried even by an episode of success; and, when ordered, on the 28th, to the breaches, stood doggedly in their ranks. Prince Gortsclmkotl", in alarm, ad'ourned the attack till the next day. He occupied is evening in the composition of a mani- festo or roclamation which deserves to live for ever. he rincipal argument in it was that, if the troops 0 his Majesty the Czar did not take Silistria on the next day, their rations should be s Next day came. It is very rare for neraloflicers tobe wounded in number. It is oolish, unmilitary, perhaps unmerciful, in them to expose themselves to personal danger, except where an army requires extraordinary encouragement. The Russians were thoroughly discouraged and demoralised. This fact is best shown by the num- ber of general oflicers killed the next day. Silistria “must be taken,” and when the storming columns on the 29th were mustered for the assault. the gloom in the countenances of the men gave a had an ry of the result. Repulsed twice from the d ences, they hesitated to obey, when ordered once more to advance. Upon this Count Orlotl‘, _;uu., General Schilders, General Gortschakofl} and 09' neral Luders placed themselves at the head of _ the men, cryin to these to follow; while Prince Paskiewitsc rode up to.the spot and addressed them partly with reproaches and partly with encour ments. The assault was unsuccessfully , and a murderous carnage took place.

had taken six field-pieces, and had slain three I

ck by a cannon ball, which carried off his thighs. General Luders had his jaw struck away; Count Orlofl‘ was killed; General Gortschakotf was

wer- severely, and Prince Paskiewitch desperately,

wounded. The Turks had not only repelled the

On the 26 assault. but had ursued the assailants up to their

me of the relievin column out- side had meanwhile alarmed and isordcred the Russians in the rear. This practically terminated the siege; for the garrison was again succoured during the confusion of the en agement; and the Russian works were so damag , that they would have all to be recommenced. Mussa Pacha, struck by a spent ball, died of the hurt in a few hours. Such was this memorable siege of Silistria, which might be compared with that of Saragossa for the bravery of the defence. We believe we shall not be ilty of exaggeration, in saying that, from first to ast, the Russians lost, under or near the walls of Silistria, 30,000 men.

ey now recrossed the river, so thoroughly demoralized, that, had there been a sufficient force to pursue them, they must have either laid down their arms, or been annihilated. They retreated from every point towards Fokshani and Birlat; evacuatin not only Lesser, but Greater Wallachia. Skender g and some of the other Turkish chiots who commanded in the south-west of the Princi- pallties, ursued the enemy at leisure beyond the Aluta. twas only in the Upper Dohrudscha that the Czar now held any portion of the further batik of the ube.

The Allies had meantime assembled, to the number of about50000, in Varna and the neigh- boufin camps; inn , as the campaign was finished ii nt e Danube, they began to meditate some at or expedition; and, after many councils of war, it was secretly decided to invade the Crimea, and to attack Sebasto l. Siege-trains were ordered from England an France, transports ‘were pared, and everything gradually pl'OVlded.fl ihseholera attacked both the lrmlel and the cow,