Jack is frightened because Jill is dangerous, Thursday,- March 26, 1981, page 10

By Hugh Johnston

SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks) have been proceeding since 1969. The first SALT Treaty was an attempt to limit Anti- Ballistic Missiles, for these ABM's could stimulate production of more missiles to counter them. Now, after six years of negotiating, a new SALT 11 treaty has been signed. It was drawn up with the understanding that an uncontrolled arms race would endanger the security of both the U.S. and the Soviet Union. The Reagan administration has put aside SALT 11. Without

this treaty of arms limitation

we could find ourselves in a new arms race, with mountino

The SALT u Treaty

this limit there will be a sublimit of 1320 on all

MIRV 'ed (multiple independent

targetable warheads) ICBM's, MIRV'ed SLBM's, .and heavy bombers with cruise missile capability. Within the 1320 limit there is a sublimit of 1200 on all MIRV'ed ICBM's and MIRV'ed SLBM's. Finally, within this sublimit there will be a further sublimit of 820 on all MIRV'ed ICBM's. The limits on MIRV'ed are crucial because these missiles increase the chances of hitting multiple

targets with a munmmmn of delivery vehicles » These

limits will have the effect of forcing the Sov1ets to

dismantle or destroy 320

good deal. -

The US must not trust the Soviet Union to uphold SALT talks on their own. ’ The US “has the capability to monitor the number of strategic nuclear delivery devices using such high a

- tedinology methods as sate- lite photography and advanced radar wstems.

'Ihere is a provision in the treaty against conceal- ment of weaponry, which is beneficial because it

‘ eliminates imperfect knowledge (both sides know what the other has). Developments in the reconnaissance field are strong disincentives against breaking this clause, for such concealed armaments can be easily found. 'Ihus,/ with the ability to admin-

on the neutron bomb by SALT'll? In fact, the neutron bomb was never even discussed at SALT 11. This weapon is considered tactical not strategic, for its purpose is to be used in Europe to counter Soviet land forces. There are no provisions in / SALT 11 about the neutron bomb, and the government ' may build it at will.

The cruise missle, ' however, was, a topic dis- cussed at SALT. The SALT ll treaty leaves the cruise missile option open and. gives provision for its development during Protocol. After protocol there will not be any restrictions on the cruise missile.

1T5 8K5

11 KILLS H (LL 1005 .

ister and police the treaty,

BUT mates A ‘ the United States need not fear any loss in security. M4057 AS For various reasons the Emwml“ SALT ll accord will improve

American security. First off, it will place equal numerical limitations on ‘ Overall US and Soviet strategic forces Also

it will— hold the develop- ment of Soviet strategic forces to levels far be- low what they would be in ' the absence of the treaty. SALT 11 contains provi- sions ensuring that the Soviets uphold their end of the agreement. It will also allow the UN tohave perfect knowledge of Soviet

tension and the distinct possibility of nuclear war. At the present time both the US and the USSR are equal in strategic nuclear forces. In sate categories the US is superior; in other the USSR is. The US at the present time has almost

twice the number of strategic

nuclear warheads than the Soviets have. They have more heavy bombers with greater readiness capability, and have more submarine launched ballistic missiles (ICBM's) . They have superior air defences and

a distinct advantage in SLBM's. These factors

tend to cancell each other out, leaving the two super- powers comparatively equal in strategic nuclear arms supply.

SALT 11 is a treaty that lasts until 1985, with a protocol ‘( a rough draft. period in the treaty) that expires in 1981. Under this agreement each country will be limited to a maximum of 2250 delivery systems (that is, all heavy bombers, ICBM's and “'T’M's) . Under

a

strategic systems, while the US would not have to alter any of theirs.

In light of the restrictions, and within the present levels of military technology, it appears that the stationary Minuteman missiles would be extremely vulnerable. This is not so. Before staging any attack on the Minutemen, the Soviets would have to examine the consequences ' of such an attack. Because of advanced warning systems, the US would have launched their Minutemen long before the Soviet missiles care crashing down on empty ‘ Minutemen silos. The Soviets would then have to be prepared for a counter- strike force from the US in the form of SLBM's and cruise milliles launched from heavy bombers. Since a direct attack on the Minutrnan missile is not - strategically feasible, the fact than the Minuteman is stationary does not make them vulnerable or‘ in— efficient as a weapon.

Another common question is "What limits are put

A and not impinging on future

strategic armaments. These points sum up to make ,a treaty that increases Arterican securitv.-

Without SALT 11 there could be an all-out, uni controlled arms race. With no constraints on the -two ' ' countries, they would be free to develop any number of new strategic systems.- The monetary cost of such an arms race would be a detriment to the US economy. It is true that there would needed to deploy these be increased employment in systems, and afterwards the defense sector. there would be no restrictions There will be. a trendto on mobile ICBM's. Therefore, a decreased standard of SALT 11 does not restrict living due to the in- the use of the MX missile duced scarcity of consumer system. _ ~ goods. Such is the case

The Minutemen, cruise, , in the USSR now. with y and MX missile systems, scarce consumer goods along with the neutron bomb, caused by intense cap- , are vital advanced tech- ital production. An arms nology strategic weapons - race over an extended per-t that have not been side— iod of time would indubit— lined by SALT 11. In ably harm the economy by keeping strategic wea— decreasing social welfare, pons at present levels due to decreased emphasis on consumer good production.

An extended arms race .\ ‘ could :;reate enough des-

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the Option of cruise missiles.

The MX missile system, a highly debated issue in the United States, is not prohibited by SALT 11. Although Protocol pro- hibits the development or testing of mobile ICBM's, it does not put any restric- tions on the development of these systems. The dur— ation would be much shorter

than the time period

development, SALT 11 mea- sures up, from the US point of View, as a pretty