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THE CHARLOTTETOWN GUARDIAN PA("E NINE-

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force, and the enor- mous nrmieu mo- bilized at the mo- ment for war in- dicate the price de- 1nanded for the de- fence of national in- tegrity. More than heniy millions of inc world`s young

» ' if inauhuudnretraiued

'|1114 teal rvady for war. the \var tiiat al- ways lhreatnris, :uni tlie \vorld`s fleets indodc Citrtrfivn hundred vessels of v=r_\'ia',' size, ene.r;'y and potcntinlitics of éamrucuon.

Despite the variant views of experts,

the bottle ship is still the arbiter of the 11.11. More dreadnougliis than subma- rines are being built, and yet from twenty to thirty suhninrines can be olmiiiieil for the price of one ilreatlnouglit. Tlicse rn-:tt units ei’ naval warfare cost from .21li),(ltit),UYJ0 to $I5,000,0tl0 eacl\_ brittle ships mid brittle cruisers alike, and cruisers from $1,500,000 to $2,5Uti,0()0.

iircat Briiain`s present navy is the

grczitcst uggregutioii of sea strength the world has ever known, though relatively it is not so large as _when its standard of rea power was at lenat :z certain supe- riority to the navii.-.fi of any two other 11n- tlons combineil. When the present war broke out Geru1nny'11 nary was assumed to~hnve sixty per cent of the strength possessed by that of Great Iiritain- liiungli in this some llielors, noial1l_v that of rclntive gun puiver. were nverestimiit- ed. As proof of this here is nn official enumeration of the latest main hat- tcrics:-- “The heaviest guns mounted in thc Brit- ish navy are 13.5 inrh, firing n projectile of 1,250 pounds. '.l‘l1er<- are 124 of them in the fleets iii lioine \v\>tei's--~l00 in hot- ilc ships and 24 in l1ati le cruisers. The heaviest guns mounted in the Gcrinnn navy are 12-inch, firing n projectile of S59 pounds. ’l‘herc are 98 of them in agai- pletcd ships, all battle ships. 1110 b|1f'9l'~‘ cruisers having only 11-inch guns." The main dependence of the Bri&h empire is its sea power, and this exist/-1 for one main purpose-"command of the ses. in war." This once set'nred>-that' B- its particular enemy or enemies behil' sealed in lmmo ports or shorn of I9!

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power--the navy can easily protect Brit- 1

ish eom1ner1-e, keen oven the lines of con\nuinieat.ion between thc different at-1.-iioiis of the empire and prevent. in- tlfarioii nf 1-hitisli territory. ’ `

Cheat Britain's Sea Powx.

\`.'l.at, then, popularly ilcsmibed, ia tb

I.-'wi power limi Great Britain had at lb diop1.1dtlon when war was declared? Anil what generally are the character and number of the units assembled in the main fleets. the detached squadrons and dimloua? Iflrst of all in im- portance is tho battle ship, and this is the outgrowth of proved need. ln old days sea fighting was more or less of a liapliazurd effort, wlicn the llldlvidllll-l essay was often the determining factor. liut as order was evolved out of chaos in naval tactics, notably in the Dill-till wars with England, the practice Ilovlv withered strength of fillbtilw in I Wm' pact or close hauled arrlY1 the lllllll being ranged in line ahead-that is, each succeeding uhlp following in the Willie °f the next ahead, so ns to give free Dill! to guns carried mainly on tho bread- side. For purposes of mutual auPP°f¢ the ships were dilll°B°i] I' °l°“l7 t° one another, ahead and astern. ll W" compatible with individual freedom Of evolution and manoeuvre. This dlSP0ll' tion necessarily involved the exCl\10l°\1 from the line of battle of all Wllell below a certain overuse °\‘ 9f““‘l‘“'d_°f fighting ship. Hence the main fighting forces camo in time to be ¢0l11P°°¢\l_°°' tlraly of "ships, fit to lie in n llne,' or "¢.,|“| mtg," gg they were frequently called. Finally dials lllP¢\‘|°l‘ ¢'“ff""" known aa "line of battle ahlvlf" ships of tho line," and at last as “battle lhip," an they are known in this era. _ But .need for other and liilllfvl' 'mil' was no lou lPl>lf¢°*» “°‘“bl’ ff" 'lm collection and transmission of - nitclli-_ nemo. such cruiaihl *Uni* ¥"““' in liao and character from fur fx-irate: ti crnhsrl, daltroyrl and scouts, and finally included modern hottie cruises: ao hoaviiy annoti and armored u to he capable or nmol!" °\‘ °°°“""‘ 1|” gg ugly, immediate aupooriu ,f ‘. mi," Qhgagthavo 0%' 1inrh¢mot»ti|1¥uk\vi1¢\°°°*"°m M m owne a ni\\*l°-°"“°°°' '

`, ,;_.; rm wand is sun " " .. `-/'k"1~‘_|\$\- ruled and peace is ‘__ Q, `

. W ,` sought to he pre- 1 ‘

Mil) served by organized '_ 12-#-Y' 115'.; 1 "

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increasing in size and power-until we come to the battle fleet, the-eo;-,¢m. trnted. nucleus, the movinghng of Um whole organization,

Same authorities do not fsrvovr the

battle cruiser, but it has great-fig‘hh`|rg qualities. can push home 1 remnants. sauce, can hold up the lagardn in o, chase and thus bring on n desired gen. eral action, and, owing to its superior speed, it can be ready as a fast wing of the main fleet and furnish a ready weapon for concentration on an encmy's line where such zulditional weight might determine victory. The functions of other auxiliary ships are explained by their niunes, but it must he kept in mind “HIL other things being equal, the bigger

i the ship the better it is as an instru- 1

U"=`"U\lif¥ Of war. Moreover, for tucticull reasons it is not expedient to lengthen unduly the line of battle, and here again exists thc manifest advanisfge oi concen- trating offensive power, :ls fur as may be, in single units; ' ` -“iff all Predictions to the contrary,

war dill not come as :1. bolt out of the blue either to Gr(-:it Britain or to Gcimiuuy. With (lreat Britain this prepared; ‘ess is

1 attributable to the fact that the inspeo

tion at l'orts1uoirth by the King had luff the fleet in a state of satisfactory luov bilinatlon, both us to the active force! and to the reserves that had responded to the call. Ships were in fighting condie tion and crews were available to mail them all. Germany was also fortunate in that fully one»thirt| of her active per- sonnel--und th(-se next to petty office-rn generally included the best trained und most skilled men of ber crew-were still on shipboard, an their discliurge i.\it1¢ the reserve was not due until October next. Supplemeniing this practically all the German navy except one battle cruiser, two armored Cruisers and 1\ few cruisers, gunboats and destroyers, wa) concentrated in northern waters.

Location of Fleeta. I

.liter the inspection at Spitbead, the Iiaads of Portsmouth, the first fleet was concentrated at Portland, the sec- ond fleet was in its various home ports, and, thanks to the experimental mobiliaa. tion ot' inspection, the ships of tho third fleet were manned with surpris-5 ing smoothness and speed when the ascend call was made. Theiiirst fleet,;

that the-cruise-etAmphior\.h.as~been .sunk by an anehored'mine1axid~timt a recon-1 nuisance in~fo'ncs-to the~Bi;ht~oE'Heligo- land has been suco@hl, tho veil of

been lifted from that-day to this. lt is known that "the command of the seo” has been established in and around the North Sea, that a number of army corps have been speedily and safely trans- ported to the Continent, that coastwise traffic is proceeding in apparent security and that the highways and byways in sea and oversen are being policed in the interests of commerce. `

The German forces have on the other

hand taken up tho role of “a fleet in be- ing" and are Dl‘0'l1UNY Ulu! NWID Wilhelmshavmmnd Borkum, the m£ of the liilbe and Hellgulanrl, the battle ships, larQ¢cruisers and submarines at anchor inshore and the light cruisers and destroyers, aided by air machines, form- ing an extended screen of ivntchfulness. scouting aml' lookout. O

Now that the war is well on it may be

asked, What has the navy done? . Thin may perhaps be best answered in on extract from an English editorial on the subject :-"No one in England now ask! ‘What is the navy doing? ltl ¥l`¢l¢Uf triumph, worth more to ua than many naval battles, ir that it him MDI the German fleet into port, and. hlvlnii either captured or driven off the aea all German merchant abipr, has !lV¢D U! I tooling of aecurity so deep that some of us can hardly yet realise that we are nlmost within oarahot of the cannon. _g for our silent but all-powerful any we should not to-day have Ml abundance oi food at D\'l¢¢l "W0 hllh" una in peace time, and in many caaea actually lower than prices of ronllll! I docado or two ago. Fiaandal and eco- nomic conditions were pretty had I fi' an gp. Had our navy not been road! ng gtgsdy and strong we could not have un ygmg going. The government,

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secrecy ahrorudingxits movementsihas not~.

have worked wonders in a crisis which when it was sprung upon us terrified responsible men, who could see how the whole commercial machinery might col- lapse, but could not perceive how dis- aster could be averted."

Well, the navy seems to have averted it. Apparently there has never been any

secret about Germany's proposed naval strategy and campaign, in tba event of war with Great Britain. The Reichs Marina Amt, or War Staff of the Ger- man Admiralty, long ago, when its navy was in the earliest stages of its creation, declared that its plans were based on two assumptions; first, that Great Brit- ain-its probable adversary-could be defeated in detail, because its naval forcu would bo dispersed. or il’ concen- trated the result would bc Great Brit- nin'l loss of supremacy at sen. .

Gorman A1dminl’a Opinion. The naval correspondent of 1-. British

yourual comments on these nsisumptioas ul fol|oWl:- ` '-

"Tho firat hypothesis, then, is disper-

sion. Events have occurred otherwise. Instead of dispersion there ls concentra- tion. The second hypothesll is radically unsound. The defeat al the Rusaltin navy by the Japanese navy d_id not leave Japan in a uealmv ‘ ‘position lu the worid.' 9

“Upon the publii-u1...1 ot' the Navy act

of 190) Admiral von der Lloltz, a former Chief of the Gorman Admiral (War) Staff, wrote an explanatory eaaay on the aubjset. He observed that war with England was far from improbable, and that it wal the business of Germany to prepare for it. In the event of the Brit- ish forces bring concentrated in bo-me warm Admiral von der Gotta considered that 'numerical inferiority can ho com-

pensated by offieioncy, hy excellence of__

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material, by the iffy and discipline of the men. Careful preparation permit- ting rapid mobilization can insure a momentary superiority.'

"if the last sentence mean anything,

it menus n surprise attack. Wlien those words were written there was nothing either in international law or in the prac- tice of nations to forbid un attack boforo declaration of war. (ln 1907 the Hague conference decreed that n declaration of war must be mode before hosliitias; but the signature of Germany to that article did not prevent her from sowillg miner befcro declaration, the other du.)

arise. Navy assay Ffa. '

"Tho plan of a surprise attack has in

failed. \Ve do not yet know that it was even attempted; probably it was not. What little is known sues to show that the British navy was ready before the Gernran navy.

“Attack in detail or dispersal of forces

has failed; surprise has failed. Contrary to German expectation, the British navy is not only concentrated in bome waters, hut has cruisers to spare for the trade routes. Tho ‘momentary superiority' hus not been gained by Germany. What she has achieved is n pt-rniaucut inferiority. For in tho event of a general fleet action in which the British fleet was victorious, though weakened. this country would atill have u sufficient navy to hold her own, whereas Gemiuny xvould have nothing left.

"Her initial assumptions linviug broken

down, Gerintuy has had recourse to the strategy of attempting to reduce the British fleet by destroyer and submarine attacks. Her object is, of course, to sink by these means as many ships of the llno as ponible. But as that inten- tion ia known, it ir not likely that the

after completing tho~eonmma:b1c stores, - V f '*"°‘\°Q.§$" -' --_Tir ,`._ _v 1 __ an .1 1mi°e'P¢rusas..i2uo~h a, 1 ' ‘ . __

neg? ‘for-1buW1'.rnnwr and thmxcfnthsixgll "_ ”'° l p of G rea* `l_ German mine-l2;ver'haB"bee11~dwfr¢=yed."'\ _ _ ` ~ ’ A ~ E ._“ \ BPI QIDS HOfn€

rine and mining operations. But in these branches of warfare this eou is numerically superior. Until Germ slice.-veils in cle\'u-i1;,; the North Sen main fleet is inoperative. if she

force, to whose interest it is that s action should take place as soon as sible.”

ln concluding this summary of Br

mind that both the British and man navies are ln n highly efficient dltion und that the officers of each men of great intelligence, fine skill

to second place among the sea Pow is phenomenal, and should it go into tion with any of its sea enemies l

The insistencies of fair play dem tha: this should be said.

l'l‘llE.\‘G'l‘l{ OF THE BRITISH

'rum Granular( Fl.ri1s:'l‘s. BRITISH FLEET.

Eifective strength of navy at

moment when war was declaredz- Super-flreudnougbt battle ships.. 10

Super-dreadnuuglit battle cruisers 3

10 5

Dreadnought battle ships. .. . Dreadnought battle cruisers. .

Total drrndnoughh.. . . . . . . . . . (Three more super-dreadnoughts

are near completion, and are due to commission this year.)

Predreadnoughta-

Powerful ships all completed be-

mdoavor will aaonod. Again, pre|um~,

_mms moo .,..,.,,1o

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German Navy Efficient. `

ably it is her intention graduaiiy to clear the _\'ort’h Sen by destroyer and subma-

all

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any 1.1-r

suc-

ceeded, her main fleet would be forced to fake action against a greatly superior

uch

PW'

iish

1 naval strength it will be well to keep in

‘er-

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are and

most useful experience. The growth of the German navy, its rise from nothing

ers, ac- t is

certain to give a good account of itself.

and

AND

the

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completed between 1895 and 1904 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . 30 Total pre-dreadnoughts .. .. . .. -

.A O

Total battle ships..-......-.. (SS

Armored cruisers- l 'I '

Big, heavily armcrl ships conn- pleted between 1005 and 190-`l.. U '_

“County class," slower and loss

powerful, completed between 19o3r1n1i.1oo5...............15 Q

Drake and Crcssy class, bigger _

and better, but slightly older D. ships eoinplctcd between 1901 QQ

‘ and 1i)03...........-......... 10 si

Total armored croisers......¢

Cruisers- "J *_* Big protected cruisers, Diudel ,

class, 21 knots, 0-inch guns .,,f (1859-19(2) . . . . . .. . . . . . . . ._ . 0 `

Older and smaller (1880-1802).. 9

-- li'

Fnst light cruisers--

Arethusa class, .'l,a'>00 tons. .'10

knots, burning eil. completed this ycnr. _ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .

"Town einen," 71.400 1114.500 tons,

25 knots (li)lU~l!il-ll, .. .. .. . . .

25-knot ships, about 300 tons

tioosuoory.................

15 - 38

Other <~ln.=se.=-

20-knot aliips. 22,100 to 5,400 tons tissio-1000) ....... ..

1U~knot ships, -'».Ut`lU tous (lSil.'1»

189151 . . . . . . . . . . .. . _ . . . . . .. .

Older ships, 2,.'»t_\0 io 4,3110 tons,

K5 to 19.5 knots (lSi\0-1393)..

9 -an

,_ _.Total protected cruisers. ..._

34.

‘Older and less powerful ships " .

\. ~\

Da-strl'-_vei's. _ '36 to 2515 knots _

(1-111:: 1014> . . . . . . . . . . ._ . M

'.l`\\1'p.~l-.1 l\r\:it.~1, '_’U io 20 ki.i0*.S

iisxz-irwm '.109 S1i‘»n1;1ri1u-.-. from l.(00 to 200 ,

:.~1:.:, spot-11 from '_‘ii to 1l.5 ' "fl ltnoisl suri.`nci~, l'_! i-1 7 knots 1»:11hn:< r1:1~d (]"1)-E-i913). .. . .

Mine layers .................- liepnir ships . . . . . ... l

Not all of these ships are available lol

service in lioniu waters, init, whether il }Curope or ui the oilu-r side of the world, all are tnkinz part in thc struggle fog Lhe command of the sen. _

75 1

GEii.\iA_\' FL|1:lr1'. ' ff

Super-drr'adnon|:i\bs,(Il building) - Noi Dreadnought l1atile~ships. . _ . 13 - Dreadnought Lnttlc cruisers.. 5 lf,

”‘ '/'_ ut

(Two other battle ships due » to coiiimissinn this year are __j -°~i?‘ _, probably ready.) 1, -`-:lf 1'rc-dn-ndnought battle ships ui 11s:11-wus) - id

(lid 1-11.-ist defence battle ship: _ 11ss11-isfm . . . . . . . . . . . ... - ‘ ,I1 A1-1n111~~1 i~r11is.»n (11417-11109), ,?,, .s_:1o1'1 to 1.5500 tons, 24.5 to 1'--I " lounon................_. - ' I

liig protected cruisers (1892-

lilltli 6,000 tons, 19 knots . . U

2-l lsiiot criiisrrs (1904-1913),

3,000 to 5000 lions .........

Small cruisers, 21 knots (1003-

mio) . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . .. . . _ ' D1-stroyers LISSU-1913), 34 to 1.

‘_‘G knots . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . - 152

Torpedo~»bonts M387-1898), 26

to'!.2lruot.s.............. - Q

Submarines about equal tn ' `

Britishln aiuaandiqeed... . 80 tal()

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lan 11

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